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News Update 04/12/2004 1.http://www.flonnet.com/fl2108/stories/20040423007301000.htm Rising aspirations PURNIMA S TRIPATHI The advent of coalition politics at the Centre has enabled regional parties to move centre stage from the peripheries of the political system. Some of them have traditionally represented regional aspirations, s ome are shrunken forms of erstwhile national parties, and some others bank on caste or communal sentiments. On the eve of Elections 2004, a look at their records and prospects. Growth beyond a caste base THE one development that changed the political discourse in the country and threw up caste-based outfits in the process was the unleashing of the Mandal Commission Report giving 27 per cent reservation to the Other Backward Classes (OBCs) by former Prime Minister V.P. Singh in 1990. Its implementation, it can justifiably be said, changed the shape of the polity from a two-party system to a multi-dimensional structure in which every caste and sub-caste pushed and shoved for its own share of the political space. This led to the emergence of caste-specific parties. In Uttar Pradesh, the Samajwadi Party (S.P.), viewed as "Yadav- centric" when it was formed in October 1992, along with the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), stood politics in the State on its head, thereby reversing in the process the earlier brahminical order promoted by the Congress culture. The focus shifted from the traditional hierarchy to one based on numerical strength. Share in power as per numerical strength became the norm. The fact that the S.P., which fought its first Lok Sabha elections in 1996, could thwart the Congress(I) from coming to power in 1999 speaks for the changed political dynamics of the country. The emergence of regional parties brought about this change and these parties and their leaders have increasingly dominated the country's politics since then. V.P. Singh saw nothing wrong in this and said the polity only came to "reflect society in actuality". According to him, the pre-Mandal political system was based on the domination by upper-caste Hindus of OBCs and all that he did was to end that. "Once the OBCs realised the power of their vote, the dynamics changed. But the idea was not to stop at this but to bring about change in society as well," he said, adding that the agenda is still incomplete. "Politics can have two purposes: power and change. Right now everyone is bothered only about power. A time will come when there will be somebody who will bring about change," he says. Interestingly, the rise of the S.P. is inversely proportional to the fall of the Congress(I) in Uttar Pradesh. In the 1996 Lok Sabha elections, the S.P. captured 20.83 per cent of the vote, which was wholly at the cost of the Congress(I). The Congress(I) could manage only 8.14 per cent of the vote and five seats. This was the same number of seats it bagged in 1991, but with a vote share of 18.3 per cent. Its performance remained equally dismal in the 1996 and 2002 Assembly elections, with a vote share of 8.35 per cent and 8.96 per cent respectively, while that of S.P. got 21.80 per cent and 25.37 per cent respectively. In the 1999 Lok Sabha elections, the S.P. secured 24.86 per cent of the vote. The BSP got 22.08 per the BJP 27.64 per cent and the Congress(I) 14.72 per cent. One reason for this voting pattern was that OBC voters moved to the S.P. and the BJP from the Congress(I) and Dalits went to the BSP. Even the minorities deserted the Congress (I). Upper-caste Hindus had already shifted base to the BJP. This left the Congress(I) with no vote base. Looking at the caste-based support, the minorities too started voting tactically and that was one of the reasons for the success of the S.P. and the BSP. While the S.P. commanded the support of the numerically strong Yadavs, the BSP had the consolidated support of Dalits. The same trend has continued since then, with each caste group voting along expected lines. But do these parties, which enjoy a dominant role in politics, have a national vision at all? For the record, while the BSP's national vision is sarvjan ka hit (welfare of all), the S.P. dreams of an India "with the N-bomb so that it has the strategic balance in its favour" and a "global government and a world without boundaries", says the S.P. president and Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Mulayam Singh Yadav. It was a measure of its increasing political importance that with its tally of 16 seats in 1996, the S.P. got to occupy crucial ministerial portfolios such as Defence and Telecommunications in the United Front government. But no matter how much Mulayam Singh speaks of his "socialist world view", his imprint on national politics has remained as that of the man who foiled Congress(I) president Sonia Gandhi's attempt to become Prime Minister in 1999. "The Samajwadi Party is the largest party from the State which sends the largest number of MPs. Its political intervention cannot be ignored. But it is difficult to say whether it has left any imprint on national politics yet," said Communist Party of India (Marxist) general secretary Harkishan Singh Surjeet. According to Surjeet, the S.P.'s activities have remained confined to the State so far. But he concedes that every party playing a role at the national level has to "operate within a certain framework, which nobody can break". Political observers, however, agree that Mulayam Singh redefined the concept of secularism by his vigorous protection of the Babri Masjid in 1990 even at the risk of earning the wrath of the majority community. In fact, it was his active espousal of secularism, as opposed to the Congress(I)'s passive approach that allowed the unlocking of the Babri Masjid and the performance of shilanyas, which resulted in Muslims shifting loyalty to the S.P. At the State level, the S.P. has remained a major player since the 1993 Assembly elections, but the fact that it could rule only briefly, from 1993 to 1995, that too together with the BSP, has meant that the S.P. has still to make its presence felt. Numerically, the S.P. has arrived, but it still has to go a long way to establish itself as a party espousing a particular ideology, championing the cause of the State taking advantage of its vantage position at the national level. As far as the BSP is concerned, it has been so fickle-minded about its alliances that its role as an interventionary power at the national level has remained limited. The party came into prominence in 1993 when it joined hands with the S.P. But the two fell out in 1995. The BSP joined hands with the BJP in 1995 but this arrangement did not last even for a year. In the 1996 Lok Sabha and Assembly elections the BSP joined hands with the Congress(I). It improved its vote share from 8.7 per cent and no seats in the 1991 elections to 20.40 per cent with six seats in 1996. But because its tally remained the same in the Assembly (67) and it could not form the government, this alliance broke. The BSP then joined hands with the BJP yet again in the by-now infamous "six-monthly rotational chief ministership" arrangement. Even this did not last long. After the 2002 Assembly elections, the party joined hands yet again with the BJP, but the government fell again after a year. The BSP's guiding principle so far has been to pursue the policy that takes it to power somehow or the other. This, however, has ensured that the party is reduced to just a pressure group at the national level. 2. http://www.flonnet.com/fl2108/stories/20040423000106500.htm Bamboo and a bitter struggle ASHA KRISHNAKUMAR Shrinking markets, cheaper substitutes for bamboo, and government policies of the past few decades have driven traditional bamboo- weavers of Kerala to poverty and deprivation. BAMBOO is nature's steel. But traditional bamboo workers are now close to breaking. The onslaught of substitute materials and government policies of the past decades, among other things, have driven bamboo weavers to poverty and starvation. For hundreds of years, Dalit and Adivasi communities (Parayas, Pulayas, Kuravas, Mavilas and Vetuvas) of Kerala have transformed bamboo reeds (Ochlandra travancorica and O.scriptoria) into a variety of products with functional and ornamental uses. Their creativity and ability to adapt to changing demands saw the weavers making varieties of baskets and mats, winnowers, window screens, bags and what not. Whole families and in many areas even entire villages were involved in the vocation of bamboo-weaving. In the 1970s, there were 3.5 lakh traditional bamboo workers, earning at least 50 per cent more than farm labourers. In fact, the economic advantage of bamboo-weaving attracted people from other communities, such as Ezhavas, to this profession. By the 1960s, it became a lucrative business with the weavers selling bamboo products on a large scale to the farm and fisheries sectors. Today, traditional bamboo-weaving in Kerala is in a pitiable state with falling incomes, shrinking markets and no access to raw materials. How did this happen? The answer seems to lie largely in the structure of the enterprise, its characteristics and the socio- economic conditions of the workers. Traditional bamboo-weaving is characterised by low capital and simple production techniques. It requires such simple tools as a billhook and a knife, which cost less than Rs.100. It is a labour-intensive, household-based rural enterprise, run mostly by women. While diverse products are made, the real constraint is that historically this has been the occupation of people belonging to the lower end of the socio-economic scale who have limited access to markets, raw materials, finance and technology, and hence poor managerial, entrepreneurial and organisational skills. The highly scattered nature of the enterprise, the disaggregated production structure, and the lack of assistance from support agencies provided the ideal climate for exploitation by intermediaries. In the 1900s, mats and baskets were made for agricultural uses from reed collected from forests by people belonging to the Scheduled Castes (S.C.s), such as Sambavas and Parayas, mainly as a feudal obligation to their masters. The mats and baskets not used on the landlord's farms were bartered within the village. At that time, it was largely a part-time activity. The situation began to change in the 1930s, when the British started to use the cheap and strong bamboo mats for tents on the warfront. The hostilities in Burma (Myanmar) gave rise to a phenomenal demand for bamboo mats. Mat-weaving became a full-time vocation. Seeing an opportunity, several people, largely from the forward communities, entered the lucrative business as weavers or as middlemen and traders. They would supply reeds to the weavers and purchase the finished products. Thus, a new class of merchant-wholesalers willing to make large investments was drawn into the business. The enterprise was concentrated in the Angamaly-Kaladi area of Ernakulam district and in the Nedumangad-Aryanad area of Thiruvananthapuram district because of the easy availability of raw material from the forests nearby and the presence of a well-developed transport system. But after the war, the demand for mats fell and those who had invested in the enterprise began to look for newer markets. Sugar mills in Maharashtra emerged as the new buyers. The mats were used as dunnage (wedge between material) in the sugar factories and for the construction of temporary sheds to store sugarcane. But mat prices began to decline with over-supply. The merchants passed on the burden of falling prices to the weavers. However, when the market became buoyant and mat prices improved, they did not pass on the benefits to the weavers. In the meantime, basket-weaving picked up mainly to cater to the agricultural sector - to store and transport grain, vegetables, copra, pepper and so on. This happened primarily because the seasonal nature of agricultural employment enabled the landless S.C. labourers to take to weaving during off-season. Most types of baskets were produced only seasonally. For example, the sturdy vallom or chendakooda were in great demand during the harvest season (between December and March). The seasonality of demand led to high fluctuations in product prices. Slowly, there emerged a demand from neighbouring States as the bamboo baskets were found to be cheap and strong and useful to transport perishable and non-perishable produce. This attracted more intermediaries and soon there was a chain of agents between the primary producers and the final users. Each area began to be controlled by a set of agents, who also kept the weavers under their control, providing them with a cash advance. The largely illiterate basket weavers were exploited mercilessly; they put in 12-15 hours of work a day but their economic conditions declined despite the sharp increase in basket sales. Slowly, the weavers got segmented by the markets to which they catered, such as agriculture, fisheries, the cashew industry and homes. Their fortunes became tied to the sector to which they supplied. THE growing bamboo enterprise led the State government to set up a committee in 1959 to study its status. The committee pointed to the exploitation of weavers by intermediaries and suggested the setting up of a corporation to coordinate the various activities of bamboo- weaving, particularly marketing. The Kerala State Bamboo Corporation was established in 1971 (first under the Ministry of Handicrafts and later as an independent body) to free the weavers from middlemen and to help them market their products. In 1977, it took over the right to collect bamboo from the forests and distribute reeds to traditional weavers and other bona fide consumers. The corporation did everything for mat weavers. It supplied reeds at a subsidised rates (on a credit basis), and bought the mats from them for marketing, primarily to the Central Warehousing Corporation and large sugar mills. The corporation's more than 100 reed-distribution and mat collection centres, mostly located in the central and southern Kerala, cover over 15,000 mat-weaving families, 2,500 reed-cutters and employ over 1,000 loaders. Workers associated with the corporation came to be known as "registered weavers". However, the traditional weavers who mainly made baskets and comprised largely the Sambava and Paraya communities were left out of the corporation's purview. Left to fend for themselves, they became more vulnerable to exploitation. Where the corporation did not function (particularly in the areas dominated by traditional weavers), cooperatives were encouraged to be set up with share capital contributed by individuals and institutions and further funded by loans, grants and deposits from government and other institutions. Most cooperatives failed for several reasons, mainly inefficient management and pressure from traders, who were largely hand in glove with the middlemen. Many of the cooperatives became defunct. The traditional weavers suffered a further blow with the Forest Department denying them access to the jungles to collect reeds. Only weavers issued passes by the Forest Department on payment of a "seigniorage" rate could collect reeds. The pass, which costs Rs.12 - over 20 per cent of the market price of reed - allows weavers to collect 20-25 reeds (one headload). Getting the pass, generally issued for a day, is a cumbersome process. It can take two or three days to collect a pass from the Forest Department office, often located many kilometres away from the weaver colonies. Thus, given the high cost of the pass and the difficulty to obtain it, many weavers either buy reeds from middlemen or collect them from the forests without a pass. Although collecting bamboo from the forest without a pass is an offence, officials generally seem to let the weavers off realising their deplorable situation. This has given rise to a new class of sub-traders who arrange "a kutta pass" (basket pass) for a price. The reed-cutters usually walk four or five kilometres into the forest to collect reeds. Culms (grass or sedge stem) are selectively cut from trees that are about one-to-two years old. They are then cut into pieces 10-12 feet long and bundled into headloads of 15-25 pieces each. The whole process takes about 10 hours. The cutters either sell the reeds to the weavers or keep them for their own use. The strong middlemen-wholesaler-retailer link usually dissuades the weavers from selling in the market as they are offered very low prices for their products - generally 20-30 per cent lower than the prices they would get from the middlemen. Thus, willy-nilly, the traditional weavers are bound to the middlemen. Studies show that if weaving is to be as remunerative as other types of casual labour, middlemen would need to increase the prices of the products by at least 480 per cent. Ironically, though the Bamboo Corporation was set up to save traditional weavers from the clutches of middlemen, the weavers seem to have slid down the economic ladder even further. The situation turned really bad for traditional weavers after the early 1990s with the introduction of products made of plastics, synthetic fibres and so on, which cut deeply into the market for bamboo products. Fishermen, farmers and households moved to the substitutes in a big way, as they are cheaper, more durable and easy to maintain. To make matters worse, the government in the mid-1990s leased large bamboo tracts to Hindustan Newsprint Limited at a subsidised price - while a tonne of bamboo reeds is allegedly priced at Rs.500-800 for the industry, it is about Rs.2,000 in the open market for the traditional weavers. Apart from depriving the traditional weavers of their raw material, this also led to the depletion of bamboo forests. For, while the weavers would cut only two-year-old bamboo culms, it is alleged (by the Bamboo Corporation) that the newsprint industry cut culms that were hardly two-three months old. Unable to cope, many weaver families started to supplement their income by taking up casual work. Many bamboo weavers, in their prime, migrated (largely seasonally) to nearby towns to work at construction sites and so on. The traders, however, filled their slot by getting migrant labour families (whose primary occupation is bamboo-weaving) from Tamil Nadu (mostly from areas adjoining Madurai district) by advancing them money. As good as bonded labour, most migrants work for 12-15 hours a day for low wages. The marginalisation of the Kerala bamboo weaver was complete. The Kerala Bamboo Workers Union, set up in 2000 to end the marginalisation of traditional bamboo workers, is sceptical about their inclusion in the National Bamboo Mission, a programme launched by the Union government in 2003 (see separate story). Says union president Raghu Eraviperur: "We have been cheated by the corporation, which we thought would help us revive our livelihood systems. Instead, it divided us by supporting only a small section of bamboo workers who make mats. Further, it aggravated our condition by cutting off our access to raw material." Says union vice-president Sasi Janakala: "As we are spread across the State and are tied up with our own local issues depending on which sector - agriculture, fishing, cashew industry and so on - we cater to, for long we had not been able to organise ourselves. But now, we have forged an alliance to bring to the fore common issues, which are deep-rooted, complex and widespread." Explains union secretary A.A. Chandran: "Our issues are complex because we are not only geographically spread, but also divided on political and caste bases." But now, left resourceless and marketless by the corporation, the weavers are anxious that they are not kept out of the Bamboo Mission as well. In a proactive measure, they have come out with recommendations, which include allowing access to raw material, a training programme for weavers to make value-added and marketable products, provision of land to cultivate bamboo, festival rebates to cooperative societies and training and research centres to upgrade skills. Says Raghu: "We hope the Bamboo Mission will address the problems of traditional weavers before it is too late." This report was prepared after a visit to the districts of Thiruvananthapuram, Kollam, Alappuzha, Ernakulam and Thrissur. 3. http://www.hindu.com/2004/04/11/stories/2004041101791800.htm The bikhu effect The Buddhist clergy feels it must rise to the rescue of the country whenever the rulers fail in their duty of 'defending' the faith, says Nirupama Subramanian. OF ALL the stories in the Mahavamsa, a sixth century chronicle about Sri Lanka, the most beloved of Sinhala-Buddhists is that of King Duttugemunu who slew a rival monarch in the island's north after a bloody campaign and established his writ over a united Lanka. His aim was to "bring glory to the (Buddhist) doctrine." This legend and the belief, also arising from the Mahavamsa, that Sri Lanka was Buddha's chosen land, "the place where his doctrine should shine," are at the heart of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism. It fuses faith with country, demanding of present-day rulers a Duttugemunu- like commitment to protect one for the other. When the rulers — "defenders of the faith" — are seen as failing in this duty, the Buddhist clergy must rise to the rescue. So say the monks who contested the recent parliamentary elections in Sri Lanka, winning nine seats in the new Parliament as members of the Jathika Hela Urumaya, or Sinhala Heritage. "How can I sit and meditate when my house is on fire," Omalpe Sobitha, a senior monk and member of the JHU, asked while speaking to The Hindu a few days before the election. The JHU came together in the weeks just prior to the election. The driving force behind it was the perception that the United National Front Government of Ranil Wickremesinghe had endangered the territorial integrity of the country — and therefore the future of Buddhism itself — by granting too many concessions to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in the peace process. This is not the first time that monks are playing a role in Sri Lanka's politics. Since a contingent of bikhus (Buddhist monks) marched with Duttugemunu's army at his request to provide "blessing and protection", and later consoled him as he wept at the bloodshed, telling him he had to do it for Buddhism, the clergy has always seen itself as providing guidance to the country's rulers. The monks view this role not as contradictory, but entirely in keeping with their status as custodians of the faith. But this is the first time bikhus have sought to influence the affairs of the country in such a direct manner. Thilak Karunaratne, the founder of the party who is not a monk himself and until three years ago was a member of the Wickremesinghe-led United National Party (UNP), said the bikhus believed entering Parliament was now the only way to influence a government that had stopped listening to them. "The rulers consult them but just to satisfy them and keep them happy, not for anything constructive. There is no point in giving advice that is not heeded. So the clergy thought it is time to grab the bull by the horns," Mr. Karunaratne told The Hindu before the elections. But even a less conciliatory approach to the LTTE — such as the one the new Freedom Alliance (F.A.) Government might be expected to adopt — that would nevertheless plan for federalism and substantial devolution to the North-East Tamils as part of an eventual political settlement would be unacceptable to the JHU. It militates against the Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist logic of faith and country as co- terminus. Monks led the street protests against a draft new Constitution with devolution proposals that President Chandrika Kumaratunga presented in Parliament in 2000, one of the reasons the document had to be pulled. They even opposed the limited devolution the Sri Lankan Government implemented in 1987 after the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. While the peace process with the LTTE is an immediate reason, the JHU's impressive performance speaks of a much deeper crisis of confidence within the Sinhala-Buddhist community. This is the crisis that gave rise to innumerable conspiracy theories about the sudden death from a heart attack of a popular Sri Lankan monk while on a tour abroad last year, and led to a rash of attacks on churches in the country. And it is directly linked to the growing participation and importance of the two main minorities in Sri Lanka — Tamil and Muslim — in mainstream democratic politics. Tamil and Muslim parties have consistently played a role in government formation after Sri Lanka adopted the proportional representation system of elections through a new Constitution in 1978. It has created the impression that the Sinhalese do not form governments any more and that traditional parties — the UNP and also Ms. Kumaratunga's Sri Lanka Freedom Party — can no longer represent the best interests of the Sinhala-Buddhists. This is why the F.A. could not farm a larger share of the protest vote against the UNP, losing it to the JHU. By joining hands with the SLFP in the F.A. coalition, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, which in earlier elections benefited from the hardline Sinhala-Buddhist vote, also stood disqualified from such support this time. The JHU's declared agenda is to "cleanse" Parliament and establish a dharmarajya, or a state based on the teachings of Buddha, in which minority parties of Tamils and Muslims will not dictate terms to the government. The nine monks in Parliament have said they will provide conditional support to the next government. Their influence will be determined on how much the new government, without a majority of its own, has to depend upon them for support. It will also be determined by the extent of support for the JHU from the rest of the 35,000-strong clergy. Sri Lanka's monks are politically divided along party lines. Many important priests did not support the decision of the JHU monks to contest the elections. But without doubt, the impact of the JHU is bound to be felt in the long term, particularly when the main parties — the UNP, SLFP and JVP — begin the task of regaining lost ground among the Sinhala- Buddhists. |