Dr. Ambedkar with the Simon Commission
PART
II
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Contents
PART II
SECTION
IV—Provincial Autonomy—
Chapter I—Provincial Government in relation to the Government of India.
Chapter 2—Provincial Government in
relation to the Crown.
SECTION VI—Summary of
Recommendations
SECTION IV
CHAPTER
I
PROVINCIAL
GOVERNMENT IN RELATION TO
THE
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
109.
It is evident that the responsibility of the Executive would be of very little consequence
if the Provincial Executive instead of being subordinate to the Provincial Legislature is
subordinate to any other body outside the Province or if the Provincial Legislature
instead of being supreme within its field is made subject to some other authority in the
matter of the exercise of its powers. In other words responsible government must also be autonomous government.
To render Provincial Government autonomous it is necessary to demarcate clearly the
spheres of operation of the Provincial and Central Governments.
110.
Prior to 1919 a Provincial Government was required under Section 45 of the Government of
India Act, 1915, to obey the orders of the Governor-General in Council, and keep him
constantly and diligently informed of its proceedings and of all matters which ought, in
its opinion, to be reported to him, or as to which he requires information, and is under
his superintendence, direction and control in all matters relating to the government of
its province. This meant that the Provincial Governments had no acknowledged authority of
their own in any of the matters which they administered;
that whatever powers they exercised were powers which were delegated to them by the
Central Government in the same way as a principal delegates his authority to his agent. By
the Act of 1919 this relation of the Provincial to the Central Government was made subject
to its provisions and rules made thereunder. Section 45(1)(b)
of the Act of 1919 provided "for the devolution of authority in respect of provincial
subjects lo local governments, and for the allocation of
revenues or other moneys to those governments,"
while Section 45 (3) laid down
that " the powers of superintendence, direction, and
control local governments vested in the Governor-General in Council under this Act shall,
in relation to transferred subjects, be exercised only for such purposes as may be
specified in rules made under this Act, but the Governor-General in Council shall be the
sole judge as to whether the purpose of the exercise of such powers in any particular case
comes within the purposes so specified." The Act of 1919 therefore made two changes : (1) It gave the provinces authority of their own as
distinguished from authority derived as agents of the Government of India. (2) It relieved
them of their former obligation to obey the Government of
India in regard to those subjects which were transferred to the control of the Ministers
but retained its powers of supervision. From this it is clear that there may be a complete
transfer of all the subjects to the control of the Ministers;
but transfer will always be subject to the powers of supervision of the Government of
India involving interference in the freedom of action by the Provincial Government. The
question is whether these powers of supervision are necessary and if so whether any other
form of relationship between the Provincial and Central Governments
can be contemplated in which these powers will be so placed as not to conflict with the
autonomy of the Province.
111.
By the Act of 1919 and the Rules made thereunder the Provincial subjects are marked off
from Central subjects. Notwithstanding this the Provincial Legislature have not been given
freedom of action or finality of action in legislating upon
Provincial subjects. The powers of Provincial Legislature
are restricted in two different ways. In certain matters defined in Section 80A it cannot without the previous sanction of the
Governor-General make or take into consideration any law although it might pertain to a
matter lying within the Provincial field. In certain other
matters Provincial Legislature may pass a law but if the law happens to fall within the
purview of Section 81A and rules made thereunder its action becomes subject to the veto of
the Governor-General. The combined effect of these two restrictions on Provincial autonomy
can be easily understood. The question is whether any other system of relationship between
the Provincial and Central Governments can be contemplated in which the powers of the
Central Government will not conflict with the autonomy of the Province.
112.
The provision regarding supervision by the Central Government over Provincial Government
in the matter of administration of Provincial subjects and of previous sanction and
subsequent veto by the Central Government of Provincial legislation regarding Provincial
subjects is a feature which is not to be found in the constitution of any other country in
which the functions of government are divided between two body politics. Central and Provincial, such as Canada, Australia and the
United States. The provisions regarding previous sanction have found their way in the
Indian constitution as a result of two erroneous suppositions. One is that it is not
possible to demarcate functions exclusively. That assumption does not seem to be well
founded. For in Canada the constitution does divide the functions into two distinct
classes (1) those which exclusively belong to the Central Government and (2) those which
exclusively belong to the Provincial Government making each government absolutely autonomous in the sphere which is allotted to it. The second
assumption is that in dealing with those functions which cannot be said to be exclusively
Provincial the only way open is to make their exercise subject to previous sanction and
subsequent veto by the Central Government. This again seems to me to be an erroneous
assumption. The constitution of Australia and the United
States are examples where the constitutions have not divided the functions into two clear
cut exclusive divisions as is done in Canada. By the scheme of division of powers and
functions adopted by the Australian constitution there are certain matters over which the
Central Government has exclusive powers. In certain other matters the powers of the
Central Government are concurrent with those of the State
Governments. But the matters of concurrent legislation are divided into two categories (1)
in which the power of the Commonwealth Parliament operates by way of paramount legislation
merely over-riding any exercise by the State of its. own powers and (2) in which the
Commonwealth has no paramount power. In the United States Governmental powers are
distinguished into (1) Powers vested in the Central Government alone, (2) Powers vested in
the State Governments alone, (3) Powers exercisable by
either the Central Government or the States, (4) Powers forbidden to the Central
Government and (5) Powers forbidden to the State Governments. Thus the constitution of
Australia and the United States both recognise that there may be functions which cannot be
said to exclusively belong to either. But neither of them have adopted the plan of
assigning them to one government subject to the previous sanction and subsequent veto of
the other government. I recommend that the scheme of division of functions and powers like
that of Canada should be tried and failing that the scheme prevalent in Australia or the
United States should be adopted. But in any case the provision of previous sanction and
subsequent veto should be done away with.
113.
The provision whereby the Central Government has been invested with powers of supervision
over subjects which have been transferred to Provincial control is partly due to want of
clear cut allocation of subjects between Central and Provincial and partly to an erroneous
view of the responsibility of the Central Government for the administration of Provincial
subjects. The power of supervision is sought to be justified on the ground that certain
subjects are of importance for Central Government. This reason will not survive a proper
allocation of the subjects on the Canadian, Australian or American lines. The other justification for
the powers of supervision is the view that the Government of India must be responsible for
the peace, order and good Government of India as a whole and that it may discharge its own
responsibilities, it must have the power of supervision. It seems to me that with the
partition of functions there must follow a partition of responsibilities as well. If these
responsibilities are partitioned and that of the Central Government confined to matters
arising out of matters assigned to it, the necessity for supervision over Provincial
Governments will vanish and I suggest that the clauses in the Government of India Act
which define the responsibilities of the Central Government
should be amended accordingly.
114.
While I am anxious to see that there should be established complete Provincial autonomy I
am opposed to any change which will in any way weaken the Central Government or which will
impair its national character or obscure its existence in the eye of the people. Holding
this view I am against making the Central Government a league composed of a number of
governments bound together to constitute for certain purposes a single body. The effect of
such an arrangement is obvious. The league will exist only as an aggregate of governments,
and will therefore vanish as soon as the governments decide to separate themselves from
one another. Such a Central Government will last only as long as the component government's will desire it to
last. The league being a confederacy of governments will
have to deal with and act upon the governments only. With the individual citizen it will
have very little to do. It will have no right to tax the individual, to adjudicate upon his causes or to make laws for him. Such
a Central Government is bound to be the weakest government possible. My conception of the
position of the Central Government will not permit me to reconcile myself even to such a
form of relationship as is found in the American constitution in which the Central
Government is a commonwealth as well as a union of commonwealths. It is true that under it
the Central Government acts immediately upon every individual through its courts and
executive officers. But it is equally true that the Central Government in the United States is a creature of the States. Having been
called into existence by the States it must stand or fall with the States. The States
retain all the powers which they have not expressly surrendered. The Central Government has no more powers than those that have been
conferred upon it by law. Such a Central Government, howsoever stronger it may be than a Central Government in a league, will not in my opinion be strong enough for the needs of India. My view is
that the national Government should be so placed as not to appear to stand by virtue of
the Provincial Governments. Indeed its position should be so independent that not only it
should survive even when all Provincial Governments have
vanished or changed into wholly different bodies but it should have the power to carry on
provincial administration when a Provincial Government by
rebellion or otherwise has ceased to function. Consequently on this aspect of the question
I make the following recommendations: (1) That all residuary powers must be with the
Central Government, (2) that there must be a specific grant of power to the Central
Government to coerce a recalcitrant or a rebellious Province acting in a manner
prejudicial to the interests of the country, (3) that all powers given to the Provincial
Government in case of its non-functioning shall return to the Central Government and (4}
that the election to the Central Legislature shall be
direct.
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT IN RELATION TO THE CROWN
115.
For the purpose of securing Provincial autonomy it is not sufficient
merely to lay down proper relations between the Provincial Government and the Central
Government. It is also necessary to define the status of the Provincial Government. This
is of practical importance principally in respect to their external relations. That the
Provinces cannot have any international status goes without
saying. But the question of their relationship with the Home Government stands on a
different footing and cannot be easily disposed of. It is clear that whatever the nature
of the relationship between the Provincial and Home Government it must be in keeping with the constitutional law of the country. The degree of
independent political existence of a Province must determine the angle from which the
problem is to be looked at. Are the Provinces to be treated
so very devoid of independent political existence that they are to be treated as mere
internal divisions comparable with the areas of local Government, unknown and unrecognised
beyond India itself ? If so, that Imperial Government would
know but one Indian authority, the Central Government, and would in all matters affecting
India address itself to that Government and receive communications from or through it
alone. On the other hand, have the Provincial Governments an independent political
existence in the eye of the law ? If they can be said to
have it, then the Imperial Government must recognise them and must in all provincial
matters address them and must receive communication from them. Of these two possible bases
of relationship there is no doubt that the latter is the more proper one. An independent political existence for the Provinces
is now an accomplished fact. They have a sphere of activity in which they have an
authority of their own. The whole scheme of reforms is
opposed to the subordination of the Provincial Governments to the Central. The chief executive of the Province is not a nominee of the head of
the Central Government. He is the representative of the Crown in the Province and not of
the Governor-General. The constitution is a pluralistic
constitution and there is nothing to suggest the view that while within India the constitution is to be treated as plural,
conferring distinct powers on each, it is to be treated by the Imperial Government as a
unitary constitution with a single responsible Government.
116.
What are the matters in which the right of Provincial Governments to deal directly with
the Home Government can be recognised ? Following the role
prevalent in the case of the Australian Commonwealth that in matters in which the Crown is
concerned solely in its capacity as part of the constitution of a Government,
communications proceed directly between the State Governor and the Colonial Office without
the intervention of the Governor-General, it must be claimed on behalf of the Provincial
Governments that they shall have the right to deal with the Home Government directly
without the intervention of the Central Government. The matters in which it must have such
a right must include the reservation, the allowance and disallowance of provincial
legislation, the appointment and removal of Provincial Governors and their instructions,
the amendment of provincial constitutions and other matters which exclusively belong to
the Provincial Governments. What about matters which do not exclusively belong to either
Government ? I suggest that in cases in which the Central
Government has paramount power of legislation, the Central Government is the sole
representative of India. But as to matters within concurrent jurisdiction of the Central
and Provincial Government, the Provincial Government must
have a right to direct representation.
117.
To make the political existence of the Provinces as an entity independent of the Government of India a reality, the representation of the Crown in
the Provincial Executive and the Provincial Legislature should be made more manifest than
it is at present. Under the existing law the Secretary of State has placed the Crown quite
in the background and has in fact usurped its place. The office of the Secretary of State
for India is analogous to the office of the Secretary of State for Colonies. But the two
play quite different roles. The Secretary of State for Colonies occupies no place in the
constitutional law of the Dominions. The constitutional laws of all the Dominions are
emphatic in. their declaration that their Executive and Legislative Government is vested
in the Crown. Section 2 of the Government of India Act gives a definite legal status to
the Secretary of State. So prominent is the position given to the Secretary of State that
he has altogether eclipsed the Crown. Indeed, except for a passing reference in Section I
there is no mention of the Crown anywhere in the Government of India Act. The reasons for
this are no doubt historical and go back to the passing of the Regulation Act of 1773 when
the East India Company disputed the right of the Crown to the possessions it had acquired
in the East. Whatever be the historical differences the fact remains that the Dominion
laws do not recognise the Secretary of State while the Indian law does. The result is that
the Secretary of State for Colonies does not govern the Dominions. His duty is to advise
the Crown to allow or disallow particular acts of the Dominion Governments. The Secretary of State on the other hand is not merely the
adviser of the Crown. By Section 2 of the Government of India Act he has been given the
fullest powers of government.
118.
The provisions contained in Section 2 cannot be justified under any circumstance. They are
derogatory to the position of the Crown and are a
perversion of the true position of a Secretary of State. They gave a false picture of the
position of the Provincial Governments. Whatever might have been the justification of the
provisions in Section 2 before 1919 the changes introduced in that year have removed it
altogether. The powers of government having been transferred to the people it is no longer possible to retain those powers in the hands of the
Secretary of State. To do so would be to introduce a system of double government fraught
with the possibilities of serious conflict. I therefore recommend that section (2) of the
Government of India Act should be deleted and two new sections of the following tenor should be added :—
(1)
The Legislative power of the Province shall be vested in a Provincial Parliament which
will consist of the King and a Council of. the
King and a Council of Representatives and which is hereinafter called
" The Provincial Legislature ".
(2)
The Executive power of the Province is vested in the King and is exercisable by the Governor as the King's
representative and extends lo the execution and maintenance of the constitution and of the
laws of the Province.
Sections
of similar import regarding the position of the Crown in the Government of India should be
added to Act of 1919. Such a change will not only help to place the Crown and the
Secretary of State in their true position, but they will also help to bring the
constitutional law of India in line with the constitutional law of the Dominions.
SECTION
V
1. Reorganisation
of Services
119.
Separation of Services.—The present organisation
of the public services in India is the outcome of the recommendations of the Aitchison Commission which inquired into the Public Service of
India in 1886-87. Prior to the appointment of the Commission the great bulk of the civil posts of higher responsibility and emoluments
were filled by recruits from Europe and that Commission was
expressly directed to suggest measures which would "
do full justice to the claims of natives of India to higher and more extensive employment
in the Public Service " of their country. The
Commission held the view that the Civil Service should be only "
a Corps d'elite " and
consequently recommended that the recruitment of officials in England should be
substantially reduced and the higher appointments so set
free transferred to a service locally recruited in India. As a result of these
recommendations officers recruited in England formed
Imperial Services and the officers locally recruited formed the Provincial
Services. The conditions of appointments in regard to pay, leave and pension of officers
belonging to the two services were to be fixed on independent grounds and were not
necessarily to have any relation to each other. This division into Imperial and Provincial
obtains in most of the Civil Services of the country which it is needless to detail. What
is important to bear in mind is that the division was made to distinguish officers
recruited in England and officers recruited in India and not as might be understood from
the description, in order to distinguish officers placed under the
Government of India and liable to serve all over India from officers placed under Local
Governments and liable to serve only in specified
provinces. For instance the officers belonging to the Provincial services in the Telegraph
(Engineering) and the Survey of India are directly under the Government of India and not
confined to any particular province while officers in the Imperial Service in the
Education and the Police Departments arc allotted to different provinces. In my opinion
time has arrived when each Province should be free to organise its own civil service. For
this the All-India character of the services must cease. There should be Central Civil
Service recruited and maintained in response to its own needs by the Central Government to run various departments which are handed
over to it by the Government of India without imposing upon
its members the liability to serve under any of the Provincial Governments. Similarly
there should be a Provincial Civil Service recruited and maintained in response to its own
needs by every Provincial Government exclusively for its
own employment. This recommendation cannot be said to involve any substantial change in
the system. For although members of the Imperial Service and Provincial Service are liable
to serve in any part in India, their All-India character is only nominal. For the cases in
which a member of the Civil Service whether Imperial or Provincial has been called upon to
serve in a Province different from the one in which he was originally posted are few.
Almost all of them continued to work to the end in the same Province in which they were
placed in the beginning. That being the case the reform which I have suggested will
involve no change. It will only recognise facts as they exist.
120.
The grounds on which I press for this reform in the organisation of the Civil Service are
many. First of all such a separation of the services into those which are Central in the
sense that they are in the employment of the Government of India and those which are
Provincial in the sense that they are in the employment of the Provincial Government has
this immense advantage, namely that it is a reform which is eminently called for by the
change in the character of the Provincial Government. If the present system was continued,
ministerial responsibility would be difficult of realisation. Public Servants in India
according to Section 96(B) of the Government of India Act no doubt hold their position
during the pleasure of the Crown. But it must be remembered that the Act does not allow
the Ministers the power to decide when His Majesty should be pleased to remove him from
office. Although that power is given to the authority who appoints him yet the
dismissed officer has been given a right of appeal to the Secretary of State. Not only the
Minister has no right of dismissing an officer, but he cannot even punish him with
impunity, because it is provided in the Act that if any officer appointed by the Secretary
of State in Council thinks himself wronged by an order of an official superior in a
Governor's Province he has a right to complain to the Governor and the Governor by the Act
as well as by the instrument of instructions is bound to inquire and pass such an order as
may appear to him just and equitable. These provisions must make any Minister, however
strong he may be, quite helpless against a recalcitrant member of the Civil Service who
refuses to carry out the policy for which the Minister is responsible to the legislature
in accordance with its wishes. Ministerial responsibility requires that a Minister shall
have power effectively to deal with an erring officer working under him. He must also have
the power to decide how many officers he must have and to what particular post any of them
might be appointed. The existing provisions do not permit him any of the powers he must
stand in sore need of. This anomaly was recognised by the Lee Commission which was
appointed soon after the reforms were introduced. That Commission recommended that no
further recruitment should take place in the transferred departments on an All-India basis
and the personnel required for them should in future be recruited and appointed by
Provincial Governments. As a result of this recommendation Provinces have been empowered
to frame rule for the recruitment of officers who will take the place of the existing All-India Service Officers in these services operating in the
transferred department when the latter vacate. The reform I have suggested is merely an
extension of the same principle which the necessities of the case have compelled the
authorities to accept. The extension cannot now be delayed for the reason that under a
fully responsible system of Government the distinction between Reserved and Transferred
will have vanished.
121.
The second advantage of a separate and independent Provincial Civil Service will be the
liberty it will give to the Provincial Governments to alter the cadre of the services
belonging to the Province. The draw-back of the All-India system is that a Minister who is
satisfied that there are several superfluous posts
ordinarily held by the members of the All-India Service and a larger number the duties of
which can be and in the temporary vacancies have been efficiently discharged by the more
moderately paid officers of the Provincial Services, and who might therefore be convinced
of abolishing such a post or transferring it to the cadre of a Provincial Service finds
himself powerless to do so. For, under the Act he has no such power. All that he can do is
to let such post remain in abeyance or to let an officer of the Provincial Service concerned officiate for a lengthened period. But even here his
powers are limited. For, under the rules he cannot do this beyond fixed number of months
without the sanction of the Secretary of State. This is a very serious limitation arising
out of the All-India Organisation of the Services in that it prevents the attainment of
the ends of economy for which the Reformed Council has been clamouring from its very
inception.
122.
These are not the only advantages of an independent system
of Provincial Civil Service. The All-India character of the service imposes upon the provinces uniformity in the conditions of employment in
relation to pay, leave allowances, promotions and pensions. I contend that such uniformity
must work great hardships upon the resources of comparatively poor Provinces. They are
obliged to pay more for the service than they can reasonably afford. Nor can it be said
that uniform scale of salary in all Provinces is necessary to ensure equality in the
standard of living. It is notorious that owing to differences in local conditions the same
standards of comfort can be had in two different Provinces on quite different salary. If
that is the case there is no reason why should uniformity in pay be enforced when such
uniformity is either burdensome or unjust.
123.
The requirement of uniformity in the conditions of service also arises directly out of the
All-India character of the Civil Service and it will not vanish unless the service ceases
to have that character. The constitution of an independent Provincial Civil Service is a
means for accomplishing this end and should be welcomed particularly when its
accomplishment can reduce the cost of administration and give the Provinces full liberty
to manage its own affairs. This of course means that the position of the Secretary of
State vis-à-vis the Provincial Governments in
the matter of recruitment to the public service must be
radically altered. The Secretary of State instead of being the general employer and the
Provincial Government indenting upon him for the number of hands necessary for work in
their provinces, the Secretary of State in those cases where the recruitment in England is
necessary should merely act as the agent of particular provinces concerned, on the terms
prescribed by the Provincial Government and not on the terms formulated by himself. The
Provinces should henceforth cease as authorities utilising the service of persons lent to
them or found for them, so to say, by the Secretary of
State. So long such a system continues the Secretary of State is bound to claim the powers
which he now enjoys under Section 96B of the Government of India Act. Much is said by the
Ministers against the powers retained by the Secretary of State over the Civil Service on
the ground that they make responsible government impossible. That criticism is perfectly
valid. But those who urged this criticism do not seem to be aware of the fact that these
powers can be taken away only when the Secretary of State ceases to be the recruiting officer.
124.
If this reform of separation of services is carried into effect, I should like to suggest
the following classification of the Provincial Civil Service —
Provincial
Civil Service
Superior
Service |
Subordinate
Service |
Subordinate
Service |
Menial
Service |
Class
I equivalent to the present I.C.S. and the Imperial Services |
|
Class
II equivalent to the Present Provincial Services |
|
125.
Recruitment Agency
for the Provincial Civil Service.—The next question that arises for consideration
relates to the agency that should be in charge of matters pertaining to the recruitment to
the Provincial Civil Service when the Secretary of State has ceased to perform that
function. I accept that the Civil Service in order that it may be free from the evil
effects of political influence and jobbery should be recruited and controlled by an
authority independent of the Ministers. I am not, however, prepared to say that a
Provincial Civil Service Commission could be instituted to take charge of this kind of
work. On financial considerations alone the proposal seems to be too big. However, I agree
with the suggestion that in every province there should be a full-time officer specially
charged with the consideration
of service matters. He should be a liaison officer between
the Public Service Commission and the Local Government.
II.
Indianisation of the Services
126.
(i) Recruitment of Indians.—The
case for Indianisation was accepted by the Islington
Commission in 1915. Its relation to the success of the Reforms was emphasised by the
authors of the Joint Report and the Lee Commission gave effect to it by defining the
proportion between the Indians and the Europeans in the different services. There is,
therefore, no necessity to argue the case for Indianisation de novo. All that is necessary to say is that during the interval that elapsed between the
appointment of the Islington Commission and the appointment of Lee Commission the angle of
vision regarding this question had completely altered. In the days of the Islington Commission the question was, " How many Indians should be admitted into the Public Services ? " At the time of the Lee Commission it had become,
"what is the minimum number of Englishmen which must still be recruited ? " I am glad to say that
the Lee Commission gave full recognition to this altered angle of vision. What is now
necessary is to determine the necessary changes in the principles which were taken by the
Lee Commission for framing the proportions of Indians and Europeans so as to accelerate
the pace of Indianisation. The consideration that should, in my opinion, govern the
proportions is the requirement of a Department and the merits of qualified Indians to run
them. If this consideration were adopted the proportions settled by the Lee Commission
will have to be altered in favour of Indians in all departments except Law and Order,
Forest and other Technical Departments.
127.
(ii) Payment of Indians.—1 press for Indianisation
not only on its own merits but also because of its potential effects on the finances of
the Province. For, I hope that Indianisation can be made to yield economy in
administration. I have not been personally able to see why equality of pay to Indians and
Europeans should be regarded as a necessary consequence of membership of an All-India
Service. Looking to the question from the standpoint of merit I have been convinced that
there is no logical justification for equal remuneration for both classes of public servants. One class consists of a body of public servants
exiled from their own home and posted in a country thousands of miles away in which they
do not think that they can properly educate their children or maintain their health.
Conditions such as these which compel them to maintain dual establishments at a standard
of living admittedly high are considerations which do not apply to those civil servants
who have their domicile in India. In contrast to their
European colleagues they are working in a country in which they are living free from the
difficulties of dual establishments not exposed to ill-health owing to climatic
considerations and accustomed to a comparatively low standard of living. The financial
burden they are obliged to carry is obviously less pressing than is the case with their
European colleagues. If this difference between personal
risk and sacrifices involved in the performance of their service is admitted, then in my
opinion, there is no logical justification for paying them on the same basis. Indeed, if
the total position of the two classes of public servants in India be compared then one
thing is certain. That if the present salary of European officers
is adequate then it is beyond dispute that the Indian officers are overpaid. If, however,
the contention is that the Indian officers are not overpaid then it follows that the
European officers are underpaid. Whichever view is taken the present practice of equal pay
to Indians and Europeans gives rise to a position which is quite unsatisfactory. I have no
hesitation in saying that under the present practice of equal payment whether or not the
European is adequately paid his Indian colleagues is
certainly overpaid. That being my view I am anxious to see that the scale of salary of
public servants with Indian domicile is lower. This argument, I am sure, cannot fail to
appeal to every Indian who examines the financial position of the different Provincial Governments and the serious embarrassments in which
each is placed by reason of the high proportion of expenditure which is devoted to the
payment of emoluments to public servants. There are some Indians I know who object to this
principle of inequality in salaries. Be it noted that these objections come from those
classes of Indians from which the Civil Service is largely recruited, and who claim to be
the leaders of the country. Theirs is a contemptible little argument without any substance
in it. It has no substance because inequality in status is not a necessary consequence of
inequality in pay. It is contemptible because it is based on self-interest. I for myself
am in favour of increasing Indianisation mainly because of
the large promise of economy which it holds out.
128.
(iii) Indianisation
and the claims of the Backward
Classes.—It is notorious that the Public Services
of the country in so far as they are open to Indians have become by reason of various
circumstances a close preserve for the Brahmins and allied castes. The Non-Brahmins, the
Depressed Classes and the Mohammedans are virtually
excluded from them. They are carrying on an intense agitation for securing to themselves
what they regard as a due share of the Public Services. With that purpose in view they
prefer the system of appointment by selection to the system of appointment by open
competition. This is vehemently opposed by the Brahmins and
the allied castes on the ground that the interests of the State require that efficiency
should be the only consideration in the matters of appointment to public offices and that
caste and creed should count for nothing. Relying upon
educational merit as the only test which can be taken to guarantee efficiency, they insist
that public offices should be filled on the basis of competitive examinations. Such a
system it is claimed serves the ends of efficiency without in any way prohibiting the
entry of the Backward Classes in the Public Services. For the competitive examination
being open to all castes and creeds it leaves the door open to a candidate from these
communities if he satisfied the requisite test.
129.
The attitude of the Brahmin and allied castes towards this question has no doubt the
appearance of fairness. The system of competitive
examination relied upon may result in fairness to all castes and creeds under a given set
of circumstances. But those circumstances presuppose that the educational system of the
State is sufficiently democratic and is such that facilities for education are
sufficiently widespread and sufficiently used to permit all classes from which good public
servants are likely to be forthcoming to complete. Otherwise even with the system of open
competition large classes are sure to be left out in the cold. This basic condition is
conspicuous by its absence in India, so that to invite Backward Classes to rely upon the
results of competitive examination as a means of entry into the Public Services is to
practise a delusion upon them and very rightly the Backward Classes have refused to be
deceived by it.
130.
Assuming therefore that the entry of the Backward Classes in
the Public Services cannot be secured by making it dependent upon open competition, the
first question that arises for consideration is, have the Backward Classes a case for a
favoured treatment ? Unless they can make good their case
they cannot expect any modification of the accepted principles of recruitment by
considerations other than those of efficiency pure and simple. In regard to this important
question I have no hesitation in stating that the Backward Classes have a case which is
overwhelming.
131.
First of all those who lay exclusive stress upon efficiency as the basis for recruitment
in public services do not seem to have adequate conception of what is covered by
administration in modern times. To them administration appears to be nothing more than the
process of applying law as enacted by the legislature. Beyond question that is a very
incomplete understanding of its scope and significance. Administration in modern times
involves far more than the scrutiny of statutes for the sake of knowing the regulations of
the State. Often times under the pressure of time or from convenience a government
department is now-a-days entrusted with wide powers of
rule-making for the purpose of administering a particular law. In such cases it is obvious
that administration cannot merely consist in applying the law. It includes the making up
of rules which have the force of law and of working them out. This system of legislation
by delegation has become a very common feature of all modern governments and is likely to
be on the increase in years to come. It must be accepted as beyond dispute that such wide
powers of rule-making affecting the welfare of large
classes of people cannot be safely left into the hands of the administrators drawn from
one particular class which as a matter of fact is opposed to the rest of the population in
its motives and interests, does not sympathise with the living forces operating in them,
is not charged with their wants, pains, cravings and desires and is inimical to their
aspirations, simply because it comes out best by the test of education.
132.
But even assuming that administration involves nothing more than the process of applying
the law as enacted by the legislature it does not in the
least weaken the case of the Backward Classes. For, officers who are drawn from a
particular caste and in whose mind consciousness of caste sits closer than conscientious
regard to public duty, may easily prostitute their offices to the aggrandisement of their
community and to the detriment of the general public. Take the ordinary case of a Mamlatdar, administering the law relating to the letting of
Government lands for cultivation. He is no doubt merely applying the law. But in applying
he may pick and choose the lessees according to his predilection and very possibly may
decide against lessees on grounds which may be communal in fact although they may be
non-communal in appearance. Take another illustration of an officer placed in charge of
the census department in which capacity he is called upon
to decide questions of nomenclature of the various communities and of their social status.
An officer in charge of this department by reason of his being a member of particular
caste in the course of his administration may do injustice to a rival community by
refusing to it the nomenclature or the status that belongs to it. Instances of
favouritism, particularly on the grounds of caste and creed are of common occurrence
though they are always excused on some other plausible ground. But I like to quote one
which pertains to the Vishwakarmans of the Madras
Presidency. It is related in their letter to the Reforms Enquiry Committee of 1924 in
which they complained that " a Brahmin member of the
Madras Executive Council Sir (then Mr.) P. Siwaswami Ayyar—when he was in charge of the portfolio of law,
issued a Government Order objecting to the suffix ' Acharya ' usually adopted by
the Vishwakarmans in their names and seeking to enforce in its place the word ' Asry ', which is weighed with common odium. Though there was
neither necessity nor authority to justify the action taken by the law member, the
Government Order was published by the law department as if on the recommendation of the
Spelling Mistakes Committee. It happened to our misfortune
that the non-official members of this Committee were drawn largely from the Brahmin
community, who never knew how to respect the rights of their sister communities and never
informed us of the line of action that they were decided upon. It was dealt more or less
as the stab in the dark."
133.
This is inevitable. Class rule must mean rule in terms of class interests and class
prejudices. If such results are inevitable then it must raise a query in the minds of all
honest people whether efficient government has also given us good government ? If not, what is the remedy ?
My view is that the disadvantages arising from the class bias of the officers belonging to Brahmin and allied castes has outweighed all the advantages attending upon their efficiency and
that on the total they have done more harm than good. As to the remedy, the one I see is a
proper admixture of the different communities in the public
service. This may perhaps import a small degree of inefficiency. But it will supply a most
valuable corrective to the evils of class bias. This has become all the more necessary
because of the social struggles that are now going on in the country. The struggles
between the Brahmins and the
non-Brahmins, between Hindus and Mohammedans, between Touchables
and Untouchables for the destruction of all inequalities and the establishment of
equality, with all their bitterness, cannot leave the judges, magistrates, civil servants
and the police without being influenced in their judgement as to the right or wrong of
these struggles. Being members of the struggling
communities they are bound to be partisans, with the result
that there may be a great loss in the confidence reposed by the public in their servants.
134.
So far I have considered the case of the Backward Classes on grounds of administrative
utility. But there are also moral grounds why entry into the public service should be
secured to them. The moral evils arising out of the exclusion of a person from the public
service were never so well portrayed as by the late Mr. Gokhale.
In the course of a telling speech he observed, " The
excessive costliness of the foreign agency is not however its only evil. There is a moral
evil, which, if anything, is even greater. A kind of dwarfing or stunting of the Indian
race is going on under the present system. We must live all the days of our life in an
atmosphere of inferiority and tallest of us must bend in order that the exigencies of the
existing system may be satisfied. The upward impulse, if I may use such an expression,
which every school-boy at Eton or Harrow may feel that he may one day be a Gladstone, a
Nelson, or a Wellington, and which may draw forth the best efforts of which he is capable,
is denied to us. The full height to which our manhood is capable of rising can never be
reached by us under the present system. The moral elevation which every self-governing
people feel cannot be felt by us. Our administrative and military talents must gradually
disappear, owing to sheer disuse, till at last our lot, as hewers of wood and drawers of
water in our own country, is stereotyped." Now what one would like to ask those who
deny the justice of the case of the Backward Classes for entry into the Public Service is
whether it is not open to the Backward Classes to allege against the Brahmins and allied
castes all that was alleged by the late Mr. Gokhale on behalf of Indian people against the
foreign agency ? Is it not open to the Depressed Classes,
the non-Brahmins and the Mohammedans to say that by their exclusion from the Public
Service a kind of dwarfing or stunting of their communities is going on ? Can they not complain that as a result of their exclusion
they are obliged to live all the days of their lives in an atmosphere of inferiority, and
that the tallest of them has to bend in order that the exigencies of the existing system
may be satisfied ? Can they not assert that the upward impulses which every school-boy of the Brahmanical
community feels that he may one day be a Sinha, a Sastri, a Ranade or a Paranjpye, and which may draw
forth from him the best efforts of which he is capable is denied to them ? Can they not indignantly assert that the full height to
which their manhood is capable of rising can never be reached by them under the present
system ? Can they not lament that the moral elevation which
every self-governing people feel cannot be felt by them and that their administrative talents must
gradually disappear owing to sheer disgust till at last their lot as hewers of wood and
drawers of water in their own country is stereotyped ? The
answers to these queries cannot but be in the affirmative. If to exclude the advanced
communities from entering into public service of the country was a moral wrong, the
exclusion of the backward communities from the same field must also be a moral wrong, and
if it is a moral wrong it must be righted.
135.
These are the considerations which lead me to find in
favour of the Backward Classes. It will be noticed that these considerations are in no way
different from the considerations that were urged in favour of Indianisation.
The case for Indianisation, it must be remembered, did not
rest upon efficient administration. It rested upon considerations of good administration. It was not challenged that the Indian was
inferior to the European in the qualities
that go into the make-up of an efficient administrator. It
was not denied that the European bureaucracy had improved their roads, constructed canals
on more scientific principles, effected transportation by rail, carried their letters by
penny post, flashed their messages by lightning, improved their currency, regulated their
weights and measures, corrected their notions of geography, astronomy and medicine, and
stopped their internal quarrels. Nothing can be a greater testimony to the fact that the
European bureaucracy constituted the most efficient government
possible. All the same the European bureaucracy, efficient though it was, was condemned as
it was found to be wanting in those qualities which make for human administration. It is
therefore somewhat strange that those who clamoured for Indianisation should oppose the
stream flowing in the direction of the Backward Classes, forgetting that the case for
Indianisation also includes the case for the Backward Classes. Be that as it may, I attach
far more importance to this than I attach either to Provincial Autonomy or to complete
responsibility in the Provincial Executive. I would not be prepared to allow the
devolution of such large powers if I felt that those powers are likely to fall in the
hands of any one particular community to the exclusion of the rest. That being my view I
suggest that the following steps should be taken for the
materialisation of my recommendations :—
(1)
A certain number of vacancies in the Superior Services, Class I and Class II, and also in
the Subordinate Services, should every year be filled by system of nomination with a pass
examination. These nominations should be filled on the recommendation of a select
committee composed of persons competent to judge of the fitness of a candidate and working
in conjunction with the Civil Service officer referred to above. Such nominations shall be
reserved to the Depressed Class, the Mohammedans and the
Non-Brahmins in the order of preference herein indicated until their
numbers in the service reach a certain proportion.
(2)
That steps should be taken to post an increasing number of officers belonging to these
communities at the headquarters.
(3)
That a Central Recruitment Board should be constituted as a central agency for registering
all applications for appointments and vacancies and putting applicants in touch with the offices where vacancies exist or occur from time to
time. It is essential to put the man and the job in touch if this desire is to be
achieved. The absence of such a Board is the reason why the efforts of the Government of
Bombay in this connection have not achieved the success which was expected of them.
SECTION
I
There
should he no separation of Karnatak or Sind from the Bombay Presidency.
SECTION
II
Chapter
1.—There
should be complete responsibility in the Provincial executive subject to the proviso that if members of the Legislature resolve
to make it a reserved subject effect shall be given to
their resolution.
Chapter
2.—Under
no circumstances should the executive be made irremovable. There shall be no communal
representation in the executive. Ministers should be amenable to courts of law for illegal
acts. The constitution should provide for the impeachment of Ministers. There should be
joint responsibility in the executive. The executive should be presided over by a Prime
Minister and not by the Governor.
Chapter
3.—The
Governor should have the position of a constitutional head. He should have no emergency
powers.
SECTION
III
Chapter
1.—There should be
adult franchise.
Chapter
2.—The
Legislature should be wholly elective. All class and
communal electorates should be abolished except for Europeans. Reserved seats should be
provided for Mohammedans, Depressed Classes and Anglo-Indians and to the
Non-Brahmins only if the franchise continues to be a restricted one.
Chapter
3.—The
Legislature should consist of 140 members. Of these Mohammedans should have 33 and the
Depressed Classes 15. The under-representation of certain
districts and the over-representation of others should be rectified on the basis of
population. There should be a Committee to adjust seats between different classes and interests. The requirement of a residential
qualification for a candidate should be removed.
Chapter 4.—Lucknow
Pact is not a permanent settlement and cannot prevent consideration of the question
arising out of it afresh and on their own merits.
Chapter
5.—There
should be no second chamber in the Province.
Chapter 6.—The
Legislature should have the power of appointing and removing the President, of defining
its privileges and regulating its procedure. Sections 72D and 80C of the Government of
India Act should be removed from the Statute. The Legislature should have the power to
move " a motion of non-confidence". The
Legislature should have the power to alter the constitution subject to certain conditions.
SECTION IV
Chapter
1.—There
should be complete Provincial autonomy. The division of functions between Central and
Provincial should be reconsidered with a view to do away with the control of Central
Government now operating through the system of previous sanction and subsequent veto.
Chapter
2.—Within
the limits fixed by the functions assigned to the Provincial Government the relations
between that Government and the Home Government should be direct and not through the
medium of the Central Government. Section 2 of the Government of India Act should be
deleted as it obscures the position of the Crown in
relation to the governance of India.
SECTION
V
There
should be a distinct Provincial Civil Service and the Secretary of State should cease
altogether to perform the function of a recruiting agency. His functions regarding the
Services may be performed by a Provincial Civil Service Commission or by an officer acting
conjointly with the Public Service Commission of India. Indianisation of Services should be more rapid. Its pace
should vary with the nature of the different departments of State. Indianisation should be
accompanied by a different scale of salary and allowances.
In the course of Indianisation of the services arrangement should be made for the
fulfilment of claims of the backward classes.
17th May 1929
APPENDIX
(Refer
footnote on page 339)
Extracts
from the Report of the Board of Education of the Bombay Presidency for the year 1850-51
System
adopted by the Board based
on the views of Court of Directors
"
Paragraph 5. Thus, the Board of Education at
this Presidency, having laid down a scheme of education, in accordance with the leading
injunctions of Despatches from the Honourable Court, and founded not more on the opinions
of men who had been attentively considering the progress of education in India, such as
the Earl of Auckland, Major Candy and others, than on the openly declared wants of the
most intelligent of the natives themselves, the Board, we repeat, were informed by your
Lordship's predecessor in Council that the process must be reversed."
Views
of Court on the expediency of educating the upper classes
"
Paragraph 8. Equally wise, if we may be
permitted to use the expression, do the indications of the Honourable Court appear to us
to be as to the quarters to which Government education
should be directed, and specially with the very limited funds which are available for this
branch of expenditure. The Honourable Court write to Madras in 1830 as follows: ' The improvements in education, however, which most
effectively contribute to elevate the moral and intellectual condition of a people are
those which concern the education of the higher classes
— of the persons possessing leisure and natural influence over the minds of their
countrymen. By raising the standard of instruction amongst these classes you would
eventually produce a much greater and more beneficial
change in the ideas and the feelings of the community than you can hope to produce by
acting directly on the more numerous class. You are, moreover, acquainted with our anxious
desire to have at our disposal a body of natives qualified by their habits and
acquirements to take a larger share and occupy higher situations in the civil
administration of their country than has been hitherto the practice under our Indian
Government.' Nevertheless, we hear on so many sides, even
from those who ought to know better of the necessity and facility for educating the
masses, for diffusing the arts and sciences of Europe amongst the hundred or the hundred
and forty millions (for numbers count for next to nothing) in India, and other like generalities indicating cloudy notions on the subject,
that a bystander might almost be tempted to suppose the whole resources of the State were
at the command of Educational Boards, instead of a modest pittance inferior in amount to
sums devoted to a single establishment in England."
Conclusion
that no means exist for educating the masses
"
Paragraph 14. It results most clearly from these
facts, that if sufficient funds are not available to put 175 vernacular schools into due
state of organisation, and to give a sound elementary education to 10,730 boys, all
question as to educating ' the masses ', the ' hundred and forty
millions ', the 900,000 boys in the Bombay Presidency
disappears. The object is not one that can be attained or approximated to by Government, and Educational Boards ought not to allow themselves
to be distracted from a more limited practical field of action by the visionary
speculations of uninformed benevolence."
Views
of Court of Directors as to the best method of operation
with limited means
"
Paragraph 15. The Honourable Court appear to
have always kept the conclusion which has been arrived at in the last paragraph very
distinctly in view. Perceiving that their educational efforts to improve the people could
only be attempted on a very small scale, they have deemed it necessary to point out to
their different Governments the true method of producing the greatest results with limited
means. We have already cited their injunctions to the Madras Government on this head (paragraph 7), and their despatch to the
Government on the same date enforces sentiment of exactly the same import : ' It is our anxious desire to afford to the higher classes
of the natives of India the means of instruction in European sciences and of access to the
literature of civilised Europe. The character which may be given to the classes possessed
of leisure and natural influence ultimately determines that of the whole people.' "
Inquiry
as to Upper Classes of India
''
Paragraph 16. It being then demonstrated that only a small
section of the population can be brought under the influence of Government education in
India, and the Honourable Court having in effect decided that this section should consist
of the ' upper classes ', it is essential to ascertain who these latter consist of. Here
it is absolutely necessary for the European inquirer to
divest his mind of European analogies which so often insinuate themselves almost
involuntarily into Anglo-Indian speculations. Circumstances
in Europe, especially in England, have drawn a marked line, perceptible in manners,
wealth, political and social influence, between the upper and lower classes. No such line
is to be found in India, where, as under all despotisms, the Will of the Prince was all
that was requisite to raise men from the humblest condition in life to the highest
station, and where, consequently, great uniformity in manners has always prevailed. A
beggar, according to English notions, is fit only for the stocks or compulsory labour in
the workhouse ; in India he is a respectable character and
worthy indeed of veneration according to the Brahminical
theory, which considers him as one who has renounced all the pleasures and temptations of
life for the cultivation of learning and undisturbed meditation on the Deity."
Upper Classes in India
"Paragraph
17.
The classes who may be deemed to be influential and in so far the upper classes in India, may be ranked as follows
:—
1st.
The landowners and jaghirdars, representatives of the
former feudatories and persons in authorities under Native powers, and who may be termed
the Soldier class.
2nd.
Those who have acquired wealth in trade or commerce or the commercial class.
3rd.
The higher employees of Government.
4th.
Brahmins, with whom may be associated though at long interval those of higher castes of
writers who live by the pen such as Parbhus and Shenvis in Bombay, Kayasthas in
Bengal, provided they acquire a position either in learning or station."
Brahmins
the most Influential
"
Paragraph 18. Of these four classes incomparably
the most influential, the most numerous and on the whole easiest to be worked on by the
Government, are the latter. It is a well-recognised fact throughout India that the ancient
Jaghirdars or Soldier class are daily deteriorating under
our rule. Their old occupation is gone, and they have shown no disposition or capacity to
adopt a new one, or to cultivate the art of peace. In the Presidency the attempts of Mr. Elphinstone
and his successors to bolster up a landed aristocracy have lamentably failed; and complete
discomfiture has hitherto attended all endeavours to open
up a path to distinction through civil honours and education to a race to whom nothing
appears to excite but vain pomp and extravagance, of the reminiscences of their ancestors' successful raids in the plains of Hindusthan, nor among the commercial classes, with a few
exceptions, is there much greater opening for the influences of superior education. As in
all countries, but more in India than in the higher civilized ones of Europe, the young
merchants or trader must quit his school at an early period in order to obtain the special
education needful for his vocation in the market or the counting house. Lastly the
employees of the state, though they possess a great influence over the large numbers who
come in contact with Government, have no influence, whatever, with the still larger
numbers who are independent of Government; and, indeed, they appear to inspire the same sort of
distrust with the public as Government functionaries in
England, who are often considered by the vulgar as mere hacks of the state."
Poverty of Brahmins
"
Paragraph 19. The above analysis, though it may
appear lengthy, is nevertheless, indispensable, for certain important conclusions deducible from it. First, it demonstrates that the influential
class whom the Government are able to avail themselves of in diffusing the seeds of
education are the Brahmins and other high castes Brahmannis
proximi. But the Brahmins and these high castes are for the most part wretchedly poor; and in many parts of India the term Brahmin is synonymous
with ' beggar '."
Wealthy classes will not at
present support superior education
"
Paragraph 20. We may see, then, how hopeless it
is to enforce what your Lordship in Council so strongly enjoined upon us in your letter of
the 24th April, 1850,— what appears, prima facie, so plausible and proper in itself — what
in fact, the Board themselves have very often attempted, viz., the
strict limitation of superior education ' to the wealthy,
who can afford to pay for it, and to youths of unusual intelligence.' The invariable answer the Board has received when
attempting to enforce a view like this, has been, that the wealthy
are wholly indifferent to superior education and that no means for ascertaining unusual
intelligence amongst the poor exist until their faculties have been tested and developed
by school training. A small section from among the wealthier classes is no doubt
displaying itself, by whom the advantages of superior education are recognised, it appears
larger in Bengal, where education has been longer fostered by Government, than in Bombay,
and we think it inevitable that such class must increase, with the experience that
superior attainments lead to distinction, and to close intercourse with Europeans on the
footing of social equality ; but as a general proposition
at the present moment, we are satisfied that the academical instruction in the arts and
sciences of Europe cannot be based on the contributions either of students or of funds
from the opulent classes of India."
Question
as to educating low castes
"
Paragraph 21. The
practical conclusion to be drawn from these facts which years of experience have forced
upon our notice, is that a very wide door should be opened
to the children of the poor higher castes, who are willing
to receive education at our hands. But here, again, another embarrassing question arises,
which it is right to notice:
If the children of the poor are admitted freely to Government Institutions what is there
to prevent all the despised castes — the Dheds, Mhars, etc., from flocking in numbers
to their walls ? "
Social
Prejudices of the Hindus.
"
Paragraph 22.
There is little doubt that if a class of these latter were to be formed in Bombay they
might be trained, under the guiding influence of such Professors and masters as are in the
service of the Board, into men of superior intelligence to any in the community; and with such qualifications, as they would then possess,
there would be nothing to prevent their aspiring to the
highest offices open to Native talent — to Judgeships,
the Grand Jury, Her Majesty's Commission of the Peace. Many benevolent men think it is the
height of illiberality and weakness in the British Government to succumb to the prejudices
which such appointments would excite into disgust amongst the Hindu community, and that an
open attack should be made upon the barriers of caste." Wise observations of the Honourable Mount Stuart Elphinstone cited
"
Paragraph 23. But
here the wise reflections of Mr. Elphinstone, the most liberal and large minded
administrator who has appeared on this side of India, point out the true rule of action. '
It is observed,' he says, ' that
the missionaries find the lowest caste the best pupils; but
we must be careful how we offer any special encouragement to men of that description; they are not
only the most despised but among the least numerous of the great divisions of society and
it is to be feared that if our system of education first took root among them, it would
never spread further, and we might find ourselves at the head of a new class, superior to
the rest in useful knowledge, but hated and despised by the castes to whom these new attainments would always induce us to prefer them.
Such a state of things would be desirable, if we were contented to rest our power on our army or on the attachment of a part of the population but
is inconsistent with every attempt to found it on a more
extended basis.' "
Contents
STATEMENT
“B”