Dr.
Ambedkar at the Round Table Conferences
______________________________________________
PART I
1.
In the
Plenary Session
5th sitting - 20-11-1930
2. Committee of
the Whole
Conference—
Comments on the Interim Report of Sub-Committee No. I (Federal Structure), 16-12-1930
3.
In Sub-Committee No. II (Provincial Constitution)—
3rd sitting- 8-12-1930
4th sitting- 9-12-1930
5th sitting- 15-12-1930
Comments on the
Report of Sub-Committee No. II,16-12-1930
4.
In
Sub-Committee No. Ill (Minorities)—
2nd sitting-
31-12-1930
5th sitting- 14-1-1931
6th sitting- 16-1-1931
Appendix
I—A scheme of political safeguards
for the protection of the Depressed Classes in the future constitution of a self-governing
India—A memorandum by Dr. Ambedkar
and Rao Bahadur R. Srinivasan.
Appendix
II—Relevant paragraphs of the Report
of Sub-Committee No. Ill related to the Depressed Classes approved by the Committee of the
Whole Conference.
5.
In Sub-Committee No. VI
(Franchise)—
2nd sitting- 22-12-1930
3rd
sitting- 30-12-1930
4th sitting- 1-1-1931
6. Committee
of the Whole Conference—
Summary of the
Report of Sub-Committee No. VI, 16-1-1931
1
IN
THE PLENARY SESSION
Fifth Sitting—20th November 1930
NEED
FOR POLITICAL POWER FOR DEPRESSED CLASSES
*[f1]Dr. B. R.
Ambedkar:
Mr. Chairman, my purpose in rising to address this
conference is principally to place before it the point of view of the depressed classes,
whom I and my colleague, Rao Bahadur
Srinivasan, have the honour to represent, regarding the
question of constitutional reform. It is a point of view of 43,000,000 people, or
one-fifth of the total population of British India. The depressed classes form a group by
themselves, which is distinct and separate from the Mohammedans, and, although they are
included among the Hindus, they in no sense form an integral part of that community. Not
only have they a separate existence, but they have also assigned to them a statute which
is invidiously distinct from the status occupied by any other community in India. There
are communities in India, which occupy a lower and subordinate position; but the position assigned to the depressed
classes is totally different. It is one which is midway between that of the serf and the slave, and which may, for convenience, be
called servile with this difference, that the serf and the slave were permitted to have
physical contact, from which the Depressed Classes are debarred. What is worse that this
enforced servility and bar to human intercourse, due to their untouchability,
involves, not merely the possibility of discrimination in public life, but actually works
out as a positive denial of all equality of opportunity and the denial of those most
elementary of civic rights on which all human existence depends. I am sure that the point
of view of such a community, as large as the population of England or of France, and so
heavily handicapped in the struggle for existence, cannot
but have some bearing on the right sort of solution of the political problem, and I am
anxious that this Conference should be placed in possession of that point of view at the
very start.
The
point of view I will try to put as briefly as I can. It is this that the bureaucratic form
of Government in India should be replaced by a Government, which will be a Government of
the people, by the people, and for the people. This statement of the view of the depressed
classes I am sure will be received with some surprise in certain quarters. The tie that
bounds the Depressed Classes to the British has been of a unique character. The Depressed
Classes welcomed the British as their deliverers from age long tyranny and oppression by
the orthodox Hindus. They fought their battles against the Hindus, the Mussalmans and the Sikhs and won for them this great Empire of
India. The British, on their side, assumed the role of trustees for the depressed classes.
In view of such an intimate relationship between the parties, this change in the attitude
of the depressed classes towards British Rule in India is undoubtedly a most momentous
phenomenon. But the reasons for this change of attitude are
not far to seek. We have not taken this decision simply because we wish to throw in our
lot with the majority. Indeed, as you know, there is not much love lost between the majority and the particular minority I represent. Ours is an
independent decision. We have judged of the existing administration solely in the light of our own
circumstances and we have found it wanting in some of the most essential elements of a
good Government. When we compare our present position with the one, which it was our lot
to bear in Indian society of the pre-British days, we find
that, instead of marching on, we are only marking time. Before the British, we were in the
loathsome condition due to our untouchability. Has the
British Government done anything to remove it? Before the British, we could not enter the
temple. Can we enter now? Before the British, we were denied entry into the Police Force.
Does the British Government admit us in the Force? Before the British, we were not allowed
to serve in the Military. Is that career now open to us? To none of these questions can we
give an affirmative answer. That the British, who have held so large a sway over us for
such a long time, have done some good we cheerfully acknowledge. But there is certainly no
fundamental change in our position. Indeed, so far as we were concerned, the British
Government has accepted the social arrangements as it found them, and has preserved them
faithfully in the manner of the Chinese tailor who, when given an old coat as a pattern,
produced with pride an exact replica, rents, patches and all.
Our wrongs have remained as open sores and they have not
been righted, although 150 years of British rule have rolled away.
We
do not accuse the British of indifference or want of sympathy. What we do find is that
they are quite incompetent to tackle our problems. If the case was one of indifference
only it would have been a matter of small moment, and it would not have made such a
profound change in our attitude. But what we have come to realise on a deeper analysis of
the situation is that it is not merely a case of indifference, rather it is a case of
sheer incompetence to undertake the task. The depressed classes find that the British
Government in India suffers from two very serious limitations. There is first of all an
internal limitation, which arises from the character, motives, and interests of those who
are in power. It is not because they cannot help us in these things but because it is
against their character, motives and interests to do so. The second consideration that
limits its authority is the mortal fear it has of external resistance. The Government of
India does realise the necessity of removing the social evils which are eating into the
vitals of Indian society and which have blighted the lives of the downtrodden classes for
so many years. The Government of India does realise that the landlords are squeezing the
masses dry, and the capitalists are not giving the labourers a living wage and decent
conditions of work. Yet it is most painful thing that it has not dared to touch any of
these evils. Why? Is it because it has no legal powers to remove them? No. The reason why
it does not intervene is because it is afraid that its intervention to amend the existing
code of social and economic life will give rise to resistance. Of what good is such a
Government to anybody? Under a Government, paralysed between two such limitations, much that goes to make life good must remain held
up. We must have a Government in which the men in power will give their undivided
allegiance to the best interest of the country. We
must have a Government in which men in power, knowing where obedience will end and resistance will begin, will not be afraid to amend the
social and economic code of life which the dictates of justice and expediency so urgently
call for. This ROLE the British Government will never be
able to play, It is only a Government which is of the people, for the people and by
the people that will make this possible.
These
are some of the questions raised by the Depressed Classes and the answers which in their
view these questions seem to carry. This is therefore the inevitable conclusion which the
Depressed Classes have come to: namely, that the
bureaucratic Government of India, with the best of motives, will remain powerless to
effect any change so far as our particular grievances are concerned. We feel that nobody
can remove our grievances as well as we can, and we cannot remove them unless we get
political power in our own hands. No share of this political power can evidently come to
us so long as the British Government remains as it is. It is only in a Swaraj constitution
that we stand any chance of getting the political power into our own hands, without which
we cannot bring salvation to our people.
There
is one thing, Sir, to which I wish to draw your particular attention. It is this. I have
not used the expression Dominion Status in placing before you the point of view of the
Depressed Classes. I have avoided using it, not because I do not understand its
implications nor does the omission mean that the depressed classes object to India's
attaining Dominion Status. My chief ground for not using it is that it does not convey the
full content of what the Depressed Classes stand for. The Depressed Classes, while they
stand for Dominion Status with safeguards, wish to lay all the emphasis they can on one
question and one question alone. And that question is, how will Dominion India function?
Where will the centre of political power be? Who will have it? Will the Depressed Classes
be heirs to it? These are the questions that form their
chief concern. The Depressed Classes feel that they will get no shred of the political
power unless the political machinery for the new constitution is of a special make. In the
construction of that machine certain hard facts of Indian social life must not be lost
sight of. It must be recognised that Indian Society is a gradation of Castes forming an
ascending scale of reverence and a descending scale of contempt—a system which gives
no scope for the growth of that sentiment of equality and
fraternity so essential for a democratic form of Government.
It must also be recognised that while the intelligentsia is a very important part of
Indian society, it is drawn from its upper strata and although it speaks in the name of
the country and leads the political movement, it has not shed the narrow particularism of
the class from which it is drawn. In other words what the Depressed Classes wish to urge
is that the political mechanism must take account of and must have a definite relation to
the psychology of the society for which it is devised. Otherwise you are likely to produce
a constitution which, however symmetrical, will be truncated one and a total misfit to the
society for which it is designed.
There
is one point with which I should like to deal before I close this matter. We are often
reminded that the problem of the Depressed Classes is a social problem and that its
solution lies elsewhere than in politics. We take strong exception to this view. We hold
that the problem of the Depressed Classes will never be solved unless they get political
power in their own hands. If this is true, and I do not think that the contrary can be maintained, then problem of Depressed
Classes is I submit eminently a political problem and must be treated as such. We know
that political power is passing from the British into the hands of those who wield such tremendous economic, social and religious
sway over our existence. We are willing that it may happen, though the idea of Swaraj
recalls to the mind of many of us the tyrannies, oppressions and injustices practised upon
us in the past and fear of their recurrence under Swaraj. We are prepared to take the
inevitable risk of the situation in the hope that we shall be installed, in adequate
proportion, as the political sovereigns of the country along with our fellow countrymen.
But we will consent to that on one condition and that is that the settlement of our
problems is not left to time. I am afraid the Depressed Classes have waited too long for
time to work its miracle. At every successive step taken by the British Government to
widen the scope of representative Government the Depressed Classes have been
systematically left out. No thought has been given to their claim for political power. I
protest with all the emphasis I can that we will not stand this any longer. The settlement
of our problem must be a part of the general political
settlement and must not be left over to the shifting sands of the sympathy and goodwill of
the rulers of the future. The reasons why the Depressed Classes insist upon it are
obvious. Every one of us knows that the man in possession is more powerful than the man
who is out of possession. Everyone of us also knows that those in possession of power
seldom abdicate in favour of those who are out of it. We cannot therefore hope for the
effectuation of the settlement of our social problem. If we allow power to slip into the
hands of those who stand to lose by settlement unless we are to have another revolution to
dethrone those, whom we today help to ascend the throne of power and prestige. We prefer
being despised for too anxious apprehensions, than ruined by too confident a security, and
I think it would be just and proper for us to insist that the best guarantee for the
settlement of our problem is the adjustment of the political machine itself so as to give
us a hold on it, and not the will of those who are contriving to be left in unfettered control of that machine.
What
adjustments of the political machine the Depressed Classes want for their safety and
protection I will place before the Conference at the proper time. All I will say at the
present moment is that, although we want responsible Government, we do not want a
Government that will only mean a change of masters. Let the Legislature be fully and
really representative if your Executive is going to be fully responsible.
I
am sorry Mr. President. I had to speak in such plain words. But I saw no help. The
Depressed Classes have had no friend. The Government has all along used them only as an
excuse for its continued existence. The Hindus claim them only to deny them or, better
still, to appropriate rights. The Mohammedans refuse to
recognise their separate existence, because they fear that their privileges may be curtailed by the admission of a rival. Depressed by
the Government, suppressed by the Hindu and disregarded by the Muslim, we are left in a
most intolerable position of utter helplessness to which I am sure there is no parallel and to which I was bound to call attention.
Regarding
the other question, which is set down for discussion, I am sorry it was decided to tag it
on to a general debate. Its importance deserved a session
for itself. No justice can be done to it in a passing reference. The subject is one in
which the Depressed Classes are deeply concerned and they regard it as a very vital
question. As members of a minority, we look to the Central
Government to act as a powerful curb on the provincial majority to save the minorities
from the misrule of the majority. As an Indian, interested in the growth of Indian nationalism, I must make it plain that I am a strong believer in the Unitary form of
Government and the thought of disturbing it I must confess does not please me very much.
This Unitary Government has been the most potent influence
in the building up of the Indian nation. That process of unification, which has been the
result of a unified system of Government, has not been completed and I should be loathed to withdraw this most powerful stimulus in the
formative period and before it has worked out its end.
However,
the question in the form in which it is placed is only an academic question and I shall be prepared to consider a federal form, if
it can be shown that in it local autonomy is not inconsistent with central unity.
Sir,
all that I, as a representative of the depressed classes, need say on their behalf I have
said. May I crave your indulgence to permit me as an Indian to say a word or two generally
on the situation, which we have to meet. So much has been said regarding its gravity that
I shall not venture to add a word more to it, although I am no silent spectator of the movement. What I am anxious
about is to feel whether we are proceeding on right lines in evolving our solution. What that solution should
be rests entirely upon the view that British delegates choose to take. Addressing myself
to them I will say, whether you will meet the situation by conciliation or by applying the
iron heel must be a matter for your judgement for the responsibility is entirely yours. To
such of you as are particular to the use of force and believe
that a regime of LETTERS DE CACHET and the Bastille will
ease the situation, let me recall the memorable words of the greatest teacher of political
philosophy, Edmund Burke. This is what he said to the
British nation when it was faced with the problem of dealing
with the American colonies:
"
The use of force alone is but temporary. It may endure for a moment, but it does not
remove the necessity of subduing again; a nation is not
governed which is perpetually to be conquered. The next
objection to force is its uncertainty. Terror is not always
the effect of force, and an armament is not a victory. If you do not succeed, you are
without resource; for conciliation failing, force remains,
but force failing, no further hope of reconciliation is left. Power and authority are
sometimes bought by kindness, but they can never be begged as alms by an impoverished and
defeated violence. A further objection to force is that you impair the object by your very
endeavours to preserve it. The thing you fought for (to wit the loyalty of the people) is
not the thing you recover but depreciated, sunk, wasted and consumed in the contest."
The
worth and efficacy of this advice you all knew. You did not listen to it and you lost the
great continent of America. You followed it to the lasting good of yourself and the rest
of the Dominions that are with you. To such of you as are willing to adopt a policy of
conciliation I should like to say one thing. There seems to be prevalent an impression
that the Delegates are called here to argue for and against a case for Dominion Status and
that the grant of Dominion Status will be dependent upon which side is the victor in this
battle of wits. With due deference to all who are sharpening their wits, I submit that
there can be no greater mistake than to make the formula of logic govern so live an issue. I have no quarrel with logic and
logicians. But I warn them against the disaster that is bound to follow if they are not
careful in the selection of the premises they choose to adopt for their deductions. It is
all a matter of temper whether you will abide by the fall of your logic, or whether you
will refute it, as Dr. Johnson did the paradoxes of Berkeley
by trampling them under his feet. I am afraid it is not
sufficiently realised that in the present temper of the country, no constitution will be
workable which is not acceptable to the majority of the people. The time when you were to
choose and India was to accept is gone, never to return. Let the consent of the people and
not the accident of logic be the touchstone of your new
constitution, if you desire that it should be worked.
COMMITTEE
OF THE WHOLE CONFERENCE
[f2]Comments
on the Interim Report of Sub-Committee No. I (Federal Structure)—16th
December 1930
[f3]Dr. Ambedkar:
I should like to raise the point, which my friend Mr. Joshi
made before we adjourned. The Lord Chancellor, as the
Chairman of this Sub-Committee, invited some of the delegates to submit any views they
might have on these particular matters, and a few delegates including myself submitted a
letter to the Chairman of the Sub-Committee, and expressed our wish that that letter
should be submitted to the Sub-Committee for consideration. I do not find in the Report
any reference to that letter, and I was informed by Lord Sankey
that that letter was not placed before the Sub-Committee, but was sent to you, Sir, as
Prime Minister. I do not think that that was quite a proper way of dealing with it. The
letter was submitted to the Chairman of the Sub-Committee, for the Sub-Committee's use and
it expressed certain definite views we held on the question of Federation. I am bound to
make this comment because, speaking for myself, the Report as drawn up is so much at
variance with the principles expressed in the letter that I find we shall have at some
stage to raise a debate on this question, and I should like
to know what steps the Lord Chancellor proposes to take.
Lord
Sankey:
I am very much obliged to Dr. Ambedkar for raising the point he has done, because I should
have liked to have raised it myself, and it gives me the opportunity of saying a few words
which I should have said at the beginning........ This is not a complete picture........
soon you are going to be presented with the complete picture, and Dr. Ambedkar, I shall
want your assistance, .........Now with regard to the letter. Dr. Ambedkar, that you were good enough to send to me, I have
considered it very carefully, and it will be vital to discuss it when we come to No. 6.§[f4]
Dr.
Ambedkar:
All I should like to know, if I may say so, is whether you will place that letter before
the Committee. At what stage you may do so is a matter which I must leave to you.
Lord
Sankey:
One moment, Dr. Ambedkar. I am going to do a good deal more than that; I am not only going to place your letter before the
Committee. I am going to draw the Committee's attention to it myself.
Dr.
Ambedkar:
I am obliged. That is enough for me.
Lord
Sankey:
One moment. I have not finished. When you are as old as I am, you will not be in such a
hurry. Instead of having to do the job myself, I personally
should very much take the gentlemen who presented the letter to come and do the job. If I
have to do it myself, I shall not do it as well as you gentlemen would. But I will do this
: not a word of the letter shall be left out; but it is not quite the time to consider it yet, because it
must be considered at that important time when we come to No. 6.
Comments
on paragraph 16 of the Report, which dealt with
Governor-General's
special power
[f5]Dr. Ambedkar :
Sir, before you proceed, I should like to make it plain that the power given to the
Governor-General to intervene to avoid serious prejudice to the interests of any section
of the population must remain. The power must be embodied in the constitution in the same
form as under section 93 of the Canadian Constitution.
Lt. Col. Gidney:
Sir, I agree with and support everything that Dr. Ambedkar has said about the
Governor-General having reserved power in such matters as he has mentioned.
*****
[f6]Chairman:
Paragraph 34. I call on Col. Gidney.
Lt.
Col. Gidney:
I have one observation to make on this paragraph and I do so in conjunction with paragraph
29. Whereas in paragraph 29 a population ratio is to be adopted in estimating the
representation of various communities in the upper chamber, in this paragraph 34, you use
the word " possibly " which still further closes the door to minorities and
special interests even to get a single representative in the upper chamber. I would
suggest that that word " possibly " be deleted from this paragraph and the other words
following, " and certainly in the Lower Chamber " be also deleted, as that the reconstructed paragraph
will read:
"
Provision should be made for the representation in both chambers, however small this
representation be "
I
think all the minority communities have every entitlement to representation in the upper
house, however small it be.
Dr.
Ambedkar:
I associate myself with what Col. Gidney has said. (Paragraph 34 dealt with representation
of special interests and of the Crown in Federal Legislature.)
IN
SUB-COMMITTEE No. II
(PROVINCIAL
CONSTITUTION)
[f7]Dr. Ambedkar: I propose to divide my remarks under
three heads : (1) provincial autonomy, (2) responsibility in
the provinces, (3) provincial services. I make a distinction between provincial autonomy
and provincial services. It seems to me that the question of provincial autonomy raises
the definition of the relations of the provincial Executive and Legislature vis-a-vis the Central Government and the Central Legislature. The first remark I would
offer with the attitude of those who hold that the time has arrived when the provincial
Governments ought to be left with as complete an autonomy as is possible under the
circumstances, and they should be free from such control as the Central Government now
exercises. But, Sir, I cannot help making this further observation, that viewing the
problem of provincial autonomy from the standpoint of the particular class I represent in
this Conference and of the interests of India as a whole and the working classes in
particular, I think that in any future constitution that we propose to devise for endowing
the Provinces with provincial autonomy we must take into consideration certain facts which
are bound to limit the character of that autonomy.
The
first limiting factor in the provincial autonomy is that it must be made subject to such
questions of a provincial character which are, although provincial in nature, also of an
All-India character. The Provinces may have their say with regard to these subjects, and
yet the Central Government should not be excluded from its jurisdiction with regard to
them. For instances, I would like to draw an illustration from labour legislation,
legislation affecting tenants and affecting agriculture. These, no doubt, in a country
like India, must become provincial subjects yet I do not think they can be viewed entirely
from such a small compass. They cannot be regarded as entirely provincial and without an
All-India character. The Central Government must have some jurisdiction over subjects of this character, notwithstanding that it cuts across
provincial autonomy.
Secondly,
I should state that in dividing the powers of Government between the Central and the
Provincial Governments in the future constitution of India with a view to giving the
Provinces as complete an autonomy as possible, it will also
be necessary that such powers as remain undefined must be left with the Central
Government. Well, I do not think that there is no other view on that point. But I say that
in the present situation in India, where the separatist tendency exists to such an extent
as we all know it. where provincial and local parochialism is more dominant than national
feeling, while we are building up a Federated India with complete autonomy of the units,
we still have the problem of making India as a whole a strong and united country. I would
make this further observation, namely, that I do not think
that the reservation of powers in the Central Government is likely to affect the autonomy
of the Provinces. The reservation of powers as interpreted by the Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council in the case of Canada has not had this over-riding effect. It means a
power that comes into existence in an emergency in a field not specifically allotted to
the Provinces. I do not think that the Provincial autonomy should be really affected.
The
second thing I should like to observe in connection with this question of Provincial
autonomy is that that autonomy must be limited by the affording of protection for the
interests of the minorities and of the Depressed Classes. As I visualise the situation in India as it will result from the new constitution, I find there
will be certain Provinces in which some communities will be in a majority, but in all the
Provinces the Depressed Classes, whom I represent, will be
in a minority. They will be in a minority in every Province. I cannot understand how we
can at this state permit the Provincial majorities to have a
complete uninterrupted and undiluted sway over the destinies of these poor people, without
any right of appeal being given to the latter in regard to mal-administration
or neglect of their interests. There must be some authority somewhere, over and above the
Provincial Government, which will be in a position to intervene and rescue them from any
adverse position in which they may be placed by the
Provincial majorities.
These
are the three things, which, in my opinion at any rate must limit the autonomy of the
future Provincial Governments of India.
Coming
to the question of the character of responsibility in the Provincial Governments, my first
observation is that the whole question of responsibility in the Provincial Legislature is
entirely dependent upon the kind of Legislature that you are going to get in the
Provinces. If the Legislature that you are going to get in the Provinces is a Legislature
which is going to be a mirror of the whole population of the
Province, if it is going to be thoroughly representative and not merely representative as
a museum is, where there are a few specimens of every species for the observation of the
general onlooker; if every minority and every class which
fears its existence will be jeopardised is placed on a position to make its influence
felt, then I think in a Legislature of that sort there will be no harm in conceding the
principle that Provincial responsibility may be introduced to the fullest extent. That is
my first observation.
Making
that a condition that the Legislatures shall be fully and adequately representative of all
the classes, I see no objection to the subjects, which are now, reserved being transferred
to popular control.
Coming
to the question of whether the responsibility in the Provinces should be joint or should
be individual I have not the slightest hesitation in saying that the responsibility not
only should be joint but must be joint. I have been a member of Legislative Council, and I
have seen how Ministries in the Provinces have worked. It has been a most painful
experience for me, as it has been the experience, I believe, of many of those who have had
the misfortune or the good fortune to be members of a Legislative Council, to find that
Ministries have been working as a kind of loose confederation, without having any complete
or unanimous view on a particular policy which they adopted. There have been divided
counsels, and cases of Ministers not being very willing to support each other.
What
has been the result? The result is this, that in no instance
have we had any considered policy put forward by the Cabinet as a whole, worked out in
detail and placed before the Legislative Council. Things
have been done by fits and starts, and I do not think we want our responsibility in future
to be bungled in that fashion.
Turning
now to the question of communal representation in the Cabinets, I must confess that I am
not very much drawn to the suggestion, which is often made that there should be communal
representation in the Cabinet. I am not, of course, oblivious of the fact; in fact, I am very conscious of it that if the minority
communities are not represented in the Cabinet it is very possible, and even very likely,
that in matters of administration which affect their daily lives their interests may be
affected very prejudicially by the policy of Ministers whose
dominant interest is communalism. I do not forget that for a moment, but my submission is
that there is a better way of dealing with that sort of evil, and it seems to me that if
the minorities could get constitutional and statutory guarantees laid down in the
Constitutional Act itself against anything likely to injure their interests being done or
left undone by the Cabinet, the danger which most of us apprehend from the fact that the
Cabinets may be communally dominated, will vanish, and we shall not have much cause to
insist on communal representation in the Cabinet. Although I am very desirous that the
Chief Minister, whoever he is, should recognise or should be made to recognise the interest of having most of the important minorities
represented in the Cabinet, we cannot for the moment forget that, after all, a Cabinet
office is a very responsible office. A Cabinet Minister has not merely to look after the
interests of the minorities; he has to see to the safety and
interest of the Province as a whole. That demands ability and competence; it does not merely demand a communal outlook, and it is from
that point of view that I look at the matter. I should like to have the interests of the
minorities and the Depressed Classes safeguarded in such a manner that constitutionally it
would be impossible for Ministers drawn from the majority communities to do anything
prejudicial to the minorities or to neglect their interests.
Coming
to the question of the relations between the Governor and his Ministry, I think one thing
is obvious, namely that no constitution, if it is really to embody full responsible
Government and collective responsibility, can permit the Governor the power to interfere
in the day-to-day administration of the country. That would run quite across the system of
responsible Government and collective responsibility. The Ministry must be allowed to
carry on the day-to-day administration on the basis of joint responsibility.
When
we come to the question of the emergency powers which it is suggested should be left with
the Governor. I find myself in a somewhat difficult
position, because I do not understand exactly what is meant. Is it meant that when an
emergency arises the Governor should simply dismiss the Ministry and have nothing to do
with it, and should promulgate whatever laws, ordinances or measures he thinks are
necessary to meet the situation, notwithstanding the fact that they are opposed by the
Ministry? I do not know what is wanted. I can quite understand the Governor should have
the absolute, undoubted and unrestricted power of dismissing a Ministry which he thinks is
not acting in the best interests of the country, but I cannot understand how there can be
responsible Government in a Province in which the Governor is allowed to do a thing
without a Ministry. It is one thing to say that the Governor should have a Ministry with
which he agrees in a particular emergency, but it is quite a different thing to say that
when an emergency arises the Governor should simply disregard the Ministry altogether. I
think this point will have to be worked out in some deal, for, as I say, I do not quite
understand it.
Coming
to the question of the Services, there is one observation I am bound to make. I quite
agree in principle that with provincial autonomy the power of regulating the Services in a
Province should belong to that Province, and that the Provinces should have full liberty
to Indianise the Services as they desire and according to
their means and circumstances. The observation which I feel bound to make, however, is
this: I cannot forget that Indians are communal minded. We
do hope it is only a hope that a time will come when all Indians will cease to look at
problems from a communal point of view in administrating matters which are left to their
charge, but that is only a hope; it is not a fact. The fact is that Indians do
discriminate between class and class, community and community, in administering such
discretion as is left to them in their administration of the law. That is a fact I cannot
get over ; it is a fact from which I have suffered
immensely. My fear with regard to the future constitution of India is that having regard
to the present position of the depressed classes, having regard to the fact that education
is not widely spread amongst them, and having regard to the fact that there is hardly a
single individual holding a gazetted post in the Bombay Presidency for instance,—
Dr.
Ambedkar :
Yes, there is one, and that is the exception, which proves the rule. You know how much
trouble I had to get him in. I very much fear that this Indianisation
may work out as a tyranny, and therefore, from my particular point of view, I should like
to emphasise that at any rate for some time it will be necessary to maintain a British
element in the Services. I do not say there should be no Indianisation, but I do say that,
having regard to our interests, it should be rather slower than some people desire it to
be.
These
are the general remarks that I wish to offer from our point of view.
Third Sitting— 8th December 1930
[f8]Dr. Ambedkar:
May I make a suggestion ? It seems to me this question of
Second Chambers is so important that it cannot be discussed properly and adequately by
being tacked on to the series of heads we are now discussing. In my opinion a special day
ought to be allotted to this subject. I see very little connection between the subject of
Second Chambers and that of the protection of minorities, or any of the other matters
enumerated in items I and 2. It seems to me this is a very important question. I find
nothing in this list of heads dealing with the composition of the Legislature; if you were to add a head " Composition of the
Legislature" we should have a proper opportunity of discussing the whole subject.
Chairman:
I cannot see how you can separate this whole subject and split it
up.
Dr.
Ambedkar:
The question of Second Chambers can certainly be separated from that of minorities.
Chairman:
Not entirely. Whether there is to be a Second Chamber or not affects almost every other
subject that comes up, the powers of the Governor vis-a-vis
the Executive and the Legislature, the powers of the Legislature and so on. I think you
had better let us go on, and if at the end we find the discussion has not been adequate,
we will try to arrange for a further discussion on this subject by itself.
Fourth Sitting—9th December 1930
[f9]Dr.
Ambedkar :
It may be. But I am taking these two communities for the moment because they are
important. It seems to me that any argument, which is based upon that fact is an argument,
which leads to a conclusion which, will never enable us to transfer law and order.
Therefore it seems to me that that is an argument which ought not to be adopted or
accepted. It seems to me also that the noble Marquess assumes that although a Mohammedan
or a Hindu will be in charge of the department of law and order, he will be entirely subject to the
whims of the particular community to which he belongs. My submission, Sir, is this, that
assumes that the future of political parties in India will be so constituted that they will be divided on
religious lines and not on the lines of political or economic differences. As I view the situation it seems to me that in the future
constitution of India the Executive will be so divided that
we shall see less of the religious and racial distinctions coming to the surface and we
shall find a Hindu Minister having a
party and a following containing a large element of Mohammedans, and a Mohammedan Minister with a following of
Hindus in his group, if that happens, and I take it is
almost a certainty that it will happen, I do not understand how, for instance, a Hindu Minister who is in charge of law and order could administer law
and order in such a manner as to offend the susceptibilities
of a part of the group which supports him in office. It seems to me therefore that the
fears so far as this particular aspect of the matter is concerned are rather unfounded.
The
second thing which seems to be agreed upon more or less is this, that not only should the
Executive be a unified Executive but that the responsibility of this unified Executive
should be joint and not several. With these conclusions,
Sir, I agree, but the points of difference that have arisen in the course of the debate to
which we have listened largely relate to the composition of the Executive and it seems to
me that there arise three different questions for our
consideration in connection with the composition of the
Executive. The first question is : should the Executive be
confined to members of the Legislature or should it be open to individuals who are
officials or non-officials and who are outside the Legislature ?
The second question is: should it consist of members of the minority communities?
The third question is: whether the Governor should have the
responsibility of appointing the Ministers himself or whether
he should appoint the Chief Minister and leave the matter of the selection of his
colleagues to that Chief Minister.
Now,
Sir, on all these three questions my answer is in the affirmative. Personally, I do not
see why the membership of the Cabinet should be rigorously restricted and confined to the
members of the Legislature. I also do not see why there should not exist some provisions
whereby the Executive should not be made as representative as possible of all the
communities that are represented in the Legislature. Thirdly, regarding the power of the
Governor to compose his Ministry, it seems to me that we must admit that it is his
prerogative right to constitute the Ministry and that you must have discretion left to him
in the matter of selecting his men. But, Sir, when I say that I answer these three
questions in the affirmative, namely, that the Executive need not be confined to the
members of the Legislature, that some provision should exist whereby different communities
may be represented in the Cabinet, and that the Governor should have left with him
abundant discretion in order to form his Cabinet, I say when I make these admissions I
make them subject to one supreme condition. That supreme condition is that however the
Executive is composed, it shall abide by one principle, namely that it shall accept joint
responsibility. If, for instance, this principle of joint responsibility is made
obligatory upon the Executive, it seems to me that the importation of a foreign element
into the Cabinet will not be a disturbing factor as it is
supposed to be. If, for instance, the new-comer who does not belong to the Legislative
Council comes into the Cabinet and accepts joint responsibility along with the Cabinet, I
do not see any reason why such a procedure should not be permitted. It was pointed out
that it may so happen that when a Ministry is censured and it goes out, the official or
the one who does not belong to the Legislature will remain
while the other members of the Cabinet will go out; that
when a new Ministry is formed, he will be again tacked on to the Ministry and that he will
be perpetually in the Council. It seems to me with all
respects that that is a somewhat fallacious view, because, unless the members who are
drawn from the Legislature to form the Ministry are prepared to take him along with them
and are prepared to bear the responsibility of his actions, they will not consent to work
with when he accepts their advice and they accept his advice. If, for instance, a Prime
Minister were so situated that he could safely take an outsider into his Cabinet and at
the same time maintain the confidence of the House, I do not see why the Chief Minister
should be prevented from having that privilege accorded to him.
In
the same way, Sir, if, for instance, it was found possible
that the Governor should have powers to see that the different minority communities are
represented in his Cabinet, and if at the same time it is made perfectly clear that
whoever is appointed to the Cabinet must accept joint responsibility with the others, then
I submit there is no harm in allowing this sort of thing. It seems to me therefore that
the point which it is necessary to emphasise
is that the Governor may have the power which as I say belongs to him as of right to
compose the Ministry in any way he likes provided that the Ministry does not violate in
its operation the principle of its being, namely, that it is to work on the principle of
joint responsibility.
Now
the next question to which I will address myself, Sir, is how best to achieve this result, how best to bring out a responsible and
unified Executive. It seems to me there are two ways open to us. One way is to define in
the constitution itself the character of the Executive by law; the
other is to leave to convention the constitution of the Executive. Both these ways are
adopted, as you all know. We all know that in the Dominions of Canada, South Africa and
Australia, responsible Government of a unified character is entirely a matter of
convention. Everyone of us knows that in the Canadian Act or in the Acts of South Africa
or Australia the words " responsible Government " do not arise. It is not even mentioned in the Canadian
Act, as I found to my great surprise, that the Ministers who are to advise the Governor
are to be members of the Legislature, although as a matter of fact they are. On the other
hand, as we know, in the constitutions of Ireland, Malta and Rhodesia
this is a subject which is not left to convention, it is something which is incorporated
in law. In Ireland we know that the Prime Minister is a creature of statute, the joint
responsibility is also defined by law.
I
therefore think that we shall have to make our choice
between the two, and in making the choice I for one would be guided by two considerations.
I fully realise that when a matter is left to convention it is possible that the
convention may be wrongly worked, that it may be abused, and may be abused with impunity.
The danger of matters being left to convention in a country like India seems to me to be
greater because there are no parties in India which have a keen eye on the way in which
the constitution works and we may have Ministers less interested in working the
constitution in the right spirit than in maintaining their seats in the Cabinet. On the
other hand it seems to me that where matters are defined by law it must necessarily take
away all the discretion that must necessarily be left to a Governor. In a country like
India where the political field with all its communal and racial difficulties is an
absolutely uncharted sea, it seems to me that we must so contrive that sufficient
discretion will be left with the Governor. My concrete suggestion therefore is this, that
joint responsibility of the Executive should be prescribed by law and that everything else
should be left to the discretion of the Governor, so that we shall have satisfied both the
conditions : we shall have provided that whatever
responsibility there is, is joint responsibility and that the composition of the Executive is at the same
time not hampered in such a manner that the communities
which do require to be represented in the Cabinet may be represented or that the necessity
which Prime Minister may feel of having a non-official, I mean an outsider, in his Cabinet
is provided for. If we do that, if we insist by law, not leaving it to the discretion of
the Governor, that the Executive shall be a joint Executive with joint responsibility, I
think all other matters may be left without any fear of abuse to the choice of the
Governor.
Now
Sir, the next topic which I will take for consideration is
that of the powers of the Governor vis-a-vis his Executive. The present relations
between the Governor and the Minister, as well we all know, are defined in section 52, sub-clause 3. That clause says that in all
transferred matters— and all matters will now be transferred, none being
reserved—the Governor shall be guided by the advice of his Ministers ; and it adds a further proviso that if he sees sufficient
cause to dissent from the advice of his Ministers he may cause action to be taken
otherwise than in accordance with that advice. With all due
respect to those who framed that clause, and they did it with the best intention of providing responsible Government, I cannot help
saying that this clause as it now stands is a perversion of responsible Government; it makes responsible Government a matter of convenience, a
matter which may be accepted and followed when it suits the Governor, whereas as a matter
of fact what we want is that responsible Government should be a matter of obligation. If
responsible Government means anything it means this, that in whatever action the Governor
takes in any field he has the support of a Ministry which has the
confidence of the House. That is a fundamental proposition
which we cannot ignore. It does not of course mean that a Governor must always accept the
advice of his Ministry; it leaves it open to the Governor to
throw out the Ministry, to say he will not abide by their advice;
but then if the Governor chooses to differ from his Ministry his obligation is not to act
on his own initiative but to find some other Ministers who
will support his action. So that the proposition is that at all times when the Governor
takes action he takes action which is in conformity with the
views of Ministers who have the confidence of the House. My submission therefore is that
this clause, namely section 52, must be so altered as to
make it plain that unless specific provision is made to the contrary by statute there may
be cases which, I will come to a little later, the Governor shall always act upon the
advice of the Ministers.
Now,
Sir, I do readily agree that there may be cases in which it is necessary to provide the Governor with over-riding powers,
powers in respect to which he will not be obliged to follow the advice of his Ministers
but will have the right of independent action. Those cases
are mentioned in paragraph 50, page 36 of Volume 2 of the Report of the Simon Commission.
The first is that he should have over-riding powers in order to preserve the safety and
tranquillity of the Province; secondly, he should have
over-riding powers in order to prevent serious prejudice to one or more sections of the
community as compared with other sections; and then lastly
it mentions certain cases where the Governor may have fixed upon him specific
responsibility as apart from the responsibility of the whole of the Executive, in which
case it says that he should also have over-riding powers.
With
regard to these items my first submission is this, that if you are going to give the
Governor to over-ride his Ministers to preserve the peace, safety and tranquillity of the
Province, it seems to me you are taking away a very large part of responsible Government in the Provinces. After all, what we are
striving for is that the Provinces shall be governed in all matters, including even the
peace, safety and tranquillity of the Province, by a Governor on the advice of his
Ministers; and, if you reserve powers to the Governor to act
contrary to their advice, it seems to me you are to a very large extent nullifying the
powers of responsible Government. I should not, therefore, give the Governor over-riding
powers in a matter of this sort, unless some way could be found whereby this large
formula, which seems to me to eat-up the whole situation, might be very narrowly defined.
Coming
to the other question, namely prejudice to one section of the community as compared with
the others, my own view is that although this is a very salutary thing my preference is
that such matters as are likely prejudicial to affect the interests of any particular
community should be governed by statute; it should not be
left to the sweet will of the Governor. I say that for this very good reason. After all, a
Governor has to keep in touch with a Cabinet which is supported by a majority in the
Legislature. He can never work at cross purposes with the Cabinet;
the greatest amity must prevail between them, and I am not sure the Governor would
always be so minded as to quarrel with a Cabinet which represented a majority in the House
merely in order to protect a minority which, in his eyes, might not be very important.
Although, therefore, I agree with the underlying suggestion there. I rather prefer that
the interests of the minorities should be protected in a firmer manner than is suggested,
and for myself I should be prepared to delete this clause.
Regarding
the other items 3, 4 and 5, I agree that in cases of this sort the Governor must have
over-riding powers, because they are cases where he personally is made responsible for the
administration of those subjects.
Coming
to the next subject, the powers of the Governor vis-a-vis
the Legislature, I will divide my remarks under three heads. There is first of all
budgetary legislation; secondly, ordinary legislation and
thirdly, emergency legislation. The Governor has today powers of certification with regard
to the provision for reserved subjects, and that will necessarily go with the abolition of
anarchy. Secondly, the Governor has authority to authorise expenditure for the safety and
tranquillity of the Province. It seems to me that if you are going to leave questions of
peace and tranquillity to be settled by a responsible ministry, the Governor should not
possess this power of authorising expenditure for the safety and tranquillity of the
Province. In the next place, be has the power of certifying Bills, which are of two sorts.
He may certify that a particular Bill which is being discussed in the Legislature shall
not be discussed because it affects the safety and tranquillity of the Province, and he
has also the power to certify a Bill which is in the interests of the safety and
tranquillity of the Province even though the Legislature may not desire to pass it in the
ordinary course. It seems to me both these powers should go;
they will not be necessary in the future constitution of India.
He
has also powers of previous sanction; certain subjects have
to be previously sanctioned by him before they can be discussed, and in my opinion this
power should go.
Sir
Ahmad Sayed Khan:
Discriminatory legislation ?
Dr.
Ambedkar :
That should be dealt with by Statute ; I should not leave it
to the Governor. The Governor must have the power of veto, and in view of the fact that
there will be no Second Chamber in those Provinces which do not want it, it is very
necessary that the Governor should have the power of veto. The Governor today has also the
power of returning a Bill to the House for reconsideration. This is a very useful power
which exists in the constitutions of the various Dominions, and I think it should be
retained. The Governor has also power to reserve a Bill for the consideration of the
Governor-General and the cases in which he should do so are defined by Statute. That is a
matter, I think which might be more conveniently considered when we consider the relations
of the Provincial Governments to the Central Government, but I should like to make one
observation on this subject. We should so endeavour to contrive our Provincial
constitution that it will function independently, as far as possible of the interference
of the Central Government in those domains which have been transferred to its control. We
must make a constitution under which there will be no occasion for constant intervention
by the Central Government, either administratively or legislatively by the reservation of Bills.
With
regard to the question of safeguards for Law and Order and for minorities, I have already
stated that Law and Order should be transferred, but I am prepared to make one suggestion,
for what it is worth. In cases of emergency, when Law and Order are being jeopardised, I
suggest the Governor should have power to pass orders finally, without respect to the
advice of the Ministry, regarding the posting and transfer of Police officers. I think
that is very necessary; it is essential.
Sir
Cowasji Jehangir:
In case of emergency only ?
Dr.
Ambedkar:
Yes, but not in other cases.
Mr.
Paul:
Not in normal times ?
Dr.
Ambedkar:
Not in normal times, no, but in cases of emergency when a riot has taken place or a
disturbance has occurred, it is very necessary that an impartial officer like the
Governor, who is not swayed by what is happening in the Cabinet, should have the ultimate
power to see that people are not transferred from one place to another to suit one
community or the other community
when a riot is actually proceeding. It seems to me that it gives him sufficient power for
the purpose of safeguarding the administration of Law and Order.
With
regard to the question of minorities, it was suggested by some speakers that a Second
Chamber would afford protection to minorities, and my friend Mr. Wood threw out the
suggestion that I had not carefully considered the position of the Depressed Classes in
relation to a Second Chamber. I should like to assure my friend that I have given the
matter most careful consideration, and I thoroughly agree
with my friend Mr. Paul that these Second Chambers, far from being a protection to
minorities, will be really milestones round their necks.
There
is one subject I did not touch on before, but which I should like briefly to mention now,
namely, the relation of the Governor to his Cabinet. Should
he preside over the Cabinet as a matter of right or should he not ? Should there be the system which prevails in this country
where the Cabinet holds its meetings without the King being there, and if so what should
be the means of communicating the results and decisions arrived at by the Cabinet to the
Governor? I do not know if that arises on this item; if it
does not, I will not waste time in discussing it.
Chairman:
We have generally discussed the whole question, so that if you desire to continue I shall
not object.
Dr.
Ambedkar:
In that connection I want to say one thing. The Simon Commission has suggested that a
Cabinet Secretary should be appointed who would be of the same status as an I.C.S. Officer, and who would act as the liaison officer of the
Cabinet to the Governor. In throwing out that suggestion the Commission says it has drawn
on the practice that has now become prevalent in this country, namely, that the Cabinet
now always has a Secretary, which formerly it did not have. I should like to submit,
however, that it is one thing to say that the Cabinet should have a Secretary, but it is a
totally different thing to say that that Secretary should have access to the Governor over
the heads of the Ministers. In this country the practice does exist, probably, of
appointing a Secretary, but I do not think any Cabinet or Prime Minister in this country
would consent to that Cabinet Secretary having access to His Majesty over the heads of the
Ministers or over the head of the Prime Minister; such a
thing would be intolerable. We know that in this country the Cabinet throughout all its
history has laid emphasis on the fact that the persons who will be near to His Majesty
should be persons who will bear the same complexion as the Ministry, and we know that that
has been carried so far that even the Ladies of the Chamber who wait upon the Queen are
required to be nominated by the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. The situation suggested,
therefore, seems to me almost impossible. I do not think any Cabinet which is working on
the principle of joint responsibility will consent to have a Secretary of this kind
attached to it.
On
the other hand, if the Governor is given the power to preside over the Cabinet when it is
discussing its policy, I doubt very much whether that will work, because although the
Ministry may, and indeed must, communicate to the Governor the decisions at which it has
arrived, I do not think the Ministry will consent to disclose to the Governor the reasons
which have led it to come to those decisions. The reasons may be very particular and very
delicate, and you all know that the Cabinet is very jealous not to let the Governor know
the reasons why it has arrived at a particular decision. The explanation of that is that
the Governor holds in his hands a tremendous power for
undoing the Ministry for he may not agree to the Ministry's
advice to dissolve the House, but may instead of being
embodied in a Statute, the matter should be left to the Instrument of Instructions, which
may provide that the Governor can attend if he desires to do so, but it should not be
obligatory at all. On the other hand, it should be made obligatory for the Cabinet to
communicate to the Governor all the recommendations at which it arrives at its meeting.
That is all I desire to say on that point.
******
[f10]Dr. Ambedkar :
We should like to say one thing on that point that the Second Chamber should not be
constituted first, and then its abolition should be left to constitutional resolution
requiring a certain majority. What we suggest is that if the
situation is such that it should be left as a matter of discretion in certain Provinces,
then first of all a resolution might be passed by the Provincial Legislature expressing
its desire for a Second Chamber, and then. that the Second Chamber should be constituted.
It should not be first imposed on the Provincial Legislature by the constitution.
Fifth
Sitting—15th December 1930
[f11]Dr. Ambedkar: Sir, I should like to make one or two observations on the amendment which the noble Marquess has moved. I should like to state at once that the position which he has taken up seems to me to be absolutely logical. In this report we are going to provide that certain interests and minority groups may be represented by nomination in the Legislative Council. At the same time we are also making provision in this report that the Governor shall be given an obligation to endeavour to secure that his Cabinet shall be representative of all interests and of all minorities. Now, Sir, unless you provide that in the making up of this Cabinet, the Governor shall also have the right to include members who represent certain important interests by nomination, it seems to me that you are creating an absolutely illogical position. Either you must provide that there shall be no nomination to the Legislative Council at all, that all interests, no matter how minute, shall be secured by election to the Legislative Council, or, if there is to be nomination then you must provide that a nominated member shall have the right to be in the Cabinet if his colleagues are prepared to work with him on the principle of joint responsibility. There is no escape from one or other of those positions.
Now.
Sir, it is stated by friends who are sitting on this side that if we accept this principle, that a nominated member shall be a member of
the Cabinet, or at least that there shall be no ban upon him, it will run counter to the
principle of responsibility. I really cannot understand that position. These gentlemen who
are saying it will run counter to the principle of responsibility are prepared to take the
votes of nominated members. I am taking the report as it stands. I do not know what future
amendments there will be. Supposing the report as it stands
is carried, that there shall be certain members in the Legislative Council who shall be
nominated. Is it the position of these gentlemen that their votes are illegal ? If those who form the Cabinet who are drawn from the elected
portion of the House can validly use the votes of members
who are nominated to the Legislative Council, if those votes can logically become the
basis of the policy of a Government, I cannot see how a member who is one of that nominated group should not become a member of that Cabinet. I fail
altogether to understand it. If, as I say, they can take these votes of nominated members
and utilise them for their own purposes. I cannot understand
what objection there can be to the inclusion of a member from the nominated group in the
Cabinet. I therefore say the position of the noble Marquess is perfectly logical. It seems
to me we have to make a choice whether we shall make a provision of the sort suggested by
the noble Marquess in his amendment, or whether we shall agree to the other proposal which
my friends say they will move at a later stage, that there shall be no nominative element
in the Legislative Councils at all. Personally I would much rather have the whole
Legislative Council elected with no trace of nomination at all. From that point of view I
am not very much in favour of the amendment suggested by the noble Marquess; but if in this Committee or
at any later stage nomination remains, then I think I shall have to agree with the noble
Marquess and accept the amendment he has proposed.
Diwan Bahadur Ramachandra Rao:
I must express my surprise at the speech to which I have just listened.
Dr.
Ambedkar:
You may, but you cannot have it both ways.
Diwan Bahadur Ramachandra Rao : He knows very well that even under the existing system
nominated members are not eligible for appointment as ministers. Section 52 clearly lays
it down that no minister shall hold office for a longer period than six months unless he
is an elected member of the local Legislature.
Dr.
Ambedkar:
That is in the melting pot.
[f12]Dr. Ambedkar:
I am afraid I shall have to oppose this amendment. First of all, such experience of
co-option as we have had in Bombay is not very encouraging. It has developed into the
worst sort of scandal; the amount of corruption and bribery
that take place are such that I for one should not like to introduce this principle in the
constitution of the Legislature of Bombay.
A
further objection is this. If the various communities that do not find themselves elected
at the polls are to get representation of a real sort, representation which is independent
of the influence of any other community, I think co-option is a principle which is
certainly not going to help them, for it may very well happen that when representatives of
the various communities stand for co-option only those will be in fact co-opted as may
happen to be subservient to and willing to play into the hands of the majority. It seems
to me this would be worse than no representation at all, and I am afraid on that ground I
must oppose the amendment. But I submit, Sir, that this Sub-Committee ought to make a
recommendation that the future constitution of the Provincial Legislatures should be such
that there should be no nominated members at all.
Diwan Bahadur Ramachandra Rao:
That is far better, of course.
Dr.
Ambedkar:
That is my own view of the matter. I am certainly opposed to co-option.
Diwan
Bahadur Ramachandra Rao: I agree that some statement
that the Legislature should be wholly elected ought to be inserted in this report, and
unless some such indication is given of the views of this Subcommittee the nominated
element will continue, though I believe it is the desire of most of our members that it
should disappear. A statement to that effect ought to find a place in the report. I have
no doubt whatsoever that everyone of us is quite alive to the evils of nomination, and we
are anxious it should disappear as early as possible. Under these circumstances I am not
prepared to support the amendment, and I would favour the proposal made by my friend, Dr. Ambedkar.
Chairman:
What was the proposal ? I have no words here.
Dr.
Ambedkar :
We should say it is the view of the Sub-Committee that hereafter the Legislative Councils
in the Provinces should be wholly elected. Chairman: That is another amendment altogether, you will have to
send it in writing if you want to move that.
*****
[f13]Chairman:
I will take your decision on this point.
Raja
Narendra Nath:
I support Sir A. P. Patro. I think the power of nomination should be strictly
confined to the representation of interests, which cannot be given by election.
Raja
Narendra Nath:
There may be in certain Provinces some communities, such as the one to which Dr. Ambedkar belongs, for which it would be impossible to arrange
election.
Dr.
Ambedkar:
I should not have anything to do with a constitution which did not provide the franchise
for my community.
Raja
Narendra Nath:
The franchise will have to be arranged on a very different basis if it is to be provided
for the community to which Dr. Ambedkar belongs, and therefore a limited power of
nomination should be provided.
Chairman:
It seems to me the majority of the Sub-Committee is in favour of clause (c) as it stands in the Report.
[f14]
Comments on the Report of Sub-Committee
No.II (Provincial Constitution)—16th December 1930
Mr.
Chintamani opposed the institution of 2nd Chamber in
Provinces. He said, it would be a costly luxury and not an institution of public utility.
In U.P. demand for 2nd Chamber comes from a small section of
the community, which according to Simon Commission, is over-represented in the Provincial
Legislature. He therefore considered this proposed 2nd Chamber as absolutely unnecessary
and undesirable either in U.P. or any other Province in India for any length of time, in
whatever conditions Dr. Ambedkar said,—" I shall
like to associate myself with the remarks which have just fallen from Mr. Chintamani ".
Chairman:
....The
discussion is now on paragraph 5(b). (This paragraph deals with the procedure of
appointment of Ministers.)
Dr.
Ambedkar:
It was moved in the Sub-Committee that the word "
elected " (Elected members of the Provincial
Legislature) should be dropped in view of the recommendation made by the Committee in
another part of the Report that probably some part of the Legislature might have to be
composed of nominated members. It was then decided that if the Committee which would be
constituted to discuss the composition of the Legislature came to the conclusion that
there should be a nominated member, the word " elected " should be dropped.
Chairman:
The word used is "ordinarily" ("The Ministers should ordinarily be drawn ") I think that covers the point. It indicates the
possible necessity of extraordinary action.
IN
SUB-COMMITTEE No. Ill (MINORITIES)
Second Sitting—31st December 1930
[f15]Dr. Ambedkar:
Mr. Chairman, I am sure you will readily agree that the task which has fallen upon me to
represent the case of the Depressed Classes is a heavy one. I think it is for the first
time that the case of the Depressed Classes from the political point of view has come to
be considered. The disabilities of the Depressed Classes were mentioned in almost every
despatch that was recorded by the Government of India in connection with the political
advancement of the country; but the despatches only
mentioned the difficulties and never attempted to give any solution of those difficulties.
The problem was just allowed to rest there. In view of that, and in view of other matters,
namely, that in a Committee consisting of so many members we are only two to voice the
grievances of 43 millions of people, and grievances which the Committee will agree are
unparalleled by the case of any other community that exists in India, I submit that the
task is really an enormous one, and I should have expected
more latitude in the matter of time allowed to me for presenting this case. But I
anticipated that probably such would be the fate that would befall me, as it did, of
course, at the Plenary Session ; and, in anticipation of
that, I and my colleague, Rao Bahadur
Srinivasan, thought it advisable to submit to this
Conference a written memorandum[f16]
giving in clear-cut language what the Depressed Classes desire by way of political
safeguards in the future constitution of India. That memorandum has already been submitted
and circulated among the members of this Committee, and I hope everyone of them has
received it. In view of this fact, that the case of the Depressed Classes is in the
possession of the members of this Committee, I do not wish to ask indulgence from the
Chairman for a larger period to present the case. I will therefore summarise, only to
emphasize, what I have stated in the memorandum which is already in the hands of the
members of the Committee.
Sir,
the first observation that I will make is this, that although there are various minority
communities in India which require political recognition, it has to be understood that the
minorities are not on the same plane, that they differ from each other. They differ in the
social standing which each minority occupies vis-a-vis
the majority community. We have, for instance, the Parsee
community, which is the smallest community in India, and yet, vis-a-vis its social standing with the majority
community, it is probably the highest in order of precedence.
On
the other hand, if you take the Depressed Classes, they are a minority which comes next to
the great Muslim minority in India, and yet their social standard is lower than the social
standard of ordinary human beings.
Again,
if you take the minorities and classify them on the basis of social and political rights,
you will find that there are certain minorities which are in enjoyment of social and
political rights, and the fact that they are in a minority does not necessarily stand in
the way of their full and free enjoyment of those civic rights. But if you take the case
of the Depressed Classes, the position is totally different. They have in certain matters
no rights, and, where they have any, the majority community will not permit them to enjoy
them.
My
first submission to this Committee, then, is that it should realise that although, to use
an illustration, the minorities are all in the same boat, yet the most important fact to
remember is that they are not all in the same class in the same boat; some are travelling in "A" Class, some in " B " Class and some in " C ", and so on. I have not
the slightest doubt in my mind that the Depressed Classes, though they are a minority and
are to that extent in the same boat as other minorities, are not even in "C" or " D " Class but are actually in the hold.
Starting
from that point of view, I agree that, in some respects, the position of the Depressed
Classes is similar to that of the other minorities in India. The Depressed Classes, along
with the other minorities; fear that under any future
Constitution of India by which majority rule will be established and there can be no
shadow of doubt that that majority rule will be the rule of the orthodox Hindus—there
is great danger of that majority with its orthodox Hindu beliefs and prejudices
contravening the dictates of justice, equality and good conscience, there is a great
danger that the minorities may be discriminated against either in legislation or
administration or in the other public rights of citizenship, and therefore it is necessary
to safeguard the position of the minorities in such a manner that the discrimination which
is feared shall not take place.
From
that point of view, however, what is asked is that the minorities shall have
representation in the Legislature and the Executive, that they shall have representation
in the public services of the country, and that the constitution shall provide that there
shall be imposed on the future legislatures of India, both Central and Provincial, certain
limitations on their legislative power which will prevent the majorities from abusing their
legislative power in such a manner as to enact laws which would create discrimination
between one citizen and another. I say, this circumstance— this danger of
discrimination is common to all minorities, and I, as a representative of the Depressed
Classes, join with the demand which the other minorities have made in this regard.
Now,
Sir, I will come to those circumstances which mark off the Depressed Classes and the other
minority communities in India. I will at once say that the way in which the position of
the Depressed Classes differs from the position of the other minority communities in India
is this, that in the first place the Depressed Classes are not entitled, under present
circumstances, to certain civic rights which the other minorities by law enjoy. In other
words, in the existing situation the Depressed Classes suffer from what are called civic
disabilities. I will give you just one or two illustrations, because I know I have not
much time at my disposal.
Take
the case of employment in the Police or in the Army. In the Government of India Act it is
provided that no subject of His Majesty shall be deprived of the right of being employed
in any public service by reason of his caste, creed or colour. Having regard to that, it
is obvious that every member of the Depressed Class community who is capable, who is in a
position to satisfy the test laid down for employment in any public department, should
have the right to enter that public department. But what do we find ? We find this. If a Depressed Class man applies for service in
the Police Department today, he is told point blank by the executive officers of the Government that no member of the Depressed
Classes can be employed in the Police Service, because he is an untouchable person. In the
case of the Military the same situation obtains. Up to 1892 practically the whole of the
Madras Army and the whole of the Bombay Army consisted of members drawn from the Depressed
Classes. All the great wars in the history of India have been fought with the help of
sepoys drawn from the Depressed Classes, both in the Bombay Presidency and in Madras. Yet
in 1892 a rule or regulation was made which debarred the Depressed Classes from entry into
the Military Service, and even today, if you ask a question in the Legislative Council as
to why this is done, the answer is that the bar of untouchability
does create insuperable difficulties in the recruitment of these classes.
I
am quite sure that this disability is as effective as it was imposed by law, and the
section in the Government of India Act, which says that all His Majesty's subjects shall
have free entry into employment provided they are otherwise fit, is altogether set at
naught.
I
can cite many other cases. For instance, there is the difficulty the Depressed Classes
find in getting themselves accommodated in public inn when they are travelling, the
difficulty they find in being taken in an omnibus when travelling from one place to
another, the difficulty they find in securing entry to public schools to which they have
themselves contributed, the difficulty they find in drawing water from a well for the
building of which they have paid taxes, and so on. But I need not go into all these cases.
The one circumstance which distinguishes the position of the Depressed Classes from that
of the other minorities is that they suffer from civic disabilities which are as effective
as though they were imposed by law.
The
second and, in my opinion, the most hideous distinction which marks the Depressed Classes
is that the Depressed Classes are subject to social persecution unknown in any other part
of the world. In that connection I want to read to the Sub-Committee a small extract from
the Report of a Committee appointed by the Government of Bombay in the year 1928 to
investigate into the position of the Depressed Classes. That Committee tried to find out
whether there were any impediments in the way of the Depressed Classes enjoying such
rights as the law gave them in common with other citizens of the State:
"
Although we have recommended various remedies to secure to the Depressed Classes their
rights to all public utilities we fear that there will be difficulties in the way of their
exercising them for a long time to come. The first difficulty is the fear of open violence
against them by the orthodox classes. It must be noted that the Depressed Classes form a
small minority in every village, opposed to which is a great
majority of the orthodox who are bent on protecting their interests and dignity from any
supposed invasion by the Depressed Classes at any cost. The danger of prosecution by the
Police has put a limitation upon the use of violence by the orthodox classes and
consequently such cases are rare.
"
The second difficulty arises from the economic position in which the Depressed Classes are
found today. The Depressed Classes have no economic independence in most parts of the
Presidency. Some cultivate the lands of the orthodox classes as their tenants at will.
Others live on their earnings as farm labourers employed by the orthodox classes and the
rest subsist on the food or grain given to them by the orthodox classes in lieu of service
rendered to them as village servants. We have heard of numerous instances where the
orthodox classes have used their economic power as a weapon against those Depressed
Classes in their villages, when the latter have dared to exercise their rights, and have
evicted them from their lands, and stopped their employment and discontinued their
remuneration as village servants. This boycott is often planned on such an extensive scale
as to include the prevention of the Depressed Classes from using the commonly used paths
and the stoppage of the necessaries of life by the village Bania.
According to the evidence sometimes small causes suffice for the proclamation of a social
boycott against the Depressed Classes. Frequently it follows on the exercise by the
Depressed Classes of their right to the use of the common well,
but cases have been by no means rare where a stringent boycott has been proclaimed simply
because a Depressed Class man has put on the sacred thread, has bought a piece of land,
has put on good clothes or ornaments, or has carried a marriage procession with the
bridegroom on the horse through the public street.
"
We do not know of any weapon more effective than this social boycott which could have been
invented for the suppression of the Depressed Classes. The method of open violence pales
away before it, for it has the most far-reaching and deadening effects. It is more
dangerous because it passes as a lawful method consistent with the theory of freedom of
contact. We agree that this tyranny of the majority must be put down with a firm hand if
we are to guarantee the Depressed Classes the freedom of speech and action necessary for
their uplift." A third thing which the Depressed Classes fear more than any other community is that whatever representation they may be granted in
the new legislature, they will always be in a very small minority, and consequently,
having regard to the apathetic attitude of the orthodox classes towards the Depressed
Classes, there is always the danger of the interests of the Depressed Classes, being
neglected altogether, or some action taken which may ultimately prove to be prejudicial to
their interests.
As
against these special circumstances which affect the Depressed Classes, we propose the
following safeguards. First of all, we want a fundamental right enacted in the
constitution which will declare " untouchability " to be
illegal for all public purposes. We must be emancipated, so to say, from this social curse
before we can at all consent to the constitution; and
secondly, this fundamental right must also invalidate and nullify all such disabilities
and all such discriminations as may have been made hitherto. Next, we want legislation
against the social persecution to which I have drawn your attention just now, and for this
we have provided in the document which we have submitted by certain clauses which are
based upon an Act, which now prevails in Burma. I need not go into that detail just for
the moment. Then what we want is this, that liability of the executive officers of the
Crown for acts of tyranny or oppression shall be made effective. Today under sections 110
and III of the Government of India Act that liability is not
real. And lastly, what we want is a right to appeal against acts of neglect of prejudice
to the Central Government and failing that, to the Secretary of State and a Special
Department in the Government of India to take charge of our welfare.
This is, in general, the cases for the Depressed Classes, and the safeguards that they want. Let me just say a word or two as regards the most important of them—namely, their right to adequate representation in the legislature. Now, on the question of the granting of representation of the Depressed Classes, we are absolutely unanimous that that representation shall be by election and not by nomination. The system of nomination has produced in the case of the Depressed Classes, results which we all say are abdominable. The system has been abused in a manner in which it was never expected that it would be abused, and it has never given the Depressed Classes the real and independent representation which they must have as their safeguard. Under no circumstances, therefore, will the Depressed Classes accept representation by nomination.
As
to the question of joint or separate electorates, our position is this— that if you
give us adult universal suffrage the Depressed Classes, barring a short transitional
period which they want for their organisation, will be prepared to accept joint
electorates and reserved seats; but if you do not give us
adult suffrage, then we must claim representation through separate electorates. That is
our position.
Now
regarding the question of the number of seats, it is not possible, of course, for us to
state definitely what that number should be, except to state that we will not tolerate any
invidious discrimination. We insist upon equality of treatment. But the whole question, in
my opinion, is entirely a relative question: it is a
question that can be determined only in connection with, and by taking into account, the
seats that will be allotted to the
other minority communities; but I will make two observations
in this connection. The first observation that I will make is this—that we, the
Depressed Classes, demand a complete partition between ourselves and the Hindus. That is the first thing. We have been called Hindus for
political purposes, but we have never been acknowledged socially by the Hindus as their
brethren. They have taken to themselves all the political advantage with our numbers, with our voting strength, have given to them,
but in return we have received nothing. All that we have received is a treatment which is
worse than the treatment that they themselves have accorded to other communities
whom they do not call Hindus. That must be the first thing, therefore, that we want to be
done.
The
second thing that I will say concerns the question of weightage.
Now, this system—1 will be plain, to my mind has been abused. I am not against
the principle of weightage. I do not accept the principle that in all circumstances every
minority must be confined to its population ratio. A minority may be so small that its
population ratio may give a representation which may be wholly inadequate for the purpose
of its protection. It may be a representation which may be of no consequence at all. If,
therefore, you want to protect a minority adequately and really, then in certain
circumstances the principle of weightage will have to be conceded. But the distribution of
weightage must be subject to some uniform and intelligible principle. In our opinion
weightage is to be conceded because a minority is weak, either in numbers, or because its
social standing is low, or its educational standing is
backward as compared with others, or because its economic strength is not sufficient to
place it on a fighting par with other communities.
Member:
Quite right.
Dr.
Ambedkar:
But I cannot understand, for instance, how weightage can be
allowed on the ground of political importance, or loyalty, or services rendered either to
the Empire or to the British Government. I think if we adopt that principle, we shall land
ourselves in very difficult circumstances from which it will be difficult to extricate
ourselves.
Regarding
the question of the representation of the Depressed Classes in the Central Legislature. If
you have again adult suffrage for the election of members of the Central Legislature,
then, of course, the Depressed Classes will claim separate representation in the
Legislature, such number of seats being allotted to them in conjunction with the seats
allotted to other minorities. But if your representation is to be by a suffrage which is
higher or much higher, based on property, and so much higher that the Depressed Classes
will probably be entirely left out, then I am afraid the Depressed Classes will have to
claim indirect election to the Central Legislature, carried on by electoral colleges
composed of members of the Depressed Classes, in the Provincial Legislature, in
Municipalities, and in district local boards. That is all that I have to say so far as the
Depressed Classes are concerned.
Having
said all that I need say let me add one thing in conclusion that this whole question of
minority representation is really the crux of the whole situation, and if the majority
community desire that all minorities should associate with them in having or in claiming,
a constitution which will give India what they call Dominion Status, or what we prefer to
call Government by the people, for the people and in the name of the people, then I am
afraid that the majority community must see to it that all fears of the minorities are set
at rest. Otherwise it may not be possible for us to take what I do not conceal from myself
is the risk that most of us are taking in claiming Dominion Status.
Fifth
Sitting—14th January 1931
[f17]Chairman:
The proposal that has just been made makes it impossible for us to go on and adopt the
Draft Report that is in front of us, because, of course, it changes the whole
circumstances. If you would be agreeable, I should propose to adjourn this Sub-Committee
now, and I will also, you being agreeable, propose to remain in the Chair and to ask that
those of you who are specially interested should meet and we must include Dr. Ambedkar.
Dr.
Ambedkar:
I am obliged to you, Sir.
Chairman
:
Oh, yes, we must include him and see whether by an exchange of opinions across the table
we could not come to an agreement.
Sir
P. C. Mitter:
I should like to join, Sir, in those discussions.
Dr.
Ambedkar:
We have heard just now these proposals and percentages being disposed of, but really it
strikes me that if you add up all these they not only go over 100 per cent but they
practically take no notice of many other communities that are existing in the Punjab and
Bengal and in other places. If these communities, the Sikhs, the Mohammedans,
the Hindus are going to appropriate 49 and 20 and so on, what is left for the other
people? Are they to be taken into account or not? That is a very serious question, Mr.
Prime Minister.
Lt. Col. Gidney :
May I just raise my humble voice—it is a very small voice. I know—in this
conflict? I support what Dr. Ambedkar has just said. Surely you are not going to take the
political rupee and give 15 annas and 9 pies to the major communities, leaving 3 pies to
be scrambled for by the other minorities. On behalf of the smaller communities I maintain
we should have some say in this distribution.
Chairman:
That is just the point. I think that we had better discuss this matter with a smaller body
and a little but more informally.
Mr.
Foot:
And no notes taken ?
Chairman:
And I shall remain in the Chair, you being agreeable, and see what
can be done to straighten out the situation that has been opened up by the very hopeful
suggestion made by Sir Muhammad Shafi.
Sixth Sitting—16th January 1931
[f18]Chairman:
" The inclusion in the Constitution of declaration of
fundamental rights safeguarding the cultural and religious life of the various communities
and securing to every individual, without distinction of race," and so on, " the free exercise," and so on.
Raja
Narendra Nath:
I propose we say " the free and equal exercise ".
Chairman:
" of his or her economic, social and civil rights ".
Raja
Narendra Nath:
I do not think we want the " his or her ". Cannot we say " the
free and equal exercise of economic, social and civil rights by citizens "? I do not insist on it.
Chairman:
" equal " is of
substance, but I do not think the other matters very much.
Raja
Narendra Nath:
I suggest we should say " free and equal exercise ". Chairman: As a matter of fact, that is a question from Dr.
Ambedkar.
Raja
Narendra Nath:
The word " equal "
was used in Dr. Ambedkar's speech.
Sir
M. Shafi:
I think "free" covers it.
Dr.
Shafa'at Ahmad Khan:
I think it should remain as it is.
Chairman:
It says " and securing to every individual........ the
free exercise ". You cannot
secure the equal exercise, because equal is an attribute of the individual who uses the
rights.
Raja
Narendra Nath:
I mean equality in rights; equal rights.
Mr.
Chintamani:
I do not see the particular propriety of that objective " equal".
Raja
Narendra Nath:
It is used in Dr. Ambedkar's draft.
Chairman:
You can secure to each individual the Free exercise of his rights, but if he does not
exercise them in terms of equality that is his lookout, not the Government's.
Raja
Narendra Nath:
Very well.
Chairman:
" his or her " can
come out, I think.
Dr.
Ambedkar:
After the word "rights" at the end of the paragraph I should like the words " without discrimination "
added.
Chairman:
It says already " without distinction of race, caste,
creed or sex ".
Dr.
Ambedkar:
I should like the word " untouchability
". You included there!
Chairman:............"
untouchability! " you
already have race and caste.
Dr.
Moonje:
I think it is all right.
Dr.
Ambedkar :
In order to explain things better I think that word might be included.
Chairman:
Do not let us produce a document which people will laugh at on account of the way it is
worded.
Dr.
Ambedkar :
I think we ought to make a distinction between caste and untouchability. Many people who
have caste do not suffer from the difficulties of untouchability.
Raja
Narendra Nath:
Even the Muslims have caste.
Diwan Bahadur Ramachandra Rao:
There is caste among the untouchables. " Caste " is a wider expression.
Mr.
Foot:
Unless an alteration which is substantial is proposed, I understand it is rather late to
make an alteration at this stage.
Dr.
Ambedkar:
I should like to say " social and civil rights on
account of untouchability or otherwise ".
Chairman:
Untouchability is a violation of social rights, and if you pile on words instead of making
it more precise it has, as a matter of fact, an exclusive tendency; it narrows the thing if you give a specific application to a
general principle. If you keep your general principle sound you are much safer so far as
its application is concerned than if you quote it as applying to the one particular
grievance.
Dr.
Ambedkar:
That is true, but I do maintain that the question of interpretation will come in, and I
should like whoever is going to handle this Report to understand that the Sub-Committee
did mean not to impose any disability on account of untouchability.
Chairman
:
In a case like that, if there is any doubt about it, I will take
the opinion of the Committee and settle it. Do you persist.
Dr. Ambedkar ?
Dr.
Ambedkar:
I am afraid, Sir, I shall have to. My dissent might be noted, that I do wish that this
should be made clear.
Chairman
:
There is a suggestion made that the word " distinction " should be substituted by the word " discrimination '", so
that it will read " without discrimination as to race,
caste " and so on.
Dr.
Ambedkar:
Yes, that would do it.
Chairman:
That will be all right ?
Dr.
Ambedker:
That will be all right. I suggest at the end it should be "
without discrimination ".
Chairman:
Quite then would you make that alteration please. Then it will read without
discrimination.
Dr.
Ambedkar:
Yes.
Chairman:
That is a good amendment : the other, I think, would have
been a bad one.
*****
[f19]Dr. Ambedkar:
Sir, as I understand, paragraph 3 summarises the demand put by the different communities
before this Committee.
Chairman:
Yes.
Dr.
Ambedkar:
In view of that, I should like to suggest that the other demands made by the Depressed
Classes specifically in their own interests, on account of the fact that their position
differs somewhat from the position of the other minorities, should be added. I do not mean
to say that they should be added as an accepted proposition by this Conference, but for
the sake of completeness those demands should be put in. I would therefore suggest the
addition of the following paragraph to this paragraph after the word " rights " : " The Depressed Classes
also urged that untouchability, with all its consequent
disabilities, should be abolished by law, and that they should be guaranteed free and
unfettered enjoyment of their rights; and they also claim
the right of appeal to the Governor-General and the Secretary of State in cases of
prejudices or neglect of their interests."
Chairman:
But you see, in so far as these suggestions can be made workable, they will come in the
details that will have to be worked out.
Dr.
Ambedkar:
I quite see that.
Chairman:
Partly legislative and partly administrative.
Dr.
Ambedkar:
But what I would like to say is this, that in view of the fact that the paragraph tries to
summarise what was put before this Committee by the
different communities, what was put by the Depressed Classes, as something specifically
for themselves, apart from what other communities needed, ought to come in by way of
completion.
Chairman:
But it says " without discrimination " and so on.
Dr.
Ambedkar :
Mr. Prime Minister, you will excuse me; it is one thing for
the constitution to say that no man shall be discriminated against, and that every man
shall be guaranteed the free enjoyment, and so on; but I
know as a matter of fact that we are hard up against facts, and that people will not allow
us to enjoy the rights which are given to us by the constitution. I am as certain of that
as I am certain of my existence. I do not want merely a paper guarantee. The whole
community will be against us, and we shall certainly never enjoy one-tenth of what is
given to us. I therefore desire that the constitution should not only declare that we
shall have specific rights that every community will have, but that the constitution
should also provide ways and means by which we shall be protected in the exercise of those
rights.
Chairman:
The point is, supposing a legislature does not pass a law which will suit you, then the
constitution has been broken.
Dr.
Ambedkar:
No. What I suggest is this : That in the memorandum which I
have circulated I have suggested certain ways and means by which we think our rights could
be protected in the matter of their exercise. The Committee here, for instance, may not
agree that that is an appropriate way of doing it; the
Committee may suggest that there are some other means of doing it. I am quite prepared and
open for consideration of these other ways and means; but
what I want to submit is this, that this draft ought to report that the Depressed Classes
did suggest that they were not satisfied with the mere declaration that they were placed
on an equal footing with other communities ; but they
pressed in that rights be given to them by the constitution. I am not asking for anything
more than that. That is by way of completion of the report. In the memorandum which I
submitted, you will see I do recommend a certain procedure for that.
Mr.
Foot :
The only difficulty which occurred to me, with every sympathy for Dr. Ambedkar, was
that if you begin to put in a statement of your position, it would have to be a very full
statement. Already we have upon the notes the claim that has been made, and the
sympathetic adoption of it here referred to again at the end of paragraph 16. It seems to
me perhaps there may be the risk that if you are going to put in any claim at all, you
will not have it fully stated in this memorandum.
Dr.
Ambedkar: I
would just like to say as regards paragraph 16, the last two sentences refer to the
Depressed Classes, and they are confined to the seats that are to be allotted to them.
That is a different matter altogether. What I am stating is
this, that the constitution may give me certain rights, but I know that 99 per cent of the
people in India are not going to allow me to exercise those rights. What is the use of
those paper rights to me unless the constitution provides that if anyone infringes my
rights he is liable to certain penalties ? What I say is
this. I do not press that the meeting should adopt my proposal. What I want is that the
constitution should be made to complete as to cover what I have said on behalf of the
Depressed Classes on this Sub-Committee.
Chairman
:
We have every sympathy with your position, and are prepared to support it; but the difference between putting a paragraph in the
constitution declaring for fundamental rights and the drafting of laws carrying out those
fundamental rights is a real one. You cannot get into a constitutional declaration any
details of a law which is going to enforce it. What you have got to do is, when you get
your representation, when you get your declaration of rights, not in detail, in your
constitution, then, as a representative of your people co-operating with the other people in the Legislature you have to produce the
law which you think carries out the declaration in the constitution, because if you put
anything more by way of detail into your constitution and the constitution is not carried
out in that respect, then the constitution is not carried out at all. So you will never
get on in that way.
Dr.
Ambedkar:
My submission is this. I perfectly agree with you that this declaration of fundamental
rights is of no consequence. I attach no importance to it myself personally, because after
all, what is important to an individual is not that his rights should be declared but that
he should have the remedy in order to enforce those rights. That is the effective
guarantee of the rights in the declaration, and therefore I want that the constitution
should give me some means whereby I can get redress when I am wrong. It is no use merely
saying that there is no " untouchability
" and so on.
Chairman:
As a matter of fact we have got the point clearly in our minds, so it need not be
reiterated; but what Dr. Ambedkar says is that a declaration
in the constitution is not good enough for him unless it is enforceable by law. That is
so. In order to make it enforceable by law, laws must be passed creating the penalties and
the crimes—the crimes first of all, and the penalties. You cannot create a crime of
this kind. I think, not safely—I am in the hands of Lord Reading; he is a lawyer, I am not—you cannot, in drafting a
general introductory clause to your constitution, create by that a crime which gives you
more rights than those that you can claim under the constitution. Under the constitution
you have got certain rights given to you, and I am not at all sure what is the position.
Supposing a Depressed Class person was actually persecuted in violation of this
declaration, could he not move for some redress in the Courts?
Lord
Reading:
Well, you have got to give him some remedy for it, of course. You must make it a
misdemeanour.
Chairman:
Can you do that in the constitution ?
Lord
Reading:
No, I do not think so. If you will forgive me for a moment I do not think Dr. Ambedkar was
pressing for that. As I understand it, he wants us to make a definite statement that he
had put the claim forward, that he was not satisfied merely with the declaration of " free exercise " etc.
What he wants also is that he drew special attention to the fact that that was no use to
him unless he also had protection for an infringement of these rights, and he leaves it
there. Then you have to consider what the remedy is hereafter. That is as I understood
him.
Dr.
Ambedkar:
That is my position.
Discussion
on paragraph 4 of the Report
Dr.
Ambedkar:
I wish to suggest an amendment to the second subparagraph of paragraph 4. After the words " Depressed Classes " I
should like to have the words added " barring a short
initial period ". It would read "' and would be acceptable to the Depressed Classes
barring a short initial period".
Chairman:
I understood you accepted it provided there was adult suffrage ?
Dr.
Ambedkar:
I said that for ten years we should have separate electorate
whether there was adult suffrage or not.
Chairman:
" And would be acceptable to the Depressed Classes
after a transition period " ?
Dr.
Ambedkar:
Yes.
Chairman:
Do you agree that makes it more accurate ?
Mr.
Chintamani:
Are we to delete the proviso " provided the franchise
was based on adult suffrage " ?
Chairman:
No, we cannot alter the speeches that were made. But what Dr. Ambedkar said—he will
correct me if I am wrong—was that if there is to be no adult suffrage then they must
claim separate electorates, but if there is adult suffrage then, after a transition
period, they would abandon them. I cannot allow the accuracy to be altered. Discussion on
paragraph 12 of the Report
Dr.
Ambedkar:
Sir, I should like to have the following words added to paragraph 12 in the beginning:
"The minorities and the Depressed Classes were definite in their assertion that they
would not consent to any self-governing constitution for India unless their demands were
accepted." And then you can proceed: " There was general agreement with respect to
recommendations," and so on. Speaking for myself, I think I made it very clear at the
time when I delivered my speech in this Committee that unless we were assured that we were
safe in the new constitution, we could give no consent to any constitution involving the
principle of responsibility. If other communities do not care to join in this, it would go
as my own statement on behalf of the Depressed Classes.
Lt. Col. Gidney:
I join in that statement too, Sir.
Chairman:
Of course, the statement as a matter of fact was made, and it was made in a representative
way, not merely as an individual statement. But if that is put in in this report, you will
observe the effect of it, that one or two of you will be able to say: " Our claims have not been
satisfied." It is not a decision of this Committee, but it does put obstacles in the
way of anything being done unless everybody says they are satisfied with what is being
done. Whether you think it is wise to take that statement, undoubtedly made to the
Committee, and put it in such a position as to make it necessary to record it in the
report which the Committee sends to the Conference, is for
you to say. I do not object at all, as a matter of record.
Lord Reading: It is
rather difficult to see what part it plays in this particular paragraph; this is dealing with the Executive, and the only point which
is mentioned about the new constitution is in regard to the successful working of it.
Dr.
Ambedkar:
My position is this, Sir, that speaking for myself, I do not merely make a statement, and
I do not want the record merely to say that I made certain demands ; I want the report also to record the strength of feeling that
is in my mind behind this; that it is not merely a demand
which I made merely to be accepted or rejected, but I said
that the acceptance of these demands was conditional on the acceptance of this.
Lord
Reading:
I do not see how it can come in this paragraph at all.
Dr.
Ambedkar:
It may come in anywhere. As it was dealing with general agreements, I thought these few
lines might come in appropriately at the top of this paragraph. If you do not think it is
suitable, I have no objection.
Chairman:
I do not think it can come in here; I do not see how you can
work that in here. You could raise it again. It is really what we should call in a Bill
before the House of Commons a new clause and not an amendment to a clause 12.
Dr.
Ambedkar:
In the third line it reads in this way: "that the
representation on the Provincial Executives of important minority communities, i.e.
Hindus, Mohammedans and Sikhs, was a matter of the greatest
practical importance.
" My amendment is this, that we should delete
the word "important", because I do not want any discriminations made between
minorities and minorities, but you should not mention any minority by name, and that if
you are going to do so, then you must mention all the minorities.
Dr.
Moonje:
That is exactly what I was going to say.
Chairman:
As a matter of fact, the reason why these words were put in is that they are in the report
to which reference is made. What is the amendment ? We are
not going to put in anything that you do not agree with. "
That the representation on the Provincial Executive of minority communities"?
Dr.
Ambedkar:
Leave it there. Delete " Hindus, Mohammedans and Sikhs ".
Chairman:
Let us see what it means. It would then read: " that the representation on the Provincial Executives of
minority communities was a matter of the greatest practical importance for the successful
working ", and so on.
Dr.
Ambedkar:
Yes.
Chairman:
That means that every minority community, if it is 8, 9, 10 or 12, must have a
representative upon the Executive.
Dr.
Ambedkar:
No; I would then add: " as far as possible leaving discretion to the
Governor". I should not like any community to be specifically mentioned.
Lord
Reading:
Surely you must look and see what this says: " There was general agreement with the recommendation of
Sub-Committee No. II (Provincial Constitution)." Then
it goes on to quote it.
Dr.
Moonje:
My suggestion was a small one, but perhaps it might meet Dr. Ambedkar's
point of view. It was on the same lines : " important minority communities, i.e. Mohammedans, Sikhs, Depressed Classes,".
That was my small amendment.
Lord
Reading:
Then the others will have to come in.
Sir
A. P. Patro:
The Depressed Classes are not Hindus ? Will you cut off the
Depressed Classes ? With due respect, I say there are
Depressed Classes who would simply revolt at the suggestion that they are not Hindus. In
Southern India, if Dr. Ambedkar comes and says they are not
Hindus, then I do not know what position Dr. Ambedkar will
have in Southern India.
Dr.
Ambedkar:
We are not discussing that here.
Sir
A. P. Patro
.'Therefore I say representation consistent with facts and
experiences.
Chairman:
I have referred to the report to which reference is made. " Hindus, Mohammedans and others "
I am told was put in by way of illustration, and these words do not appear in the report.
Sir
Muhammad Shafi:
That is what I was going to
say.
Chairman:
Just one minute. The word " important " does " that the
representation on the Provincial Executives of important minority communities ". Therefore "
important " will have to stand.
Members:
Yes.
Chairman
:
But " Hindus, Mohammedans and Sikhs " will have to go out ; they
have no business to be there.
Dr.
Ambedkar :
Just before you go from that, Sir, I should like to draw
attention to the words " working of the new
constitution and it was also agreed that on the same grounds Mohammedans should be
represented on the Federal Executive ". The words " important minorities "
should replace the word "
Mohammedans " there I mean, in keeping with what we are
saying in the beginning.
Chairman:
Oh, yes! " It was also
agreed on the same grounds "—
Dr.
Ambedkar:
" they should be represented also on the Federal
Executive ". Chairman: " That important
minorities should be represented on the Federal Executive. On behalf of the smaller
minorities a claim was put forward for their representation, either individually or
collectively, on the Provincial and Federal Executives or that, failing this, in each
cabinet, there should be a Minister specially charged," and so on. That is exactly
what was put forward.
Lord
Reading:
Yes.
Chairman:
Officially.
*****
[f20]Chairman:
As a matter of accurate recording, the use of the word "
Mohammedans " is
perfectly right.
Sir
Muhammad Shafi:
Federal stands on a special footing.
Chairman
:
" Mohammedans "
stands.
Mr.
Joshi:
Yes, I agree to that.
Dr.
Ambedkar:
Then you must add to "Mohammedans", "and other important minorities ".
Chairman:
No, you cannot. That was the claim.
Dr.
Ambedkar:
May I not say so for myself ? Speaking for myself, I speak
on behalf of the Depressed Classes as well.
Mr.
Joshi:
It is not agreed. You did not make the claim.
Dr.
Ambedkar:
It is not a question of whether I did or not.
Chairman:
Now, we are doing business, and it is two minutes to eleven.
Dr.
Moonje :
I would ask, instead of the word " agreed," that
we should say, ''it was also claimed that on the same
grounds," and so on.
Sir
Muhammad Shafi:
No, no, it was agreed. That is a matter of fact.
Dr.
Moonje:
I do not know what took place in the Federal Structure Committee.
Sir
Muhammad Shafi:
The record shows it.
Dr.
Moonje:
But here, of course, I do not agree with that point.
Sir
A. P. Patro:
That is accepted, and it goes to the next paragraph.
Dr.
Moonje:
A claim was put in.
Chairman:
The statement was made that the Mohammedans should be recognised, and to that, according
to the minutes, there was an agreement, and that has just been lifted out of the records.
Mr.
Joshi:
The records of this Committee ?
Lt. Col. Gidney:
I made a distinct statement on this matter when we had this before the plenary session,
and I made statement to this effect— that it is all very well for the larger
communities to demand certain things, but the minorities
wanted some representation.
Chairman:
That is in.
Lt.
Col. Gidney:
This is only an alternative.
Chairman:
Oh, no, it is not. The sentence gives an alternative, but it says the claim was made that
there should be either representation of the minorities direct, or, failing that that is,
if that is impossible then...
Lt. CoL Gidney :
That is all we want.
Rao Bahadur Pannir Selvam:
" Failing this "
might replaced by " if this should be found impossible ".
Chairman:
Yes, instead of " failing this ", " if that should be
found impossible '". There is no reason why that should
not be substituted, " if this should be found
impossible ".
Lord
Reading:
What is the difference ? We are spending time over inter-changeable phrases, that is all.
Sardar
Ujjal Singh: Make
provision for any other communities in the Federal Executive, and insert the words " important minorities "
there. We might make some provision, somehow or other, not necessarily, but provision must
be there.
Chairman:
May I bring you up against the hard facts of the situation. You cannot, on a Federal
Executive, have every minority.
Dr.
Ambedkar :
Let me make my position clear. In the Provincial Constitution, what we have done is, we
have placed an obligation upon the Governor to endeavour to do it. He is not tied down,
but in the endeavour he should certainly be allowed the freedom to select even from other
important minorities. We are not tying him hand and foot in the making of the
Constitution. All we have done is that we place an obligation on him not to select, but we
place an obligation upon him merely to make an endeavour. Surely that is not tying him
down hard and fast, and I submit that after the word " Mohammedans " the words " other important minority communities " should come.
Chairman
:
No, we have passed that point. We are now at the second point.
Sir
A. P. Patro:
May I refer to paragraph 13 ?
Dr.
Ambedkar:
I would suggest that my dissent be recorded from paragraph 12.
Sardar
Ujjal Singh: After the
word " Mohammedans ",
" other important minorities "
should be added.
Lt.
Col. Gidney :
Why close it to the other minorities ?
Chairman:
I really must rule. As I have said already, we are not closing it to the other minorities.
I am quite willing to discuss amendments on the words as they are, but really you must not
raise false issues. This makes a claim that the other minorities shall also be
represented, but if this should be found impossible—that alteration has been
made—then there will be a Minister. That is an accurate record of the claims which
were made. Paragraph 12 agreed.
Dr. Ambedkar :
I think our dissent should be recorded.
Chairman:
Very well.
[Paragraph
No. 12 as adopted finally by the Sub-Committee No. III (Minorities).] 12.
There was general agreement with the recommendation of Sub-Committee
No. II (Provincial Constitution) that the representation on the Provincial Executives of
important minority communities was a matter of the greatest practical importance for the
successful working of the new constitution, and it was also agreed that, on the same
grounds, Muhammadans should be represented on the Federal
Executive. On behalf of the smaller minorities a claim was put forward for their
representation, either individually or collectively, on the Provincial and Federal
Executives, or that, if this should be found impossible, in each Cabinet there should be a
Minister specially charged with the duty of protecting minority interests.
[f21]Dr.
Ambedkar and Sardar Ujjal Singh would add the words
"and other important minorities " after the word " Mohammedans " in line 6.)
Discussion
on paragraph 18 of the Report
[f22]Chairman:
17 is deleted. Now 18, which will then become 17. That this Report be presented to the
Committee of the Whole Conference, Those in favour ? On the contrary ? That is
carried. Then it will go to the Committee of the Whole Conference.
Dr.
Ambedkar:
Sir, there is my amendment.
Chairman:
I beg your pardon; I am so sorry.
Dr.
Ambedkar :
I should like to have this amendment put in as a separate paragraph after 16.
Chairman
:
Make it the last paragraph ?
Dr.
Ambedkar:
Yes.
Chairman:
Then that is the over-riding paragraph.
Dr.
Ambedkar:
My amendment is this: "
That the minorities and the Depressed Classes
were definite in their assertion that they would not consent
to any self-Government constitution for India unless their
demands were accepted."
Chairman
:
As a matter of fact that was said, and it was said in a responsible way ; it was not merely an individual expression of opinion.
Dr.
Ambedkar :
I think it should be in.
Mr.
Joshi:
I think labour cannot be regarded as a minority for that statement.
Chairman:
I cannot rule it out.
Dr.
Ambedkar:
I would accept the words : "
unless their demands are accepted in a reasonable manner ".
Chairman:
That makes it meaningless.
Dr.
Ambedkar:
Or " their reasonable demands are accepted ".
Mr.
Zafrullah Khan:
Does anybody suppose that if the demands are met in a reasonable way they are going to be pleased?
Mr.
Foot:
It is only the record of a claim.
Chairman:
It is only the record of a claim. That paragraph should be added as paragraph 18, a new
paragraph.
A
SCHEME OF POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS FOR THE PROTECTION
OF
THE DEPRESSED CLASSES IN THE FUTURE CONSTITUTION OF A SELF-GOVERNING INDIA
[f23]
Appendix to Report of Sub-Committee No. III
(Minorities) (Submitted by Dr. Bhimrao R. Ambedkar and Rao Bahadur R. Srinivasan)
The
following are the terms and conditions on which the Depressed Classes will consent to
place themselves under a majority rule in a self-governing India:
Condition
No. I
EQUAL
CITIZENSHIP
The
Depressed Classes cannot consent to subject themselves to
majority rule in their present state of hereditary bondsmen. Before majority rule is
established their emancipation from the system of untouchability
must be an accomplished fact. It must not be left to the will of the majority. The
Depressed Classes must be made free citizens entitled to all the rights of citizenship in
common with other citizens of the State.
(A) To
secure the abolition of untouchability and to create the equality of citizenship, it is
proposed that the following fundamental right shall be made part of the constitution of
India :
Fundamental Right
U.S.A.
Constitution Amendment XIV and Government of Ireland Act, 1920, 10 & 11, Geo. V, Ch. 67,
sec. 5 (2).
"
All subjects of the State in India are equal below the law and possess equal civic rights.
Any existing enactment, regulation, order, custom or interpretation of law by which any,
penalty, disadvantage, disability
is imposed upon or any
discrimination is made against any subject of the State on account of untouchability
shall, as from the day on which this Constitution comes into operation, cease to have any
effect in India."
This
is so in all Constitutions, see Prof. Keith's remarks in Cmd 207, p. 56.
(B)
To abolish the immunities and exemptions now enjoyed by
executive officers by virtue of sections 110 and 111 of the Government of India Act, 1919
and their liability for executive action be made co-extensive with what it is in the case of a European British Subject.
Condition
No. II FREE ENJOYMENT OF EQUAL RIGHTS
It
is no use for the Depressed Classes to have a declaration of equal rights. There can be no
doubt that the Depressed Classes will have to face the whole force of orthodox society, if
they try to exercise the equal rights of citizenship. The Depressed Classes therefore feel
that if these face the whole force of orthodox society if they try to exercise the equal
rights of citizenship. The Depressed Classes therefore feel
that if these declarations of rights are not to be mere pious pronouncements but are to be
realities of everyday life then they should be protected by adequate pains and penalties
from interference in the enjoyment of these declared rights.
(A) The
Depressed Classes therefore propose that the following section should be added to Part XI
of the Government of India Act, 1919, dealing with Offences, Procedure and Penalties :
(i)
Offence
of Infringement of Citizenship
U.
S. Statutes at arge .Civil Rights Protection Acts of April 9,1866 and
of March l, 1875 passed in
the interest of the Negroes after their emancipation
"
Whoever denies to any person except for reasons by law applicable to persons of all
classes and regardless of any previous condition of untouchability
the full enjoyment of any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges of
inns, educational institutions,
roads, paths, streets, tanks, wells and other watering places, public conveyances on land,
air or water, theatres or other places of public, amusement, resort or convenience whether
they are dedicated to or maintained or licensed for the use of the public shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five years
and shall also be liable to fine."
(B)
Obstruction by orthodox individuals is not the only menace to the Depressed Classes in the
way of peaceful enjoyment of their rights. The commonest form of obstruction is the social
boycott. It is the most formidable weapon in the hands of the orthodox classes with which
they beat down any attempt on the part of the Depressed Classes to undertake any activity
if it happens to be unpalatable to them. The way it works and the occasions on which it is
brought into operation are well described in the Report of the Committee appointed by the
Government of Bombay in 1928 'to enquire into the educational, economic and social
condition of the Depressed Classes (untouchables) and of the Aboriginal Tribes in the
Presidency and to recommend measures for their uplift'.
The following is an extract from the same :
Depressed Classes and Social Boycott.
"
102. Although we have recommended various remedies to secure to the Depressed Classes
their rights to all public utilities we fear that there will be difficulties
in the way of their exercising them for a long time to come. The first difficulty is the
fear of open violence against them by the orthodox classes. It must be noted that the
Depressed Classes form a small minority in every village, opposed to which is a great
majority of the orthodox who are bent on protecting their interests and dignity from any
supposed invasion by the Depressed Classes at any cost. The danger of prosecution by the
Police has put a limitation upon the use of violence by the orthodox classes and
consequently such cases are rare.
"
The second difficulty arises from the economic position in which the Depressed Classes are
found today. The Depressed Classes have no economic independence in most parts of the
Presidency. Some cultivate the lands of the orthodox classes as their tenants at will.
Others live on their earnings as farm labourers employed by the orthodox classes and the
rest subsist on the food or grain given to them by the orthodox classes in lieu of service
rendered to them as village servants. We have heard of numerous instances where the
orthodox classes have used their economic power as a weapon against those Depressed
Classes in their villages, when the latter have dared to exercise their rights, and have
evicted them from their land, and stopped their employment and discontinued their
remuneration as village servants. This boycott is often planned on such an extensive scale
as to include the prevention of the Depressed Classes from using the commonly used paths
and the stoppage of sale of the necessities of life by the village Bania.
According to the evidence sometimes small cause suffice for the proclamation of a social
boycott against the Depressed Classes. Frequently it follows on the exercise by the
Depressed Classes of their right to the use of the common well, but cases have been by no
means rare where a stringent boycott has been proclaimed simply because a Depressed Class
man has put on the sacred thread, has bought a piece of land, has put on good clothes or
ornaments, or has carried a marriage procession with the bridegroom on the horse through
the public street.
In
the opinion of the Depressed Classes the only way to overcome this kind of menace to their
rights and liberties is to make social boycott an offence punishable by law. They are
therefore bound to insist that the following sections should be added to those included in
Part XI of the Government of India Act, 1919, dealing with Offences, Procedure and
Penalties:
This
and the following legal provisions are bodily taken from
Burma Anti-boycott Act, 1922 with a few
with a few changes to suit the necessities of the case.
(i)
A person shall be deemed to boycott another who— (a)
refuses to let or use or occupy any house or land, or to deal with work for hire, or do
business with another person, or to render to him or receive from him any
service, or refuses to do any of the
said things on the terms on which such things should commonly be done in the ordinary
course of business, or (b) abstains from such
social, professional or business relations as he would, having regard to such existing
customs in the Community which are not inconsistent with any fundamental right or other
rights of citizenship declared in the Constitution, ordinarily maintain with such person,
or (c) in any
way injures, annoys or interferes with such other person in the exercise of his lawful
rights.
II.
PUNISHMENT FOR BOYCOTTING
Whoever,
in consequence of any person having done an act which he was legally entitled to do or of
his having omitted to do any act which he was legally entitled to omit to do or with
intent to cause any person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do or to omit to
do any act which he is legally entitled to do, or with intent to cause harm to such person
in body, mind, reputation or property, or in his business or means of living, boycotts
such person or any person in whom such person is interested, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years or with fine
or with both :
Provided
that no offence shall be deemed to have been committed under this section if the Court is
satisfied that the accused person has not acted at the instigation of or in collusion with
any other person or in pursuance of or in collusion with any other person or in pursuance
of any conspiracy or of any agreement or combination to boycott.
III.
PUNISHMENT FOR INSTIGATING
OR PROMOTING A BOYCOTT
Whoever—
(a) publicly
makes or publishes or circulates a proposal for, or (b) makes, publishes or
circulates any statement, rumour or report with intent to, or which he has reason to
believe to be likely to, cause, or (c) in any other way
instigates or promotes the boycotting of any person or class of persons, shall be punished
with imprisonment which may extend to five years or with fine or with both. Explanation.—An offence under this section
shall be deemed to have been committed although the person affected or likely to be
affected by any action of the nature referred to herein is not designated by name or class
but only by his acting or abstaining from acting in some specified manner.
(b) IV.
PUNISHMENT FOR THREATENING A BOYCOTT
Whoever,
in consequence of any person having done any act which he was legally entitled to do or of
his having omitted to do an act which he was legally entitled to omit to do, or with
intent to cause any person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit
to do any act which he is legally entitled to do, threatens to cause such person or any
person in whom such person is interested, to be boycotted shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five years or with fine
or with both.
Exception.—It
is not boycott—
(i)
to do any act in furtherance of a bona fide labour dispute,
(ii) to do any act in the ordinary course of business competition. N.B.—All these offences shall be deemed to be
cognizable offences.
Condition
No. Ill
protection
against discrimination
The
Depressed Classes entertain grave fears of discrimination either by legislation or by
executive order being made in the future. They cannot therefore consent to subject
themselves to majority rule unless it is rendered impossible in law for the legislature or
the executive to make any invidious discrimination against the Depressed Classes.
It
is therefore proposed that the following Statutory provision be made in the constitutional
law of India:
"
It shall not be competent for any Legislature or Executive in India to pass a law or issue
an order, rule or regulation so as to violate the rights of the subjects of the State,
regardless of any previous condition of untouchability, in
all territories subject to the jurisdiction of the dominion of India,—
(1)
to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal property,
(2)
to be eligible for entry into the civil and military employ and to-all educational institutions except for such conditions and
limitations as may be necessary to provide for the due and adequate representation of all
classes of the subjects of the State,
(3)
to be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages,
facilities, educational institutions, privileges of inns, rivers, streams, wells, tanks,
roads, paths, streets, public conveyances on land, air and water, theatres, and other
places of public resort or amusement except for such conditions and limitations applicable
alike to all subjects of every race, class, caste, colour or creed,
(4)
to be deemed fit for and capable of sharing without distinction the benefits of any
religious or charitable trust dedicated to or created, maintained
or licensed for the general public or for persons of the same faith and religion,
(5)
to claim full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and
property as is enjoyed by other subjects regardless of any previous condition of
untouchability and be subject to like punishment, pains and penalties and to none
other."
Condition
No. IV
ADEQUATE
REPRESENTATION IN
THE LEGISLATURES
The
Depressed Classes must be given sufficient political power to influence legislative and
executive action for the purpose of securing their welfare. In view of this they demand
that the following provisions shall be made in the electoral law so as to give them—
(1)
Right to adequate representation in the Legislatures of the Country, Provincial and
Central.
(2)
Right to elect their own men as their representatives, (a)
by adult suffrage, and (b)
by separate electorates for the first ten years and thereafter by joint electorates and
reserved seats, it being understood that joint electorates shall not be forced upon the
Depressed Classes against their will unless such joint electorates are accompanied by
adult suffrage.
N.B.—Adequate
Representation for the Depressed Classes cannot be defined in quantitative terms until the
extent of representation allowed to other communities is known. But it must be understood
that the Depressed Classes will not consent to the
representation of any other community being settled on better terms than those allowed to
them. They will not agree to being placed at a disadvantage
in this matter. In any case the Depressed Classes of Bombay and Madras must have weightage over their population ratio of representation
irrespective of the extent of representation allowed to other minorities in the Provinces.
Condition
No. V
ADEQUATE
REPRESENTATION IN
THE SERVICES
The
Depressed Classes have suffered enormously at the hands of the high caste officers who
have monopolized the Public Services by abusing the Law or by misusing the discretion
vested in them in administering it to the prejudice of the
Depressed Classes and to the advantage of the caste Hindus without any regard to justice,
equity or good conscience. This mischief can only be avoided by destroying the monopoly of
caste Hindus in the Public Services and by regulating the recruitment to them in such a
manner that all communities including the Depressed Classes will
have an adequate share in them. For this purpose the Depressed Classes have to make
the following proposals for statutory enactment as part of the constitutional law :—
(1)
There shall be established in India and in each Province in India a Public Service
Commission to undertake the recruitment and control of the Public Services.
(2)
No member of the Public Service Commission shall be removed except by a resolution passed
by the Legislature nor shall he be appointed to any office under the Crown after his
retirement.
(3)
It shall be the duty of the Public Service Commission subject to the tests of efficiency
as may be prescribed—(a) to recruit the Services in
such a manner as will secure due and adequate representation of all communities, and (b) to regulate from
time to time priority in employment in accordance with the existing extent of the
representation of the various communities in any particular service concerned.
Condition
No. VI
REDRESS
AGAINST PREJUDICIAL ACTION OR NEGLECT OF INTERESTS
In
view of the fact that the Majority Rule of the future will be the rule of the orthodox,
the Depressed Classes fear that such a Majority Rule will not be sympathetic to them and
that the probability of prejudice to their interests and neglect of their vital needs
cannot be over-looked. It must be provided against, particularly because, however
adequately represented, the Depressed Classes will be in a minority in all legislatures.
The Depressed Classes think it very necessary that they should have the means of redress
given to them in the constitution. It is therefore proposed that the following provision
should be made in the constitution of India:—
British
North America Act, 1867 , sec. 93.
"
In and for each Province and in and for India it shall be the duty and obligation of the
Legislature and the Executive or any other Authority established by law to make adequate
provision for the education, sanitation, recruitment in Public Services and other matters
of social and political advancement of the Depressed Classes and to do nothing that will prejudicially affect them.
"
(2) Where in any Province or in India the provisions of this section are violated an
appeal shall lie to the Governor-General in Council from any act or decision of any
Provincial Authority and to the Secretary of State from any act or decision of a Central
Authority affecting the matter.
"(3)
In every such case where it appears to the Governor-General in Council or to the Secretary
of State the Provincial Authority or Central Authority does not take steps requisite for
the due execution of the provisions of this section then and in every such case, and as
far only as the circumstances of each case require, the Governor-General in Council or the
Secretary of State acting as an appellate authority may prescribe, for such period as they
may deem fit, remedial measures for the due execution of the provisions of this section
and of any of its decisions under this section and which shall be binding upon the
authority appealed against."
Condition
No. VII
SPECIAL
DEPARTMENTAL CARE
The
helpless, hapless and sapless condition of the Depressed Classes must be entirely
attributed to the dogged and determined opposition of the whole mass of the orthodox
population which will not allow the Depressed Classes to have equality of status or
equality of treatment. It is not enough to say of their economic condition that they are
poverty-stricken or that they are a class of landless labourers, although both these
statements are statements of fact. It has to be noted that the poverty of the Depressed
Classes is due largely to the social prejudices in consequence of which many an occupation
for earning a living is closed to them. This is a fact, which differentiates the position
of the Depressed Classes from that of the ordinary caste labourer and is often a source of
trouble between the two. It has also to be borne in mind that the forms of tyranny and
oppression practised against the Depressed Classes are very various and the capacity of
the Depressed Classes to protect themselves is extremely limited. The facts which obtain
in this connection and which are of common occurrence throughout India are well described
in the Abstracts of Proceedings of the Board of Revenue of the Government of Madras dated
5th November 1882, No. 723, from which the following is an extract:
"
134. There are forms of oppression only hitherto hinted at which must be at least cursorily
mentioned. To punish disobedience of Pariahs, their
masters—
(a)
Bring false cases in the village court or in the criminal courts. (b) Obtain, on
application, from Government, waste lands lying all round the paracheri,
so as to impound the Pariahs' cattle or obstruct the way to their temple.
(c)
Have mirasi names fraudulently entered in the Government
account against the paracheri.
(d)
Pull down the huts and destroy the growth in the back-yards. (e)
Deny occupancy right in immemorial sub-tenancies. (f) Forcibly cut the Pariahs' crops, and on
being resisted charge them with theft and rioting.
(g)
Under misrepresentations, get them to execute documents by which they are afterwards
ruined. (h) Cut off the flow of water from
their fields. (i) Without legal notice, have the property
of sub-tenants attached for the landlords' arrears of revenue.
"135.
It will be said there are civil and criminal courts for the redress of any of these
injuries. There are the courts indeed; but India does not
breed village Hampdens. One must have courage to go to the
courts; money to employ legal knowledge, and meet legal
expenses ; and means to live during the case and the
appeals. Further most cases depend upon the decision of the first court; and these courts are presided over by officials who are sometimes corrupt and who generally, for other reasons,
sympathize with the wealthy and landed classes to which
they belong.
"136. The influence of these
classes with the official world can hardly be exaggerated. It is extreme with natives and
great even with Europeans. Every office, from the highest to the lowest, is stocked with
their representatives, and there is no proposal affecting
their interests but they can bring a score of influence to
bear upon it in its course from inception to execution."
There
can be no doubt that in view of these circumstances the uplift of the Depressed Classes
will remain a pious hope unless the task is placed in the forefront of all governmental
activities and unless equalisation of opportunities is realized in practice by a definite
policy and determined effort on the part of the Government. To secure this end the
proposal of the Depressed Classes is that the Constitutional Law should impose upon the
Government of India a statutory obligation to maintain at all times a department to deal
with their problems by the addition of a section in the Government of India Act to the following
effect:—
"
1. Simultaneously with the introduction of this Constitution and as part thereof there shall be created in the Government of
India a Department to be in-charge of a Minister for the purpose of watching the interests
of the Depressed Classes and promoting their welfare.
"
2. The Minister shall hold office so long as he retains the confidence of the Central
Legislature.
"
3. It shall be the duty of the Minister in the exercise of any powers and duties conferred upon him or transferred to him by law,
to take all such steps as may be desirable to secure the preparation, effectively carrying
out and co-ordination of measures preventative of acts of
social injustice, tyranny or oppression against the Depressed Classes and conducive to
their welfare throughout India. " 4. It shall be
lawful for the Governor-General—-
(a)
to transfer to the Minister all or any powers or duties in respect of the welfare of the
Depressed Classes arising from any enactment relating to education, sanitation, etc.,
(b)
to appoint Depressed Classes welfare bureaux in each province to work under the authority
of and in co-operation with the Minister.'"
Condition
No. VIII
depressed
classeS
aND
THE
cabinet
Just
as it is necessary that the Depressed Classes should have the power to influence governmental action by seats in the Legislature so
also it is desirable that the
Depressed Classes should have the opportunity to frame the general policy of the
Government. This they can do only if they can find a seat
in the Cabinet. The Depressed Classes therefore claim that in common with other
minorities, their moral rights to be represented in the Cabinet should be recognized. With
this purpose in view the Depressed Classess
propose:
That
in the Instrument of Instructions an obligation shall be placed upon the Governor and the
Governor-General to endeavour to secure the representation of the Depressed Classes in his
Cabinet.
REPORT
OF SUB-COMMITTEE No. Ill (MINORITIES)
These
are some of the paragraphs of the Report related to the interests of Depressed Classes
which have been approved by the Committee of Whole Conference on 19th January 1931
3.
One of the Chief proposals brought before the Sub-Committee was the inclusion in the
constitution of a declaration of fundamental rights safeguarding the cultural and religious
life of the various communities and securing to every individual without discrimination as
to race, caste, creed or sex, the free exercise of economic, social and civil rights (Dr. Ambedkar called attention to the necessity of including in the
constitution sanctions for the enforcement of the fundamental rights, including a right of
redress when they are violated).
4.
Whilst it was generally admitted that a system of joint free electorates was in the
abstract consistent with democratic principles as generally understood, and would be
acceptable to the Depressed Classes after a short transitional period, provided the
franchise was based on adult suffrage, the opinion was expressed that, in view of the
distribution of the communities in India and of their unequal
economic, social and political effectiveness, there was a real danger that under such a
system the representation secured by minorities would be totally inadequate, and that this
system would therefore give no communal security.
5.
Claims were therefore advanced by various communities that arrangements should be made for
representation and for fixed proportions of seats. It was also urged that the number of
seats reserved for a minority community should in no case be less than its proportion in
the population. The methods by which this could be secured were mainly three ( 1 ) nomination, (2) joint
electorates with reservation of seats, and (3) separate electorates.
8.
The discussion made it evident that the demand which remained as the only one which would
be generally acceptable was separate electorates. The general objection to this scheme has
been subject to much previous discussion in India. It involves what is very difficult
problem for solution, viz. what should be the amount of communal representation in the
various Provinces and in the Centre; that, if the whole, or
practically the whole, of the seats in a legislature are to be assigned to communities,
there will be no room for the growth of independent political opinion or of true political
parties, and this problem received a serious complication by the demand of the
representatives of the Depressed Classes that they should be deducted
from the Hindu population and be regarded, for electoral purposes, as a separate
community.
12.
There was general agreement with the recommendation of Sub-Committee
No. II (Provincial Constitution) that the representation on the Provincial Executives of
important minority communities was a matter of the greatest practical importance for the
successful working of the new constitution, and it was also agreed that on the same
grounds Mohammedans should be represented on the Federal
Executive (Dr. Ambedkar would add the words, " and
other important minorities " after the word " Mohammedans "). On
behalf of smaller minorities, a claim was put forward for their representation, either
individually or collectively, on the Provincial and Federal Executives, or that, if this
should be found impossible in each Cabinet, there should be a Minister specially charged
with the duty of protecting minority interests.
13.
As regards the administration, it was agreed that recruitment of both Provincial and
Central Services should be entrusted to P. S. Cs., with instructions to recruit the claims of various
communities to fair and adequate representation in the Public Services, whilst providing
for the maintenance of a proper standard of efficiency.
16.
It has also been made clear that the British Government cannot with any chance of
agreement impose upon the communities an electoral principle which, in some feature or
other, would be met by their opposition. It was therefore plain that, failing an
agreement, separate electorates with all their drawbacks and difficulties, would have to
be retained as the basis of the electoral arrangements under the new constitution. From
this the question of proportions would arise. Under these circumstances, the claims of the
Depressed Classes will have to be considered adequately.
18.
The Minorities and Depressed Classes were definite in their assertion that they would not
consent to any self-governing constitution for India unless their demands were met in a
reasonable manner.
IN SUB-COMMITTEE No.
VI (FRANCHISE)
Second Sitting—22nd December 1930
[f24]Dr.
Ambedkar: It seems to me that there are only two
important questions which this Round Table Conference is going to consider. One question
is whether India should have responsible Government, and the second question is to what
people that Government should be responsible.
In
the Plenary sessions we all joined in one chorus in demanding that India should have a
responsible form of Government, and I for one, speaking on behalf of the Depressed Classes
in that Plenary session, joined with my friends sitting opposite in demanding responsible
Government for India. When I did so, however, I was under the impression that the Indian
people who came to represent their country at this Round Table
Conference were not only united in making a demand for responsible Government for India but were also united in the view as to whom that
Government should be responsible.
I
am sorry to say, Sir, that I have been deluded. I find now that although some of our people would desire me and others to join them
in their demand for Dominion Status, they do not join with us in demanding that the
Government which will be set up under that Dominion Status shall be responsible to the
people of India as a whole. I never thought there would be this division of opinion, and
that I should have to stand up to defend the position we take.
Now,
Sir, speaking on behalf of the Depressed Classes I cannot honestly consent to responsible
Government or to Dominion Status unless I can be sure that the people for whom I speak are
to have a place in that constitution. I must make that fact plain to all my friends. As an
objection has been raised to the proposal for adult suffrage by some of my friends, I
propose to deal with the arguments brought forward against it.
One
of the arguments brought forward was that we should follow the precedent laid down in this
country, that adult suffrage should be reached by stages. It is suggested that we should
follow the stages adopted in this country from 1832 to 1918. Those who take their stand on
the political history of enfranchisement in this country seem to think that there was some
philosophical course of action thought out by the English people in devising the steps
that were taken by them in enfranchising the people from 1832 onwards, that they had
decided before hand that they must enfranchise only a limited number of people in 1832
that otherwise it would be philosophically wrong; that they
should take the next step only in 1867, and not in 1866;
that they should take the next step in 1884 and not in 1867. I do not know whether those
who use that argument believe that there was any philosophic belief behind that fact. But
I should like to point out to my friends, those who base their arguments upon this fact,
that if you read the political history of England, you will find that not only was there
no philosophical belief which determined the stages that were taken by the British people,
but the question of franchise was treated in this country as a mere matter of party
politics: that each party tried to extend the franchise
because it thought that as a political catch-word it would influence and augment that
party. Perhaps that will be news to my friend who used that argument, and, I must say,
always uses it with satisfaction to himself, feeling that he is placing an insuperable
obstacle in our path. We will be perhaps pleased to find that one of the great steps in
the political enfranchisement of the people of England was taken by a Conservative
Government in this country, and not by the Liberals or the Radicals.
The
second thing I should like to point out to my friend is this. Does he really mean to tell
us that because the franchise in this country was limited, that, therefore, the Government
produced under that franchise was a good Government, a Government the object of which was
the welfare of the people and the prosperity of the masses ?
Is that the inference he wants to draw from that fact ?
That because the franchise was limited, that, therefore, there was no trouble, and that
everybody was satisfied in this country ? Surely that is
not the case. If my friend will only take the trouble of reading the life of Lord Shaftesbury, and the social and political history of England,
he will certainly find that the unreformed Parliament was not a blessing to anyone.
Thirdly,
I should like to point out to my friend, if he really is serious and if he really believes
what he says, that the people of India ought not be given adult suffrage, because they are not fit for it, that the only
alternative for him is to go back to India and not to demand Dominion Status or
responsible Government, for surely, if it is the view of the gentleman who puts forward
this case that the Indian people are not fit to exercise the franchise, are not fit to
take upon themselves the responsibilities of Government, then I do not understand in whose
name he asks for responsible Government. Is it for this class ?
Is it for himself ? For whom is it ? The only argument, as I understand in favour of responsible
Government and in favour of Dominion Status, is the assumption which must constitute the
basis of any such argument, that the people of India are fit to undertake the
responsibility of Government. If my friend does not believe that the Indian people are
capable of exercising that responsibility, then the only
conclusion is that the Indian people cannot have Dominion Status and cannot have
responsibility.
The
second argument that was brought forward was that, although adult suffrage may be an
ideal, it cannot be brought into effect at the present moment, because we have not the
machinery to give effect to it. Now I have great sympathy with that argument, but I should
like to point out that there are considerations in opposition to that view. Let us
understand what the franchise does really mean. Surely the franchise does not mean a mere
matter of the ballot box, does not mean a mere matter of polling booths and the placing of
polling officers there. The franchise means something more vital than that. Now, Sir, as I
understand it, to me the suffrage and the franchise are nothing else but the right of
self-defence; it means that you will create a legislature
which will have the amplest power of passing laws which will affect the life, liberty and
property of the people. Surely, if that is going to be the position, if your legislature
is going to have that power of affecting your life in these most vital matters, then
surely every individual who is going to be subject to that legislation ought to have the
power to defend himself against laws which will probably in the circumstances invade his
liberty, invade his life and his property. It is not a mere
question of the ballot box; it is not a mere question of
polling booths.
May
I put it in a different way ? If I understand the
franchise, I understand it to be the right to regulate the terms of what one might call
associated life in society; that is the essence of the
franchise. When you give a man the franchise, what you mean is that you give him power to
regulate the terms on which he will live in relationship with other individuals in
society. Now, if that is the meaning of the suffrage, surely you cannot give the higher
classes, the intellectuals as they are called, or the propertied classes, the power to
regulate the terms of associated life, and leave the lower classes at their mercy. They,
too, must have the power to regulate the terms of associated life. Just as the capitalist
must have the power, if he is to have any constitution, to dictate how he shall live on
terms of associated life with the labour, surely the labour
is entitled also to have the power to regulate the terms on which he shall live with his capitalist master. It cannot be
a one-sided bargain ; it must not be a one sided bargain.
If you understand the franchise in the right sense of the word, then it seems to me the
franchise is something which must be regarded as the inherent right of every individual in
the State; and if you understand that the franchise is the
inherent right of every man or woman who is capable of understanding it, then surely you
cannot make an inherent right of a people dependent upon the convenience of your
administration.
My
friend used that argument, that we must not have adult suffrage because we shall not have
polling booths and polling officers. I should like to remind him of what would be the
situation if he were told that he had been wronged by an individual, that he had a good
case which, if he brought it to the Court would certainly succeed, but that he could not
be given redress because we had not sufficient judges in the High Court. How would he like
that position ? Surely, if the franchise is an inherent
right, and if there are administrative difficulties in the effectuation of that franchise,
then the remedy is not to curtail the franchise, but the remedy is to provide the
necessary machinery, so that every man or woman capable of enjoying, that franchise shall be in a position to give effect to it.
Sir,
it seems to me that the difficulties of administering the franchise-which
have been placed before us arise from two different sources. We-are
told that the constituencies in India are very vast; and,
surely, as we see from the Report of the Simon Commission, they are of a most fabulous.
character. It is said that if you increase the number of electors in the existing
constituencies, as they exist today, the whole machinery will break down. My submission to
this Conference is this : Surely this difficulty can easily
be met. It seems to me this difficulty can be met in this way. It seems to me that the
difficulty arises largely because of the composition and
strength of your Legislative Councils today; that composition is so-very limited that you cannot help having the large
constituencies that you have today. It seems to me that
from the standpoint of numbers the existing strength of the legislatures in the Provinces
is ridiculous. Let us have the figures for a moment before our mind's eye. I find on
comparison that Madras, Bengal and the United Provinces have more or less the same
population as France, Great Britain and Italy. The Madras Legislative Council consists of
132 members; the Bengal Legislative Council consists of 140
members; the United Province Legislative Council
consists-of 123 members. On the other hand, France has a Lower Chamber which consists of
626 members; Great Britain has somewhere over 600, and
Italy has 560 members. Take, on the other hand, Bombay and
the Punjab, which are more or less on a par in the matter
of population. Bombay has 114 members; the Punjab has 94.
Bombay and the Punjab are more or less equal in population to Spain; if you take the Lower Chamber in Spain, you find it consists
of 417 members. I know it is not in existence now, but that is another matter. It is a
matter of constitution. In France it is in existence with a large number. Then take the
Central Provinces in which the Legislative Council has 73 members. I find that the
population of the Central Provinces is equal to that of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia has 313
members. Assam has 53 members; in population it is equal to
Portugal, and Portugal has 146 members.
Now,
surely if you are going to cramp these vast aggregations of people into Legislative Councils which do not
exceed 140 in membership, you are bound, as a result, to have very large
constituencies. Why are you afraid of increasing the numbers in the Legislature ? I cannot understand it. If you are not afraid, and if you
follow the parallels in other countries, then surely you
can very easily reduce the size of the electorates, and thereby remove one of the
difficulties that is said to exist in the matter of adult suffrage.
Then
another difficulty which was pointed out was that it was
said we should not have a sufficient number of polling officers. Now that difficulty to my
mind also does not seem to be of a very serious character. It seems to me that if all the
college students in India could be drafted into the service of the electoral departments,
this difficulty could be very easily solved. Some of my friends on the other side laugh at
it, but I do not know why. I know, as a matter of fact, that in the census all college students, and school boys also, help the census department
in carrying on the enumeration. If, for instance, the same system were adopted on the
polling day, if all the college students were asked to help in this matter and I have not
the slightest doubt that they would come to the rescue of the department, then surely we
should have more polling officers than we
need on the occasions of this sort.
It
seems to me, therefore, that the difficulties of the situation are not insuperable. Let me
point this out to my friends opposite who object to adult suffrage on this ground. It
seems to me their position is of a some-what curious
character. Where a member of the British Delegation raises a difficulty, and says there are heaps of difficulties in the way of
India, and, therefore, India must not have .Dominion Status
or responsible Government, the gentlemen sitting opposite would not allow the English
gentlemen to take advantage of the difficulties; they would
tell him at once: "
Why, you bolster up difficulties to put down our claims.
These are difficulties which surely can be met." Let me tell him that we on this side
are also not prepared to allow you to take advantage of this difficulty. We say that if
there are difficulties in the way of getting the power in our hands, those difficulties
ought to be solved. We are not going to let you have the advantage of the situation.
Sir,
so far I have dealt with the arguments which have been presented against adult suffrage.
Now let me put one or two arguments which I think are in favour of adult suffrage, and
which in my opinion, are more or less decisive. The first argument that I will put is
this, that you cannot have in India any system of suffrage short of adult suffrage which
will give equality of representation to all the castes and communities in India; there is no other system you can devise for India which will
give that result. Take, for instance, the existence of constituencies. In Bengal and in
the Punjab the Mohammedans form a majority of the
population. You have in Sind also, as apart from Bombay,
the Mohammedans in a majority. Now what is the state of the Mohammedan communities in
these Provinces ?
I
am putting this as a feeler: My Mohammedan friends may take
their stand apart from this: I am putting it as a case.
What is the position of the Mohammedan communities in these Provinces under the system of
franchise that we have today. The Mohammedans in Sind form something like 70 per cent of the population ; and yet, if I am not very much mistaken, their voting
strength is only 49 per cent. Take, for instance, again Bengal and the Punjab; there again the Mohammedans pre-dominate
in population, and yet in the voting list they are in the minority. Take again the
Depressed Classes; under the existing franchise they are
nowhere at all in the electorate. I think it is a most disgraceful thing to have a
franchise of this sort. You have to remember one thing:
that Indian society is composed of so many castes and creeds and those castes and creeds
are not related to each other in what one might call the vertical perpendicular, so that
if you chop-off this mass at any particular point you get a part which is representative
of all the communities in an equal degree. On the other hand, if I may put it so, they are
related in such a manner that the parallel grains are, so to speak, placed horizontally
one on the other, so that if you chop at any particular point you get a part which is
representative of one single community only or at the most two, and the rest are not
represented at all. Now surely you do not want to create a system of political Government
in which only some castes and some communities will predominate. Surely you do not want to create in India a South Africa where
only some people will have the vote and the rest will not. I say, if you are
interested in giving every man a vote, in giving every man the political franchise, so
that he may work out his destiny, then you cannot have any other system of franchise in
India than that of adult suffrage.
Now,
let me give you another example. As I say, I am not opposed to female suffrage, and I am
very obliged to our lady colleague, Mrs. Subbarayan, for
supporting us in this matter. I will go with her whole-heartedly. Let me point out one or
two illustrations of what has been suggested by way of enlarging and broadening the
franchise. It is suggested that there should be a franchise of literacy. I do not propose
to call it a fancy franchise, but let me tell you what will be the effect of it. The
effect of it would be this: that some communities would
have their voting strength almost doubled, while other communities would stand where they
are. Literacy in India is so unevenly distributed, that some communities would have all
the increase of the franchise added to their stock, while other communities would remain
where they are. Surely you do not want to create that sort of situation.
Therefore
my submission is, that if this Conference and the members who are assembled round this
table are true to their creed, believe that India must have responsible Government, and
that Government must be responsible to the people, then I submit there is no alternative
to adult suffrage. Then, Sir, there is one more consideration that I would like to point
out, that seems to me to be a most decisive consideration in this matter. We all of us
know that the question of joint versus separate electorate is a most thorny question; it seems to me to be a very crucial question. May I point
out to this Conference that, at least in my opinion, the question of joint versus separate
electorates is inextricably bound up with the question of franchise. You will not ask any
minority in India, you will not compel any minority in India,
and you will not get the consent of any minority in India,
to agree to joint electorates unless that minority has adult suffrage.
I am not going to place myself under the thumb and
authority of any majority Government, unless I am certain
that I can exercise in the elections electoral power which is commensurate with my social
power. Unless I know that every man and every woman in the Depressed Class community will
be able to exercise the vote and to determine the destiny of the candidate who is going to
represent the mass of people in the country, I certainly am
not going to consent to ioint electorates; certainly not. I am not going
to place myself in a minority position; I am not going to
allow the majority to select my candidate. No, under no circumstances. And I think what is true of my
minority may also be true of the Muham-madans. I do not
wish to say something that I shall have to say in another Committee, but the point is so
relevant that I cannot help making a reference. You cannot in fairness ask the Mohammedans of Bengal or the Punjab to accept joint
electorates unless you place them in a majority in the electorate. You cannot deny the
franchise to the Mohammedans, make a minority of them in the electoral power, and then
say, " Come along and have a joint electorate ".
The
decisiveness of this fact was acknowledged by the Nehru Committee and by three members of
the Indian Central Committee.
Let
me, before I conclude, make one or two remarks to my friends who will not give us adult
suffrage. I made it plain at the beginning of my speech that we make the question of the
grant of responsible Government to India not entirely dependent on this question. Although
I know that my friend and I are only two in a Conference of 80 or 90, we represent 43
millions of people.
Diwan
Bahadur Ramachandra Rao: Would Dr. Ambedkar
accept the proposal of Lord Zetland ?
Dr. Ambedkar: We
might accept the principle. But may I say that I am receiving hundreds of letters and
telegrams on the subject I have brought forward. It is a crucial thing.
Sir P. C. Mitter: What about the Central Legislature ? Does he want adult suffrage, and what size does he want the
Legislature to be ?
Dr. Ambedkar: That
will be a question to be decided later on. The Central Legislature, I think, ought to
consist of 500 members.
Sir P. C. Mitter:
And adult suffrage also ?
Dr. Ambedkar: Yes.
[f25]Sir Cawasji Jehangir: All these
suggestions, I may say so with due respect to the Begum, emanate from the feeling that the
franchise is the foundation of the representation in the Councils. That is so in all
countries.
But
where we have introduced the principle of weightage for
communities, that principle does not hold good.
Colonel Gidney : I will now make a concrete suggestion, and my concrete
suggestion is this, that in adopting the scheme suggested by Lord Zetland we should go in
for direct and for indirect election. So far as direct election is concerned, I suggest
there should be no further broadening of the franchise, and that the present franchise
should remain as it is.
Colonel Gidney: That
is all right.
Sir Cowasji Jehangir: That should return a certain number of
representatives to the Legislature, both for urban and for rural constituencies. A large
number of the population will remain without the direct vote, and for that whole block of
the population the franchise should be broadened. It should be on the basis of 25 per cent
of the adult population, and they should return their representatives by the indirect
system of election both in rural and urban areas. I make no distinction between the two.
That will bring in industrial labour as well as agricultural labour.
Dr. Ambedkar: It
will not bring in anything of the sort.
*
*
*
*
[f26]Dr.
Ambedkar: Sir, this
morning I said what I need say regarding the question of franchise; but, without prejudice of what I have stated this morning, I
should like to examine the suggestions which are put forward before this Committee for the
purpose of extending the franchise. I take it that this Committee is agreed that the ideal
is adult suffrage. Some of us think that it ought to be realised immediately; the rest of our friends think that it ought to be evolved by
stages. We have therefore put before us two concrete suggestions. One suggestion is that
we should adopt the system of instalment and increase the suffrage by a graduated scheme
of 25 per cent addition to the existing voting list, say at an interval of a certain
number of years. We have on the other hand the suggestion of our noble friend the Marquess
of Zetland in which also effect is sought to be given to some realisation of this ideal of
adult suffrage.
Now,
comparing the two, I cannot help saying that I have a partiality for the suggestion of the
noble Lord, although, as I say, I hold strongly that we must have undiluted adult
suffrage. If it were a mere matter of choice between the two, I should certainly like to
have a system which immediately lays the foundation of adult suffrage in preference to a
system which gives
some sort of suffrage to only a class of the people and postpones the fact of self-Government to a large mass for a time to come. But,
having said that, I cannot, as I say, give whole-hearted support to the suggestion,
because I find there are certain difficulties. But, because I think that probably the
noble Marquess will come to our help in meeting the difficulties which some of us feel, I propose to make one or two observations. One thing I see: that if this system of indirect elections by groups is
adopted, it seems to me the Depressed Classes probably will not fare better under that
system. I say that for this reason: the Depressed Classes
are scattered throughout India in small numbers in every village;
their life is practically dominated on all sides by powerful bodies of villagers who
hold over them social and economic sway. It is possible, and I think it is also probable,
that when this indirect election comes to be applied to them, such an amount of pressure
may be applied by the village community on the Depressed Classes that, in exercising their
vote, so to say, in the primary election, they may be
compelled to select people who may not be their best
representatives. That is a fear which I certainly have.
Another thing which I find is that if this system is to be
adopted in preference to the graduated system of extending the vote by instalments, I do
not understand why we should confine this to the propertied class or to any other class ; I do not see why we should not extend the system in such a
manner that adult suffrage should become the foundation of the system.
A Member: That is
the intention.
Dr. Ambedkar : I am glad to
hear that. With regard to the difficulties that have been suggested, that this would
complicate the matter of separate electorates, I do not think it will, because with
indirect election you can still maintain separate registers for such communities as may
desire to have them. I do not think that will create any difficulty in the matter.
But,
as I say, we cannot, for instance, give support to this principle unless we know really
how this principle is going to work in practice, unless we
know all the details about it. My concrete suggestion, therefore, is that this Committee should appoint a small Sub-Committee in order to consider this
system and to report upon it, so that we may be better able, with full knowledge and
information, to recommend this to a Franchise Committee that may hereafter be left to work
out the system. It seems to me in its raw form, if the noble Lord will excuse my using
that expression, it is somewhat difficult, and it is too much of a large order for anyone of us—speaking, at any rate, for myself to give out
support to this principle
*****
[f27]Mr.
Basu: But is it necessary to put a maximum figure at
all, because the Franchise Committee will be there, they will have to consider it and go
into details. I think we should put the minimum figure;
that is all that is required. As regards the maximum, they may decide as to what the
maximum should be.
Dr. Ambedkar: I
should like to make the observation with regard to the first paragraph in your
summarisation. I should like to have it stated in the paragraph which you have drawn up
that the opinion of the Committee was that the extension of the franchise should be
limited by considerations of administration and machinery. That was the only limitation
that we thought should be put in.
Sir C. Setalvad: It is not merely administration ; there are other considerations as well.
Mrs. Subbarayan:
What is practicable ?
Dr. Ambedkar: Practical means machinery. I mean the Committee
might find that it was practicable with the present machinery that 50 per cent of the
population should be enfranchised.
Mr. Zujrulluh Khan: Do you mean 50 per cent of the total population ?
Dr. Ambedkar: Yes.
Mr. Zufrltllah Khan: That would be slightly
more than universal adult franchise.
Chairman: It is
suggested that we should leave out the maximum. The whole thing is conditional on the
expert Committee finding it practicable and desirable; so
that we need not have a maximum. Let us leave out the maximum. Does anyone wish me to read
it again ?
Mr. K. T. Paul: If you leave out
25 per cent, if it weakens our statement I would not agree
to it.
Chairman: It does
not weaken it.
Mr. Chintamani: Very
often in these matters when a minimum is stated it comes to be a maximum in actual
practice. If we indicate the figure
10
per cent in our Report, it will show the Franchise Committee that is appointed that we
should be contented if they secure a maximum of 10 per cent. Those of us who mentioned the
figure of 25 per cent did so as a sort of unsatisfactory compromise between the present
position and adult franchise. I, for one, shall not be happy if you take it out.
Mr. Foot : Mr.
Chintamani mentioned 25 per cent of the adult population ?
Mr. Chintamani: Of
the total population.
Mr. Foot: I beg your
pardon.
Mr. Joshi: Sir, I am
very sorry to say that you should not put down in the Report that the suggestion is a
unanimous one, because I for one would not agree to it, and I reserve to myself the right
of re-opening the question of adult suffrage in the full Conference.
Dr. Ambedkar: That
is my position too.
Mr. Joshi: It should
be put down in the Report.
*****
[f28]Dr. Ambedkar: It would be a
second best, provided we knew it was going to work. (Universal adult suffrage.)
Chairman: Subject to that, are the
rest of the Committee agreed?
Sir C. Jehangir: I cannot agree to this figure, 25 per cent until
we have the whole of the facts before us.
Chairman: We are suggesting that an expert Franchise Committee be set up.
Sir P. C. Mitter:
Before we fully know the facts it would not be right for us
to commit ourselves.
Chairman: It would
not do for us to hand over our job to the expert Franchise Committee. We are in the
unfortunate position of having to make some recommendation, and we cannot say that we
recommend merely that somebody else should take over our job.
Sir P. C. Mitter: I
am expressing only my own personal opinion. I suggest to the Franchise Committee that
there should be an increase, as large an increase as possible, and I would not have
objected to 10 or 20 or 50 per cent. If I know all the facts before hand on which to base
an opinion.
Chairman: Would you
like. Sir Provash, to put in
such qualification as you desire, to the effect that any recommendation
both as to maximum and minimum should be entirely subject
to the discretion of the Franchise Committee ? I feel that
we ought to give that Committee some guidance. However, we have got near enough now, and we will take an opportunity of speaking with you about this
afterwards.
Mr. Chintamani: I do
not know, Sir, whether you will agree to what I am about to suggest, but there is also
before us an important proposal that the Franchise Committee should be asked to devise
such qualifications as will ensure, as far as possible, the same proportion of voters to
population in the different communities. This was proposed by the Simon Commission, and it
has been supported by several local Governments. Could that be considered new ? If the Franchise Committee
find it not possible they will reject it.
Chairman: I think it
comes under the next head, namely, " general basis of
franchise, (i) Should the
franchise qualifications be the same for all communities in the same area ? " I call your attention to those words " in the same area ".
Do not let us embark now on the subject of women's suffrage
or anything of that sort.
Sir P. C. Mitter : I
thought from what you ruled that the special interests and communal interests came under
the Minorities Committee.
Chairman: We shall very likely know more about that after
tomorrow. For the moment we are discussing the general
basis of the franchise, and whether the qualifications should be the same for all
communities.
Diwan
Bahadur Ramachandra Rao: You said that you would speak to the Prime Minister
and let us know whether this matter came within the
province of our Committee or of the other.
Dr. Ambedkar: I
should like to make one proposal. Although the question of universal adult suffrage has
been pointed out by certain members of this Committee to be for the present not possible
or practicable, it seems to me that it may be possible to have, at any rate, adult suffrage for
the Depressed Classes. There is no reason why, for instance, all communities should have
the same franchise—in fact, there may even be cases which we find in the practical
affairs of life, that in order to reach equality of status, we may have to adopt, so to
speak, methods of inequality. In the matter of treating the richer class as against the poorer, for example, we do enact certain special measures
for the benefit of the latter. We tax the richer class at a
higher rate than the poorer, the object being that the principle of ability to pay the tax
may be realised in practice. I think that the same
consideration might be applied to the Depressed Classes. If the object of the Committee is
that all communities should be represented in equal proportion in the electorate, there is
no reason why one class of people may not be treated
differently from another class of people if a different sort of treatment is the only
means available for the purpose. It
seems to me that if, for instance, adult suffrage were applied to the Depressed Class and
not to other communities, but other communities had a system such
as Lord Zetland has suggested, it would not be in reality
any difference at all, and it would not put any great pressure on the electoral machinery
available in the Provinces, having regard to the peculiar position of the Depressed Classes, and having
regard also to the consensus of opinion that no other system of franchise would give them
the vote and without the vote there would be no solicitude
expressed for them by any candidate who stands for the Legislature at the present time. I think that the Committee would not do any great harm if
it recognised the application of this principle to the Depressed Classes.
[f29]Chairman: We are now discussing the question of the educational qualification. I may just remind you that the second conclusion to which we came was this: " We recommend that in any given area the franchise qualification should be the same for all communities, but we desire that the Expert Franchise Committee, in making their proposals, should bear in mind that the ideal system would as nearly as possible give each community a voting strength proportional to its population and this Committee should so contrive their franchise as so far as practicable to bring about this result." I am afraid that is rather a counsel of perfection, but at the same time the only way in which we can possibly expect them to carry that out is if we give them a certain latitude; that is manifest. Therefore, in considering all these questions of educational qualifications and so on, you have to remember that unless you authorise the Franchise Committee to take these into account, you are restricting and not enlarging their possibility of action.
Dr. Ambedkar: I
should like, if I may, to ask one question with regard to the conclusion which you, Sir,
have read out, and at which you said the Sub-Committee had
arrived. Does that conclusion imply that the Franchise Committee will have the liberty to
consider a variety of franchises for different communities, to arrive at the result that
the voting strength shall be proportional to the strength of those communities ?
Chairman: I do not think that is it. We have to
give guidance to the Franchise Committee; they will fill in
the details. We are, as it were, the architects, and they are the masons and builders.
Dr. Ambedkar: I
understand that, but what I should like to know is whether that conclusion gives liberty
to the Franchise Committee to have a different franchise for the different communities
with the object of securing equality.
Chairman: No. The
first sentence says that we recommend that in any given area the franchise qualification
should be the same for all communities.
We will now proceed with our discussion on the educational qualification.
******
[f30]Mr.
Jadhav : Would any
Legislative Council have the power to go back after ten
years and restrict the franchise ? Some of them might wish
to do that.
Chairman : Their
powers would be powers of extension, not of diminution.
Dr. Ambedkar: I
should like to say a word on this subject, without prejudice to the position we have taken
all along. It seems to me that as compared with the alternatives which have been
suggested, one by Mr. Joshi that there should be some law
providing for automatic extension, and the other, the main
proposal, that the matter should be left to the sweet will of the legislatures, the recommendations made by the Simon Commission
seems to me to be better and to be more readily acceptable from my point of view. It might
be much better, as I say, to have some authority which will investigate at the end of a
definite period exactly what has been the result of the
working of the franchise up to that period. That body will be able to see what disparity
there has been as between the different provinces. That body will be able to see what is
the machinery existing at the end of the ten years, in order to cope with the elections if the
franchise were to be altered, and that body, being
impartial itself, will be able to deal with the rights of the mass of the people much more
readily, in a much more just and equitable way, than the class-conscious people who may be
installed as a result of the limited franchise which we are introducing today. For these
reasons it seems to me that the proposals of the Simon
Commission are better than the alternatives.
Sir Cowasji Jehangir: Who is to set that up ?
Dr. Ambedkar : Just as Parliament in the Act suggested that there
should be a Public Service Commission, so it could be suggested that there should be the
appointment of a Committee.
Sir Cowasji Jehangir : By the Central
Government ?
Dr. Ambedkar: Yes.
Chairman: I think I
know enough now to draft a Report on this subject, but I should like to know what is your
view—not that we shall here and now recommend that any Expert Franchise Committee or
any other Committee should be set up after 15 years, say, but
in view of possibility that one Province might extend its franchise much more generously
than another, so that the whole thing might get out of step, ought we to contemplate the
possibility of anybody being constituted to look into the matter then, to try and adjust
things, or shall we merely content ourselves with leaving things to the Provinces, or
ought we to follow Dr. Ambedkar's
idea of a Committee? We need not say that it has to
come into being, or when it is to come into being, but that
it might function if it came into being.
Mr. Basu: At any
period when the Central Government desired to appoint a Committee.
Chairman: We will
not say how it is to be appointed, but what do you say about
the possibility of appointing such a body ?
Diwan
Bahadar Ramachandra Rao: I think the Government of India should set up such a
body, not that Parliament should set up such a body.
Dr. Ambedkar: What
difference does it make?
Diwan Bahadur
Ramachandra Rao: We are leaving great freedom in all
these matters. I would like to eliminate parliamentary control. I should like to know what
the proposal is. If you say that after a number of years it shall be competent for the
Government of India to appoint a Committee to look into this question in the whole of the
Provinces, I shall have no objection, but if it is a question of Parliament going into
this question again in ten years, I object to it entirely. I have no objection to the
Committee being appointed by which the franchise will be extended, but I should like that
power vested entirely in the Government of India and to be exercised at its discretion
whenever there is necessity for such a thing within a certain number of years, or after a
certain number of years.
Dr. Ambedkar: How
has it any bearing on the functions of this Subcommittee whether this Committee is
appointed by Parliament or by the Government of India?
Diwan Bahadur Ramachandra Rao:
We are devoluting authority to India from Parliament,
because in 1919 when this question came up before the Parliamentary Committee, I and
several others with me contended that there should be devolution of questions like this to
authorities in India; and because such a step was not
taken, we are now confronted with the accumulated complaints about franchise which are now
being investigated and they could not be investigated because parliamentary permission was
required. Therefore I suggest that any step taken in that direction should be devolution of complete power to the Government of India, to
be exercised at its discretion to go into the whole question of franchise in a certain
number of years. That is a point upon which I really desire to lay some
stress.
*****
[f31]Dr.
Ambedkar: It is now evident, at least to myself and
some of my friends, that we shall have to record a note of dissent from certain propositions that will be placed before the Sub-Committee. Will it
be permissible for us to submit to you a note of dissent on the various points, which you
may be kind enough to append to the; report, or will you allow us some other method ?
Chairman: I do not think that up to the present any of the
Sub-Committees have appended minority reports, as it were;
I think the report of the Sub-Committee has been one
report, but has indicated on its face that certain members—naming them if
necessary—have dissented.
Dr. Ambedkar: I should like, with your permission to point out one
disadvantage which I see in that procedure. If we are not allowed to record our minute of
dissent, you do not give us an opportunity to put our suggestions in a concrete form,
which we should like to do if we may be allowed to do so. We are allowed the negative
liberty of saying we do not agree, and that is all.
Chairman: I am not
sure we cannot meet you. I think you have made your objection quite clear. What you want
really is adult suffrage, and I think we have got a sentence in to indicate that certain
members of our Sub-Committee—naming them—objected to this because they thought
the system of adult suffrage was the only satisfactory system. That states the point.
Dr. Ambedkar: What
we should do would depend on the report.
Chairman: Let us leave the difficulty until it arises, and
then see if we cannot meet you. I think we can.
Fourth
Sitting—1st January 1931
[f32]DRAFT
REPORT—POINT 4
4.
Extension of the Franchise:
While it was generally held that adult suffrage was the goal which should ultimately be
attained, it was agreed that the basis of the franchise could forthwith be broadened and
that a large increase was desirable. Some difference of opinion existed as to the extent
to which this was practicable
in present circumstances, and it was realised that the Subcommittee had not the necessary
material to determine the precise limits of the advance. The Statutory Commission
suggested such an increase in the number of electors as would bring that number up to ten
percent of the population. Some of our members thought that an increase to twenty-five per
cent of the adult population was immediately practicable.
We
recommend that an expert Franchise Commission should be appointed with instructions to
provide for the immediate increase of the electorate so as to enfranchise not less than
ten per cent of the total population and indeed a larger number—but not more than
twenty-five per cent of the total population—if that should, on a full investigation,
be found practicable and desirable.
We
recommend that, in addition to providing for this increase the Commission should consider
the introduction of a scheme by which all adults not entitled to a direct vote would be
grouped together in primary groups of about 20, for the election of one representative
member from each group, who would be entitled to vote in
the Provincial elections either in the same constituencies
as the directly qualified voters or in separate constituencies to be formed for them.
(Mr.
Joshi, Mr. Shiva Rao, Dr. Ambedkar and Mr. Srinivasan
regard these proposals as only " second best " and consider that the immediate introduction of adult suffrage is both practicable and
desirable.
Sir
Cowasji Jehangir Sir P. C. Mitter and Mr. Basu do not assent to the maximum
or minimum we have suggested, but desire the discretion of the Franchise Commission to be
entirely unfettered.)
[f33]Discussion
on point 4 of Draft Report
Dr. Ambedkar: I beg to move an amendment to paragraph 4, namely. that in the second section,
line 2, to add the following words after the word "
practicable "—"
with the electoral machinery available in present circumstances ".
It would then read " Some difference of opinion
existed as to the extent to which this was practicable with
the electoral machinery available
in present circumstances." Several Members: There are other grounds.
Dr. Ambedkar : That
is my amendment. I leave it to the Chairman as the best
judge to sum up the sense of the Committee, but the impression that was left upon my mind was that the majority of those who opposed
universal adult suffrage as being practical politics for the immediate future did so
mainly upon the ground that there was not sufficient
electoral machinery in India to cope with the situation if
everybody was allowed to vote.
Chairman : I do not
think myself, Dr. Ambedkar, that was the sole ground on which the matter was put. It was
one of the main grounds, but in recording the view of the Committee I do not think we
should limit ourselves to saying that that was the sole ground. For instance, the
difficulty of communications, and the lack of facilities for travel, and so on, were also very much stressed.
Dr. Ambedkar: I
would rather like to have it made clear in the Report.
Mr. Joshi: You might
put in some such words as " practical electioneering difficulties ".
Sir Cawasji Jehangir: But there are other objections.
Mr. Joshi: We are
talking of the general majority, and not of those people who do not want to vote on principle.
Chairman: I
think what is already stated meets the point. After all,
you and Mr. Joshi come in under the note at the end.
Dr. Ambedkar: I
quite see that. Although we stand for the ideal, we may
have to accept the second best, but we should like to have the second best as good as it can possibly be made. I think my point ought
to be made clear, so that the expert Franchise Committee
might consider it.
Chairman : I do not
think that would meet the majority of the Committee. I think the majority of the Committee
would rather feel that the words should not be qualified. Very well.
Now
what about the next sentence beginning, "We recommend that an Expert Franchise
Commission should be appointed with instructions to provide for the immediate increase of
the electorate so as to enfranchise not less than ten per cent of the total population and
indeed a larger number— but not more than twenty-five per cent of the total
population—if that should, on a full investigation, be found practicable and
desirable."
Dr.
Ambedkar: I have
an amendment on page 3. Instead of the words " but not
" I should like to have the words " and even substituted ".
Chairman: Many of us
felt, and I am one of them, that an immediate increase of twenty-five per cent was
straining it somewhat, and I do not think we should be asked to strain it further. Again,
you come in under your reservation. Dr. Ambedkar.
Dr.
Ambedkar:
My second amendment is to strike out the words "and desirable ". This matter, whatever increase is desirable or not, is
really one which must be decided by this Committee. It cannot be decided by the Expert
Franchise Commission. That Commission is to be appointed to devise ways and means to carry
into effect the decisions we take. How much increase is desirable is certainly a matter
which cannot be left to the competence of the new Franchise
Commission. From that point of view I think it is necessary to drop these words.
Chairman: It is very
difficult to separate what is practicable and what is desirable. " Practicable " is an
elastic word. It may be a very difficult thing to achieve or it may be a comparatively
easy thing to achieve; but it may be possible of
achievement and therefore you will say it is practicable. In considering the desirability,
you can hardly shut out of your mind the extent to which the thing is practicable. The two
must come in together to a certain extent.
Dr. Ambedkar : We have decided that in our opinion an extension which
covers twenty-five per cent of the population is desirable.
Chairman: You use
such an elastic word as " practicable ". That is the difficulty I feel. You cannot put the two
words in completely watertight compartments. What is practicable must react on what is
desirable, and you use a very elastic word. I think it
would be wiser to keep both there. We give a clear view of our indication by saying at the very
outset that we look forward to adult suffrage as an ideal.
[f34]Chairman: We had
better take it line by line. Will anybody interrupt if they have an amendment to propose: " We recommend that, in
addition to providing for this increase, the Commission should consider the introduction
of a scheme by which all adults not entitled to a direct vote would be grouped together in
primary groups of about 20,"—"then it is
proposed to insert " or in some other suitable manner ". Is there any objection ?
—" for the election of one representative member from each
group, who would be entitled to vote in the Provincial elections either in the same
constituencies as the directly qualified voters or in separate constituencies to be formed
for them ".
"
(Mr. Joshi, Mr. Shiva Rao,
Dr. Ambedkar and Mr. Srinivasan
regard these proposals as only ' second best ' and consider that the immediate introduction of adult
suffrage is both practicable and desirable.) "
Dr. Ambedkar: I
should like to say that Mr. K. T.
Paul was also of the same opinion as ourselves.
Chairman: That will
be noted.
Mr. Joshi: I propose
that instead of the words " second best " the words " quite
inadequate " should be substituted.
Chairman: That is
really a matter for you gentlemen. If you prefer those words "
quite inadequate " instead of the words " second best ", that
is a matter for you really. So it will read: " Mr. Joshi, Mr. Shiva Rao, Dr. Ambedkar, Mr. Srinivasan and Mr. K. T. Paul regard these
proposals as quite inadequate and consider that the immediate introduction of adult
suffrage is both practicable and desirable." Mr.
Jadhav: My name also should be added to that list.
Chairman: A note
will be made of that. Then it goes on : " Sir Cowasji Jehangir, P.
C. Mitter, and Mr. Basu do not assent to the maximum or minimum we have
suggested, but desire the discretion of the Franchise Commission to be entirely
unfettered." Obviously that is a matter for them to say what they want.
[f35]Chairman: The minor
communities are really protected, not so much by the number of voters as by the number of
representatives they have, whether they have separate electorates or whether they have
joint electorates with reservation. That is in the main their protection.
But
in order to try to get a conclusion could not we say this, instead of using the words " each community "—Mr.
Chintamani put it to me— "
We desire that the Franchise Commission in making their proposal should bear in mind that
the ideal system would as nearly as possible give the major communities a voting strength
in proportion," and so on. I think that would do.
Sir C. Jehangir: " The two
major communities."
Chairman: His point is, he does not want to confine himself to the
major communities, but he wants to put it in this way that he is only recommending with
regard to the major communities; the Minor communities are
not the subject matter of the recommendation at all. Cannot you meet him on that ?
Sir
C. Jehangir:
It is too dangerous. When you talk about separate electorate, we have no separate
electorates and we do not want them.
Dr. Ambedkar: It
means this, that in order to maintain the advantage of having a large existing electorate
the suffrage should not be extended to the majority of the people. That is what it comes
to, that in order that Sir Cowasji Jehangir should maintain
the existing ratio of his population to the electoral strength the other people in the
country should not be on the electoral strength.
Sir C. Jehangir: All
I mean is that the smaller community should not be jeopardised.
Dr. Ambedkar: Your
position is bound to be jeopardised in any lowering of the franchise, and if you feel that
proportionately to the other voters your position goes down, then your safety lies either
in trusting to the majority or in asking for separate electorates. But you cannot say: '• Because we will be thrown down, we will sink,
therefore other communities should not be given it." It comes to nothing else but
that.
Sir C. Jehangir: I
do not say that.
Chairman: I am
afraid that we will have to take our conclusion. Bear in mind, if you will, that we are
agreeing to adult suffrage as an ideal. We have passed that part of the report. I have
suggested the words " would as nearly as possible give
at least major communities ".
First
of all I will put it to the Committee that the words should remain as they are " give, if possible, each community ". Who is against that?
A
note will be taken that Sir Cowasji Jehangir, Colonel Gidney
and Sardar Ujjal Singh dissent from the latter part.
Dr. Ambedkar: If you
want to place it before the Franchise Committee we should still like to say that in our
view the principle of adult suffrage should be applied to the Depressed Classes. Chairman: We have
got that already.
Mr. Foot: Otherwise
you would put an addendum to each paragraph.
Chairman: We cannot
have that every time.
Mr. Jadhav: Brahmins
and non-Brahmins and different communities in Bombay,
Depressed Classes and all should be added.
Chairman: We cannot
go into that. (Dr. Ambedkar insists for recording his
dissent from para. 13.)
[f36]Mr.
Foot:
There is only one point. In view of the general objection based
upon the claim for adult suffrage, need you have a note following each paragraph ? Would not
there be a general note at the end embodying the objection taken by Mr. Joshi and his colleagues ?
Chairman: I think
that would be better for you, I quite understand your position. Dr. Ambedkar: I
leave it to you.
Chairman: If I may
say so, I think it might make you appear to be in rather a false position if, for
instance, you appeared to be objecting to the women's vote.
Dr. Ambedkar: We
have very good ground for doing that. We are quite
prepared, in our minds, and we can meet whatever objection may be raised on that ground.
We have no theoretical objection to women.
Mr. Jadhav : The
maximum of 25 per cent will be taken up by women, and then there will be no necessity of any other lowering of the franchise.
6
COMMITTEE
OF THE WHOLE CONFERENCE
[f37]Summary of the Report submitted
by Sub-Committee No. VI (Franchise)—16th January 1931
(Some
of the paragraphs related to Dr. Ambedkar's proposals) The
Sub-Committee recommended vide :
Para.
4:
(1) that an expert Franchise Commission should be appointed with instructions to provide
for the immediate increase of the electorate so as to enfranchise not less than 10 per
cent of the total population and indeed a larger number—but not more than 25 per cent
of the total population—if that should, on a full investigation, be found practicable
and desirable,
(2)
that in addition to providing for this increase, the commission should consider the
introduction of a scheme by which all adults not entitled to a direct vote would be
grouped together in primary groups of about 20 or in some other suitable manner, for the
election of one representative member from each group, who would be entitled to vote in
the Provincial
elections either in the same constituencies as the directly qualified voters or in
separate constituencies to be formed for them. (Mr. Joshi, Mr. Shiva Rao, Dr. Ambedkar,
Mr. Srinivasan, Mr.K.T. Paul and Mr. Jadhav regards these proposals as quite inadequate and consider that the immediate introduction, of adult suffrage is both practicable and desirable.)
Para.
7:
The Sub-Committee was of opinion that the Franchise Commission should consider the
possibility of framing a suitable educational qualification as an additional qualification
for the franchise.
Para.
8:
The Sub-Committee agreed that the existing Military Service qualification should be
retained and recommended that the Franchise Commission should consider the extension of
this qualification so as to include service in the Auxiliary and Territorial Forces.
Para. 9: The
Sub-Committee agreed that special qualifications should be prescribed for women and
recommended that the Franchise Commission should devote special attention to this question
in the light of all the evidence available including the
recommendation of the Statutory Commission and the suggestion made in the Sub-Committee
that the age-limit mentioned in the proposals of the Statutory Commission should be
lowered from 25 to 21.
(Mr.
Joshi, Mr. Shiva Rao, Dr. Ambedkar and Mr. Srinivasan
dissent from the proposals in paragraphs 7, 8 and 9.)
13.
The Sub-Committee considered it inadvisable to lay down any programme of automatic
extension of the franchise. It preferred that it should be left to each Provincial
Legislature to extend its franchise at its discretion, after a lapse of 10 years from the
date of the introduction of the new constitution.
(Mr.
Joshi, Mr. Shiva Rao, Dr. Ambedkar and Mr. Srinivasan considered that a preference of
automatic extension of the franchise should be laid down.)
[No
comments by Dr. Ambedkar in the discussion. Comments in Committee of the Whole Conference
(16th January 1931) on Report of Sub-Committee No. VI
(Franchise) by Mr. N. M.
Joshi.]
Mr. Joshi: I want to
make one point clear, on paragraph 9. It is said that Mr. Joshi, Mr. Shiva Rao, Dr.
Ambedkar and Mr. Srinivasan dissent from the proposals in paragraphs 7, 8 and 9. I want it
to be noted that we are not against the claims of women for some kind of qualification
being created for them. Unfortunately, we had to take up the attitude which we did in the
Committee, on account of the fact that the Committee fixed a certain limit to the total
number of voters, being created, and in these circumstances it became our duty to protect
the interests of the unenfranchised because if we accept the principle of giving votes to
the wives of those who are enfranchised, the limit of
enfranchising those who had not the franchise is bound to be higher. On account of the
special and difficult position in which we were placed we had to take up the attitude of
not giving votes to the wives of those who are already enfranchised and thus depriving the
unenfranchised of their rights. We are not against removing the disqualification of sex.
Part II
[f3]Dr.
Ambedkar was not the member of this Sub-Committee. He was however included as member of
the Federal Structure Committee in the 2nd R.T.C.
[f5]Proceedings
of the R.T.C., p. 261.
[f7]Proceedings of the Sub-Committee No. II (Provincial Constitution),
Government of India, Central Publication Branch, Calcutta, 1931, pp. 18-22. The terms of
reference to this Committee were as under:—
(1)
" The powers of the Provincial Legislature."
(2)
" The constitution, character, powers and
responsibilities of the Provincial Executive."
[f8]Proceedings
of Sub-Committee No. II (Provincial Constitution), p. 56.
[f9]Proceedings
of the Sub-Committee No. II (Provincial Constitution), pp. 95-102.
[f10]*
Proceedings of Sub-Committee No. II (Provincial Constitution), p. 133.
[f15]Proceedings
of the Sub-Committee No. Ill (Minorities), Government of India, Central Publication
Branch, Calcutta, 1931, pp. 73-80. The terms of reference to the Sub-Committee were as
under:—
" The provision to be made to secure the willing
co-operation of the minorities and the special interests."
[f16]The
memorandum is appended at the end of this chapter as Appendix I, pp. 546-54.
[f17]Proceedings
of the Sub-Committee No. Ill (Minorities), pp. 127-28.
[f18]Proceedings
of the Sub-Committee No. Ill (Minorities), pp. 129-31.
[f19]Proceedings
of the Sub-Committee No. III (Minorities), pp. 133-35.
[f21]Paragraph
No. 12 as adopted after discussion in the Sub-Committee No. III.
[f22]Proceedings
of the Sub-Committee No. III (Minorities), p. 153.
[f25]Proceedings
of the Sub-Committee No. VI (Franchise), pp. 68-69.
[f28]Proceedings
of the Sub-Committee No. VI (Franchise), pp. 76-78.
[f31]Proceedings
of the Sub-Committee No. VI (Franchise), pp. 147-48. * Ibid., pp. 149-50.
[f33]Proceedings
of the Sub-Committee No. VI (Franchise), pp. 152-54.
[f34]
Proceedings of the Sub-Committee No. VI (Franchise),
p. 159.
[f35]Proceedings
of the Sub-Committee No. VI (Franchise), pp. 171-72.
[f36]Proceedings
of the Sub-Committee No. VI (Franchise), pp. 175-76.