PAKISTAN OR THE PARTITION OF INDIA
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Contents
PART
IV : PAKISTAN AND THE MALAISE
Chapter XI : Communal aggression
PART
IV
PAKISTAN AND
THE MALAISE
The
Hindu-Muslim problem has tow aspects to it. In its first aspect, the problem that presents
itself is the problem of two separate communities facing each other and seeking adjustment
of their respective right and privileges. In its other aspect, the problem is the problem
of the reflex influences which this separation and conflict produces upon each of them. In
the course of the foregoing discussion we have looked at the project of Pakistan in
relation to the first of the aspects of the Hindu-Muslim problem. We have not examined the
project of Pakistan in relation to the second aspect of that problem. Yet, such an
examination is necessary because that aspect of the Hindu-Muslim problem is not
unimportant. It is a very superficial if not an incomplete view to stop with the problem
of the adjustment of their claims. It cannot be overlooked that their lot is cast together
as such they have to participate in a course of common activity whether they like it or
not. And if in this common activity they face each other as two combatants do, then their
actions and reactions are worth study, for they affect both and produce a state of affairs
from which if it is a deceased state, the question of escape must be faced. A study of the
situation shows that the actions and reactions have produced a malaise which exhibits
itself in three ways :(l) Social Stagnation, (2) Communal Aggression, and (3) National
Frustration of Political 'Destiny. This malaise is a grave one. Will Pakistan he a remedy
for the malaise ? Or, will it aggravate the malaise ? The following chapters are devoted
to the consideration of these questions.
SOCIAL
STAGNATION
I
The social evils which characterize the Hindu
Society, have been well known. The publication of Mother
India by Miss Mayo gave these evils the widest publicity. But while Mother India served the purpose of exposing the
evils and calling their authors at the bar of the world to answer for their sins, it
created the unfortunate impression throughout the world that while the Hindus were
grovelling in the mud of these social evils and were conservative, the Muslims in India
were free from them, and as compared to the Hindus, were a progressive people. That, such
an impression should prevail, is surprising to those who know the Muslim Society in India
at close quarters.
One may well ask if there is any social evil
which is found among the Hindus and is not found among the Muslims ?
Take child-marriage. The Secretary of the Anti-Child-marriage Committee, constituted by the All-India Women's Conference, published a bulletin which gives the extent of the evil of child-marriage in the different communities in the country. The figures which were taken from the Census Report of 1931 areas follows :—
TABLE
MARRIED FEMALES AGED 0-15 PER 1000 FEMALES OF
THAT AGE
|
Hindus |
Muslims |
Jains |
Sikhs |
Christians |
1881 |
208 |
153 |
189 |
170 |
33 |
1891 |
193 |
141 |
172 |
143 |
37 |
1901 |
186 |
131 |
164 |
101 |
38 |
1911 |
184 |
123 |
130 |
88 |
39 |
1921 |
170 |
III |
117 |
72 |
32 |
2931 |
199 |
186 |
125 |
80 |
43 |
.
Can the position among the Musalmans so far as
child-marriage goes, be considered better than the position among the Hindus ?
Take the position of women. It is insisted by
Muslims that the legal rights given to Muslim women, ensure them a greater measure of
independence than allowed to other Eastern women, for example, Hindu women, and are in
excess of the rights given to women in some Western countries. Reliance is placed on some
of the provisions of the Muslim Law.
Firstly, it is said the Muslim Law does not fix
any age for marriage, and recognizes the right of a girl to marry any time. Further,
except where the marriage is celebrated by the father or the grandfather, a Muslim girl,
if given in marriage in childhood, has the power to repudiate her marriage on attaining
puberty.
Secondly, it is held out that marriage among
the Musalmans is a contract. Being a contract, the husband has a right to divorce his wife
and the Muslim Law has provided ample safeguards for the wife which, if availed of, would
place the Muslim wife on the same footing as the husband in the matter of divorce. For, it
is claimed that the wife under the Muslim Law can, at the time of the marriage,' or even
thereafter in some cases, enter into a contract by which she may under certain
circumstances obtain a divorce.
Thirdly, the Mahomedan Law requires that a wife
can claim from her husband, by way of consideration for the surrender of her person, a sum
of money or other property—known as her " dower ". The dower may be fixed
even after marriage and if no amount is fixed, the wife is entitled to proper dower. The
amount of dower is usually split into two parts, one is called " prompt " which
is payable on demand, and the other " deferred " which is payable on dissolution
of marriage by death or divorce. Her claim for dower will be treated as a debt against the
husband's estate. She has complete dominion over her dower which is intended to give her
economic independence. She can remit it or she can appropriate the income of it as she
pleases.
Granting all these provisions of law in her
favour, the Muslim woman is the most helpless person in the world. To quote an Egyptian
Muslim leader :—
" Islam has set its seal of inferiority
upon her, and given the sanction of religion to social customs which have deprived her of
the full opportunity for self-expression and development of personality."
No Muslim girl has the courage to repudiate her
marriage, although it may be open to her on the ground that she was a child and that it
was brought about by persons other than her parents. No Muslim wife will think it proper
to have a clause entered into her marriage contract reserving her the right to divorce. In
that event, her fate is " once married, always married." She cannot escape the
marriage tie, however irksome it may be. While she cannot repudiate the marriage, the
husband can always do it without having to show any cause. Utter the word " Tallak "' and observe continence for three
weeks and the woman is cast away. The only restraint on his caprice is the obligation to
pay dower. If the dower has already been remitted, his right to divorce is a matter of his
sweet will.
This latitude in the matter of divorce destroys
that sense of security which is so fundamental for a full, free and happy life for a
woman. This insecurity of life, to which a Muslim woman is exposed, is greatly augmented
by the right of polygamy and concubinage, which the Muslim Law gives to the husband.
Mahomedam Law allows a Muslim to marry four
wives at a time. It is not unoften said that this is an improvement over the Hindu Law
which places no restriction on the number of wives a Hindu can have at any given time. But
it is forgotten that in addition to the four legal wives, the Muslim Law permits a
Mahomedan to cohabit with his female slaves. In the case of female slaves nothing is said
as to the number. They are allowed to him without any restriction whatever and without any
obligation to marry them.
No words can adequately express the great and
many evils of polygamy and concubinage and especially as a source of misery to a Muslim
woman. It is true that because polygamy and concubinage are sanctioned, one must not
suppose they are indulged in by the generality of Muslims; still the fact remains that
they are privileges which are easy for a Muslim to abuse to the misery and unhappiness of
his wife. Mr. John J. Pool, no enemy of Islam, observes [f1]1:—
"This latitude in the mailer of divorce is
very greatly taken advantage of by some Mohamedans. Slohart, commenting on this subject in
his book, Islam, and its Founder, says: ' Some
Mohamodans make a habit of continually changing their wives. We read of young men who have
had twenty and thirty wives, a new one every three months: and thus it comes about that
women are liable to be indefinitely transferred from one man to another, obliged to accept
a husband and a home whenever they can find one, or in case of destitution, to which
divorce may have driven them, to resort to other more degrading means of living. Thus
while keeping the strict letter of the law, and possessing only one or certainly not more
than four wives, unscrupulous characters may yet by divorce obtain in a lifetime as many
wives as they please.
" In another way also a Mohammedan may
really have more than four wives, and yet keep within the law. This is by means of living
with concubines, which the Koran expressly permits. In that sura which allows four wives, the words are added,
' of the slaves which ye shall have acquired.' Then in
the 70th suru. it is revealed that it is no
sin to live with slaves. The very words are: ' The slaves which their right hands possess,
as to them they shall be blameless.' At the present day, as in days past, in multitudes of
Mohamedan homes, slaves are found; as Muir says, in his Life of Mahomet ' so long as this unlimited
permission of living with their female slaves continues, it cannot be expected that there
will be any hearty attempt to put a stop to slavery in Mohamedan countries.' Thus the
Koran, in this matter of slavery, is the enemy of the mankind. And women, as usual, are
the greater sufferers.'
Take the caste system. Islam speaks of brotherhood. Everybody
infers that Islam must be free from slavery and caste. Regarding slavery nothing needs to
be said. It stands abolished now by law. But while it existed much of its support was
derived from Islam and Islamic countries.[f2]2 While the prescriptions by the Prophet
regarding the just and humane treatment of slaves contained in the Koran are praiseworthy,
there is nothing whatever in Islam that lends support to the abolition of this curse. As
Sir W. Muir has well said 3[f.3] :—
"...rather, while lightening, lie riveted
the fetter.... There is no obligation on a Muslim to release his slaves. ... "
But if slavery has gone, caste among Musalmans has remained. As an
illustration one may take the conditions prevalent among the Bengal Muslims. The
Superintendent of the
Census for 1901 for the Province of Bengal
records the following interesting facts regarding the Muslims of Bengal :—
" The conventional division of the
Mahomedans into four tribes— Sheikh, Saiad, Moghul and Pathan—has very little
application to this Province (Bengal). The Mahomedans themselves recognize two main social
divisions, (1) Ashraf or Sharaf and (2) Ajlaf Ashraf means ' noble ' and includes all
undoubted descendants of foreigners and converts from high caste Hindus. All other
Mahomedans including the occupational groups and all converts of lower ranks, are known by
the contemptuous terms, ' Ajlaf , ' wretches ' or ' mean people ': they are also called
Kamina or Itar, ' base ' or Rasil, a corruption of Rizal, ' worthless '. In some places a
third class, called Arzal or ' lowest of all ', is added. With them no other Mahomedan
would associate, and they are forbidden to enter the mosque to use the public burial
ground.
"Within these groups there are castes with
social precedence of exactly the same nature as one finds among the Hindus.
' 1. Ashraf
or better class Mahomedans.
(1) Saiads.
(2) Sheikhs.
(3) Pathans.
(4) Moghul.
(5) Mallik.
(6) Mirza.
II. Ajlaf
or lower class Mahomedans.
(1) Cultivating Sheikhs, and others who were originally Hindus
but who do not belong to any functional group, and have not gained admittance to the
Ashraf Community, e.g. Pirali and Thakrai.
(2) Darzi, Jolaha, Fakir, and Rangrez.
(3) Barhi, Bhalhiara, Chik, Churihar, Dai,
Dhawa, Dhunia, Gaddi, Kalal, Kasai, Kula Kunjara, Laheri, Mahifarosh, Mallah, Naliya,
Nikari.
(4) Abdal, Bako, Bediya, Bhal, Chamba, Dafali,
Dhobi, Hajjam, Mucho, Nagarchi, Nal,Panwaria, Madaria,Tunlia.
III. Arzal
or degraded class. Bhanar, Halalkhor, Hijra, Kasbi, Lalbegi, Maugia, Mchlar."
The Census Superintendent mentions another
feature of the Muslim social system, namely, the prevalence of the " panchayat
system." He states :—
" The authority of the panchayat extends
to social as well as trade matters and... marriage with people of' other communities is
one of offences of which the governing body lakes cognizance. The result is that these
groups are often as strictly endogamous as Hindu castes. The prohibition on inter-marriage
extends to higher as well as to lower castes, and a Dhuina, for example, may marry no one
but a Dhuina. If this rule is transgressed, the offender is at once hauled up before the
panchayat and ejected ignominiously from his community. A member of one such group cannot
ordinarily gain admission to another, and he retains the designation of the community in
which he was born even if he abandons its distinctive occupation and takes to other means
of livelihood.... thousands of Jolahas are butchers, yet they are still known as
Jolahas."
Similar facts from other Provinces of India
could be gathered from their respective Census Reports and those who are curious may refer
to them. But the facts for Bengal are enough to show that the Mahomedans observe not only
caste but also untouchability.
There can thus be no manner of doubt that the
Muslim Society in India is afflicted by the same social evils as afflict the Hindu
Society. Indeed, the Muslims have all the social evils of the Hindus and something more.
That something more is the compulsory system of purdah
for Muslim women.
As a consequence of the purdah system a segregation of the Muslim women is
brought about. The ladies are not expected to visit the outer rooms, verandahs or gardens,
their quarters are in the back-yard. All of them, young and old, are confined in the same
room. No male servant can work in their presence. A woman is allowed to see only her sons,
brothers, father, uncles and husband, or any other near relation who may be admitted to a
position of trust. She cannot go even to the mosque to pray and must wear burka (veil) whenever she has to go out. These burka women walking in the streets is one of the
most hideous sights one can witness in India. Such seclusion cannot but have its
deteriorating effects upon the physical constitution of Muslim women. They are usually
victims to anaemia, tuberculosis and pyorrhoea. Their bodies are deformed, with their
backs bent, bones protruded, hands and feet crooked. Ribs, joints and nearly all their
bones ache. Heart palpitation is very often present in them. The result of this pelvic
deformity is untimely death at the time of delivery. Purdah
deprives Muslim women of mental and moral nourishment. Being deprived of healthy social
life, the process of moral degeneration must and does set in. Being completely secluded
from the outer world, they engage their minds in petty family quarrels with the result
that they become narrow and restricted in their outlook.
They lag behind their sisters from other
communities, cannot take part in any outdoor activity and are weighed down by a slavish
mentality and an inferiority complex. They have no desire for knowledge, because they are
taught not to be interested in anything outside the four walls of the house. Purdah women in particular become helpless, timid,
and unfit for any fight in life. Considering the large number of purdah women among Muslims in India, one can easily
understand the vastness and seriousness of the problem of purdah 4[f.4]
The physical and intellectual effects of purdah are nothing as compared with its effects on
morals. The origin of purdah lies of course in
the deep-rooted suspicion of sexual appetites in both sexes and the purpose is to check
them by segregating the sexes. But far from achieving the purpose, purdah has adversely affected the morals of Muslim
men. Owing to purdah a Muslim has no contact
with any woman outside those who belong to his own household. Even with them his contact
extends only to occasional conversation. For a male there is no company of and no
commingling with the females except those who are children or aged. This isolation of the
males from females is sure to produce bad effects on the morals of men. It requires no
psychoanalyst to say that a social system which cuts off all contact between, the two
sexes produces an unhealthy tendency towards sexual excesses and unnatural and other
morbid habits and ways.
The evil consequences of purdah are not confined to the Muslim community
only. It is responsible for the social segregation of Hindus from Muslims which is the
bane of public life in India. This argument may appear far fetched and one is inclined to
attribute this segregation to the unsociability of the Hindus rather than to purdah among the Muslims. But the Hindus are right
when they say that it is not possible to establish social contact between Hindus and
Muslims because such contact can only mean contact between women from one side and men
from the other 5 [f.5]
Not that purdah and the evils consequent thereon are not
to be found among certain sections of the Hindus in certain parts of the country. But the
point of distinction is that among the Muslims, purdah has a religious sanctity which it has not
with the Hindus. Purdah has deeper roots among
the Muslims than it has among the Hindus and can only be removed by facing the inevitable
conflict between religious injunctions and social needs. The problem of purdah is a real problem with the
Muslims—apart from its origin—which it is not with the Hindus. Of any attempt by
the Muslims to do away with it, there is no evidence.
There is thus a stagnation not only in the
social life but also in the political life of the Muslim community of India. The Muslims
have no interest in politics as such. Their predominant interest is religion. This can be
easily seen by the terms and conditions that a Muslim constituency makes for its support
to a candidate fighting for a seat. The Muslim constituency does not care to examine the
programme of the candidate. All that the constituency wants from the candidate is that he
should agree to replace the old lamps of the masjid by supplying new ones at his cost, to
provide a new carpet for the masjid because the old one is torn, or to repair the masjid
because it has become dilapidated. In some places a Muslim constituency is quite satisfied
if the candidate agrees to give a sumptuous feast and in other if he agrees to buy votes
for so much a piece. With the Muslims, election is a mere matter of money and is very
seldom a matter of social programme of general improvement. Muslim politics takes no note
of purely secular categories of life, namely, the differences between rich and poor,
capital and labour, landlord and tenant, priest and layman, reason and superstition.
Muslim politics is essentially clerical and recognizes only one difference, namely, that
existing between Hindus and Muslims. None of the secular categories of life have any place
in the politics of the Muslim community and if they do find a place—and they must
because they are irrepressible—they are subordinated to one and the only governing
principle of the Muslim political universe, namely, religion.
II
The existence of these evils among the Muslims
is distressing enough. But far more distressing is the fact that there is no organized
movement of social reform among the Musalmans
of India on a scale sufficient to bring about their eradication. The Hindus have their
social evils. But there is this relieving feature about them—namely, that some of
them are conscious of their existence and a few of them are actively agitating for their
removal. The Muslims, on the other hand, do not realize that they are evils and
consequently do not agitate for their removal. Indeed, they oppose any change in their
existing practices. It is noteworthy that the "Muslims opposed the Child-Marriage
Bill brought in the Central Assembly in 1930, whereby the age for marriage of a girl was
raised to 14 and of a boy to 18 on the ground that it was opposed to the Muslim canon law.
Not only did they oppose the bill at every stage but that when it became law they started
a campaign of Civil Disobedience against that Act. Fortunately the Civil Disobedience
campaign of the Muslims against the Act did not swell and was submerged in the Congress
Civil Disobedience campaign which synchronized with it. But the campaign only proves how
strongly the Muslims are opposed to social reform.
The question may be asked why are the Muslims
opposed to social reform ?
The usual answer given is that the Muslims all
over the world are an unprogressive people. This view no doubt accords with the facts of
history. After the first spurts of their activity the scale of which was undoubtedly
stupendous leading to the foundations of vast empires—the Muslims suddenly fell into
a strange condition of torpor, from which they never seem to have become awake. The cause
assigned for this torpor by those, who have made a study of their condition, is said to be
the fundamental assumption made by all Muslims that Islam is a world religion, suitable
for all people, for all times and for all conditions. It has been contended that :—
"The Musalman, remaining faithful to his
religion, has not progressed; he has remained stationary in a world of swiftly moving
modern forces. It is, indeed, one of the salient features of Islam that it immobilizes in
their native barbarism, the races whom it enslaves. It is fixed in a crystallization,
inert and impenetrable. It is unchangeable; and political, social or economic changes have
no repercussion upon it.
" Having been taught that outside Islam
there can be no safety; outside its law no truth and outside its spiritual message there
is no happiness, the Muslim has become incapable of conceiving any other condition than
his own, any other mode of thought than the Islamic thought. He firmly believes that he
has arrived at an unequalled pitch of perfection; that he is the sole possessor of true
faith, of the true doctrine, the true wisdom ; that he alone is in possession of the
truth—no relative truth subject to revision, but absolute truth.
" The religious law of the Muslims has had
the effect of imparting to the very diverse individuals of whom the world is composed, a
unity of thought, of feeling, of ideas, of judgement."
It is urged that this uniformity is deadening
and is not merely imparted to the Muslims, but is imposed upon them by a spirit of
intolerance which is unknown anywhere outside the Muslim world for its severity and its
violence and which is directed towards the suppression of all rational thinking which is
in conflict with the teachings of Islam. As Renan observes 6[f.6]:—
" Islam is a close union of the spiritual
and the temporal; it is the reign of a dogma, it is the heaviest chain that humanity has
ever borne.... Islam has its beauties as a religion;.... But to the human reason Islamism
has only been injurious. The minds that it has shut from the light were, no doubt, already
closed in their own internal limits; but it has persecuted free thought, I shall not say
more violently than other religions, but more effectually. It has made of the countries
that it has conquered 9 closed field to the rational culture of the mind. What is, in fact
-essentially distinctive of the Musalman is his hatred of science, his persuasion that
research is useless, frivolous, almost impious—the natural sciences, because they are
attempts at rivalry with God; the historical sciences, because they apply to times
anterior to Islam, they may revive ancient heresies. Renan concludes by saying:—
"Islam, in treating science as an enemy,
is only consistent, but it is a dangerous thing to be consistent. To its own misfortune
Islam has been successful. By slaying science it has slain itself; and is condemned in the
world to a complete inferiority."
This answer though obvious, cannot be the true
answer. If it were the true answer, how are we to account for the stir and ferment that is
going on in all Muslim countries outside India, where the spirit of inquiry, the spirit of
change and the desire to reform are noticeable in every walk of life. Indeed, the social
reforms which have taken place in Turkey have been of the most revolutionary character. If
Islam has not come in the way of the Muslims of these countries, why should it come in the
way of the Muslims of India ? There must be some special reason for the social and
political stagnation of the Muslim community in India.
What can that special reason be ? It seems to
me that the reason for the absence of the spirit of change in the Indian Musalman is to be
sought in the' peculiar position he occupies in India. He is placed in a social
environment which is predominantly Hindu. That Hindu environment is always silently but
surely encroaching upon him. He feels that it is de-musalmanazing him. As a protection
against this gradual weaning away he is led to insist on preserving everything that is Islamic without caring to examine whether
it is helpful or harmful to his society. Secondly, the Muslims in India are placed in a
political environment which is also predominantly Hindu. He feels that he will be
suppressed and that political suppression will make the Muslims a depressed class. It is
this consciousness that he has to save himself from being submerged by the Hindus socially
and-politically, which to my mind is the primary cause why the Indian Muslims as compared
with their fellows outside are backward in the matter of social reform. Their energies are
directed to maintaining a constant struggle against the Hindus for seats and posts in
which there is no time, no thought and no room for questions relating to social reform.
And if there is any, it is all overweighed and suppressed by the desire, generated by
pressure of communal tension, to close the ranks and offer a united front to the menace of
the Hindus and Hinduism by maintaining their socio-religious unity at any cost.
The same is the explanation of the political
stagnation in the Muslim community of India. Muslim politicians do not recognize secular
categories of life as the basis of their politics because to them it means the weakening
of the community in its fight against the Hindus. The poor Muslims will not join the poor
Hindus to get justice from the rich. Muslim tenants will not join Hindu tenants to prevent
the tyranny of the landlord. Muslim labourers will not join Hindu labourers in the fight
of labour against capital. Why ? The answer is simple. The poor Muslim sees that if he
joins in the fight of the poor against the rich, he may be fighting against a rich Muslim.
The Muslim tenant feels that if he joins in the campaign against the landlord, he may have
to fight against a Muslim landlord. A Muslim labourer feels that if he joins in the
onslaught of labour against capital, he will be injuring a Muslim mill-owner. He is
conscious that any injury to a rich Muslim, to a Muslim landlord or to a Muslim
mill-owner, is a disservice to the Muslim community, for it is thereby weakened in its
struggle against the Hindu community.
How Muslim politics has become perverted is
shown by the attitude of the Muslim leaders to the political reforms in the Indian States.
The Muslims and their leaders carried on a great agitation for the introduction of
representative government in the Hindu State of Kashmir. The same Muslims and their
leaders are deadly opposed to the introduction of representative governments in other
Muslim States. The reason for this strange attitude is quite simple. In all matters, the
determining question with the Muslims is how it will affect the Muslims vis-a-vis the Hindus. If representative government
can help the Muslims, they will demand it, and fight for it. In the State of Kashmir the
ruler is a Hindu, but the majority of the subjects are Muslims. The Muslims fought for representative government in Kashmir, because
representative government in Kashmir meant the transfer of power from a Hindu king to the
Muslim masses. In other Muslim States, the ruler is a Muslim but the majority of his
subjects are Hindus. In such States representative government means the transfer of power
from a Muslim ruler to the Hindu masses, and that is why the Muslims support the
introduction of representative government in one case and oppose it in the other. The
dominating consideration with the Muslims is not democracy. The dominating consideration
is how democracy with majority rule will affect the Muslims in their struggle against the
Hindus. Will it strengthen them or will it weaken them ? If democracy weakens them, they
will not have democracy. They will prefer the rotten state to continue in the Muslim
States rather than weaken the Muslim ruler in his hold upon his Hindu subjects.
The political and social stagnation in the
Muslim community can be explained by one and only one reason. The Muslims think that the
Hindus and Muslims must perpetually struggle; the Hindus to establish their dominance over
the Muslims and the Muslims to establish their historical position as the ruling
community—that in this struggle the strong will win, and to ensure strength they must
suppress or put in cold storage everything which causes dissension in their ranks.
If the Muslims in other countries have
undertaken the task of reforming their society and the Muslims of India have refused to do
so, it is because the former are free from communal and political clashes with rival
communities, while the latter are not.
III
It is not that this blind spirit of
conservatism which dose not recognize the need of repair to the social structure has taken
hold of the Muslims only. It has taken hold of the Hindus also. The Hindus atone time did
recognize that without social efficiency no permanent progress in other fields of activity
was possible, that, owing to the mischief wrought by evil customs Hindu Society was not in
a state of efficiency and that ceaseless efforts must be made to eradicate these evils. It
was due to the recognition of this fact that the birth of the National Congress was
accompanied by the foundation of the Social Conference. While the Congress was concerned
with defining the weak points in the political organisation of the country, the Social
Conference was engaged in removing the weak points in the social organisation of the Hindu
Society. For some time, the Congress and the Conference worked as two wings of one common
body and held their annual sessions in the same pandal. But soon the two wings developed
into two parties, a Political Reform Party and a Social Reform Party, between whom raged
fierce controversy. The Political Reform Party supported the National Congress and the
Social Reform Party supported the Social Conference. The two bodies became two hostile
camps. The point at issue was whether social reform should precede political reform. For a
decade the forces were evenly balanced and the battle was fought without victory to either
side. It was, however, evident that the fortunes of the Social Conference were ebbing
fast. The gentlemen who presided over the sessions of the Social Conference lamented that
the majority of the educated Hindus were for political advancement and indifferent to
social reform and that while the number of those who attended the Congress was very large
and the number who did not attend but who sympathized with it even larger, the number of
those who attended the Social Conference was very much smaller. This indifference, this
thinning of its ranks was soon followed by active hostility from the politicians, like the
late Mr. Tilak. In course of time, the party in favour of political reform won and the
Social Conference vanished and was forgotten,7
[f7]With it also vanished from the Hindu Society the urge for
social reform. Under the leadership of Mr. Gandhi, the Hindu Society, if it did not become
a political mad-house, certainly became mad after politics. Non-co-operation, Civil
Disobedience, and the cry for Swaraj took the place which social reform once had in the
minds of the Hindus. In the din and dust of political agitation, the Hindus do not even
know that there are any evils to be remedied. Those who are conscious of it, do not
believe that social reform is as important as political reform, and when forced to admit
its importance argue that there can be no social reform unless political power is first
achieved. They are so eager to possess political power that they are impatient even of
propaganda in favour of social reform, as it means so much time and energy deducted from
political propaganda. A correspondent of Mr.
Gandhi put the point of view of the Nationalists very appropriately, if bluntly, when he
wrote 8[f.8] to Mr. Gandhi,
saying:—
" Don't 'you think that it is impossible
to achieve any great reform without winning political power ? The present economic
structure has got to be tackled? No reconstruction is possible without political
reconstruction and I am afraid all this talk of polished and unpolished rice, balanced
diet and so on and so forth is mere moonshine."
The Social Reform Party, led by Ranade, died
leaving the field to the Congress. There has grown up among the Hindus another party which
is also a rival to the Congress. It is the Hindu Maha Sabha. One would expect from its
name that it was a body for bringing about the reform of Hindu Society. But it is not. Its
rivalry with the Congress has nothing to do with the issue of social reform vs. political reform. Its quarrel with the
Congress has its origin in the pro-Muslim policy of the Congress. It is organized for the
protection of Hindu rights against Muslim encroachment. Its plan is to organize the Hindus
for offering a united front to the Muslims. As a body organized to protect Hindu rights it
is all the time engaged in keeping an eye on political movements, on seats and posts. It
cannot spare any thought for social reform. As a body keen on bringing about a united
front of all Hindus, it cannot afford to create dissensions among its elements which would
be the case if it undertook to bring about social reforms. For the sake of the
consolidation of the Hindu rank and file, the Hindu Maha Sabha is ready to suffer all
social evils to remain as they are. For the sake of consolidation of the Hindus, it is
prepared to welcome the Federation as devised by the Act of 1935 in spite of
its many iniquities and defects. For the same
purpose, the Hindu Maha Sabha favours the retention of the Indian States, with their
administration as it is. ' Hands off the Hindu States ' has been the battle-cry of its
President. This attitude is stranger than that of the Muslims. Representative government
in Hindu States cannot do harm to the Hindus. Why then should the President of the Hindu
Maha Sabha oppose it ? Probably because it helps the Muslims, whom he cannot tolerate.
IV
To what length this concern for the
conservation of their forces can lead the Hindus and the Musalmans cannot be better
illustrated than by the debates on the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act VIII of 1939 in
the Central Assembly. Before 1939, the law was that apostasy of a male or a female married
under the Muslim law ipso facto dissolved the
marriage with the result that if a married Muslim woman changed her religion, she was free
to marry a person professing her new religion. This was the rule of law enforced by the
courts, throughout India at any rate, for the last 60 years.[f9]9
This law was annulled by Act VIII of 1939,
section 4 of which reads as follows:—
" The renunciation of Islam by a married
Muslim woman or her conversion to a faith other than Islam shall not by itself operate to
dissolve her marriage:
Provided that after such renunciation or
conversion the woman shall be entitled to obtain a decree for the dissolution of marriage
on any of the grounds mentioned in section 2:
Provided further that the provision of' this
section shall not apply to a woman converted to Islam from some other faith who
re-embraces her former faith."
According to this Act, the marriage of a
married Muslim woman is not dissolved by reason of her conversion to another religion. All
that she gets is a right of divorce. It is very intriguing to find that section 2 does not
refer to conversion or apostasy as a ground for divorce. The effect of the law is that a
married Muslim woman has no liberty of conscience and is tied for ever to her husband
whose religious faith may be quite abhorrent to her.
The grounds urged in support of this change are
well worth attention. The mover of the Bill, Quazi Kazmi, M.L.A. adopted a very ingenious
line of argument in support of the change. In his speech 10[f.10] on the motion
to refer the Bill he said:—
" Apostasy was considered by Islam, as by
any other religion, as a great crime, almost amounting to a crime against the State. It is not novel for the religion of' Islam to have that
provision. If we look up the older Acts of any nation, we will find that similar provision
also exists in other Codes as well. Fur the male a severer punishment was awarded, that of
death, and for females, only the punishment of imprisonment was awarded. This main
provision was that because it was a sin, it was a crime, it was to be punished, and the
woman was to be deprived of her status as wife. It was not only this status that she lost,
but she lost all her suit us in society; she was deprived of her properly and civil rights
as well. But we find that as early as 1850 an Act was passed here, called the Caste
Disabilities Removal Act of 1850, Act XXI of 1850.....
" .... by this Act, the forfeiture of
civil rights that could be imposed on a woman on her apostasy has been taken away. She can
no longer be subjected to any forfeiture of properly or her right of inheritance or
anything of the kind. The only question is that the Legislature has come to her help, it
has given her a certain amount of liberty of thought, some kind of liberty of religion to
adopt any faith she likes, and has removed the forfeiture clause from which she could
suffer, and which was a restraint upon her changing the faith. The question is how far we
are entitled after that to continue placing the restriction on her status as a wile. Her
status as a wife is of some importance in society. She belongs to some family, she has got
children, she has got other connections too. If she has got a liberal mind, she may not
like to continue the same old religion. If she changes her religion, why should we,
according to our modern ideas, inflict upon her a further penalty that she will cease to
be the wife of her husband. I submit, in these days when we are advocating freedom of
thought and freedom of religion, when we are advocating inter-marriages between different
communities, it would be inconsistent for us t support a provision that a mere change of
faith or change of religion would email forfeiture of her rights as the wife of her
husband. So, from a modern point of view, I have got no hesitation in saying that we
cannot, in any way, support the contrary proposition that apostasy must be allowed to
finish her relationship with her husband. But that is only one part of the argument.
"Section 32 of the Parsi Marriage and
Divorce Act, 1936, is to the effect that a married woman may sue for divorce on the
grounds 'that the defendant has ceased to be a Parsi ....'
" There are two things apparent from this.
the first is, that it is a ground for dissolution, not from any religious idea or
religious sentiment, because, if two years have passed after the conversion and if
plaintiff does not object, then either the male or female has no right to sue for
dissolution of marriage. The second thing is, that it is the plaintiff who has got the
complaint that the other party has changed the religion, who has got the right of getting
the marriage dissolved....... In addition to this Act, as regards other communities we can
have an idea of the effect of conversion on marriage tie from the Native Converts '
Marriage Dissolution Act, Act XXI of 1886 ........ It applies to all the communities of
India, and this legislation recognises the fact that mere conversion of an Indian to
Christianity would not dissolve the marriage but he will have the right of going to a law
court and saying that the other party., who is not converted, must perform the marital
duties in respect of him...... then they are given a year's time and the judge directs
that they shall have an interview with each other in the presence of certain other persons
to induce them to resume their conjugal relationship, and if they do not agree, then on
the ground of desecration the marriage is dissolved. The marriage is dissolved no doubt,
but not on the ground of change of faith. . . .. .So, every community in India has got
this accepted principle that conversion to another religion cannot amount to a dissolution
of marriage."
Syed Gulam Bikh Nairang, another Muslim member
of the Assembly and a protagonist of the Bill, was brutally frank. In support of the
principle of the Bill he said 11[f.11] :—
" For a very long lime the courts in
British India have held without
reservation and qualification that under all circumstances apostasy automatically
and immediately puts an end to the married slate without any judicial proceedings, any
decree of court, or any other ceremony. That has been the position which was taken up by
the Courts. Now, there are three distinct views of Hanafi jurists on the point. One view which is
attributed to the Bokhara jurists was adopted and even that not in its entirely but in
what I may call a mutilated and maimed condition. What that Bokhara view is has been
already stated by Mr. Kazmi and some other speakers. The Bokhara jurists say that marriage
is dissolved by apostasy. In fact, I should be more accurate in saying—1 have got
authority for that—that it is, according to the Bokhara view, not dissolved but
suspended. The marriage is suspended but the wife is then kept in custody or confinement
till she repents and embraces Islam again, and then she is induced to marry the husband,
whose marriage was only suspended and not put an end to or cancelled. The second view is
that on apostasy a married Muslim woman ceases to be the wife other husband but becomes
his bond woman. One view, which is a sort of corollary to this view, is that she is not
necessarily the bond woman of her ex-husband but she becomes the bond woman of the entire
Muslim community and anybody can employ her as a bond woman. The third view, that of the
Ulema of Samarkand and Baikh, is that the marriage lie is not affected by such apostasy
and that the woman still continues to be the wife of the husband. These are the three
views. A portion of the first view,
the Bokhara view, was taken hold of by the Courts and rulings after rulings
were based on that portion.
" This House is well aware that it is not only in this solitary instance that judicial error
is sought to be corrected by legislation, but in many other cases, too, there have been
judicial errors or conflicts of judicial opinion or uncertainties and vagueness of law.
Errors of judicial view are being constantly corrected by legislation. In this particular
mailer there has been an error after error and a tragedy of errors. To show me
those rulings is begging the question. Surely, it should be realized that it is no answer
to my Bill that because the High Courts have decided against me, I have no business to
come to this House and ask it to legislate this way or that way."
Having regard to the profundity of the change,
the arguments urged in support of it were indeed very insubstantial. Mr. Kazmi failed to
realize that if there was a difference between the divorce law relating to Parsis,
Christians and Muslims, once it is established that the conversion is genuine, the Muslim
law was in advance of the Parsi and the Christian law and instead of making the Muslim law
retrograde, the proper thing ought to have been to make the Parsi and the Christian law
progress. Mr. Nairang did not stop to inquire that, if there were different schools of
thought among the Muslim jurists, whether it was not more in consonance with justice to
adopt the more enlightened view which recognized the freedom of the Muslim woman and not
to replace it by the barbaric one which made her a bonds-woman.
Be that as it may, the legal arguments had
nothing to do with the real motive underlying the change. The real motive was to put a
stop to the illicit conversion of women to alien faiths, followed by immediate and hurried
marriages with some one professing the faith she happened to have joined, with a view to
locking her in the new community and preventing her from going back to the community to
which she originally belonged. The conversion of Muslim woman to Hinduism and of Hindu
woman to Islam looked at from a social and political point of view cannot but be fraught
with tremendous consequences. It means a disturbance in the numerical balance between the
two communities. As the disturbance was being brought about by the abduction of women, it
could not be overlooked. For woman is at once the seed-bed of and the hothouse for
nationalism in a degree that man can never be.12
[f12] These conversions of women and their subsequent marriages
were there-fore regarded, and rightly, as a series of depredations practised by Hindus
against Muslims and by Muslims against Hindus with a view to bringing about a change in
their relative numerical strength. This abominable practice of woman-lifting had become as
common as cattle-lifting and, with its obvious danger to communal balance, efforts had to
be made to stop it. That this was the real reason behind this legislation can be seen from
the two provisions to section 4 of the Act. In proviso I the Hindus concede to the
Musalmans that if they convert a woman who was originally a Muslim she will remain bound
to her former Muslim husband notwithstanding her conversion. By proviso 2 the Muslims
concede to the Hindus that if they convert a Hindu married woman and she is married to a
Musalman, her marriage will be deemed to be dissolved if she renounces Islam and she will
be free to return to her Hindu fold. Thus what underlies the change in law is the desire
to keep the numerical balance and it is for this purpose that the rights of women were
sacrificed.
There are two other features of this malaise
which have not been sufficiently noted.
One such feature is the jealousy with which one
of them looks upon any reform by the other in its social system. If the effect of such
reform is to give it increase of strength for resistance, it at once creates hostility.
Swami Shradhanand relates a very curious
incident which well illustrates this attitude. Writing in the Liberator 13[f.13] his
recollections, he refers to this incident. He says :—
" Mr. Ranade was there. . . . to guide the
Social Conference to which the title of ' National ' was for the first and last lime
given. It was from the beginning a Hindu Conference in all walks of life. The only
Mahomedan delegate who joined the National Social Conference was a Mufti Saheb of
Barreily. Well! The conference began when the resolution in favour of remarriage of
child-widows was moved by a Hindu delegate and by me. Sanalanist Pandits opposed it. Then
the Mufti asked permission to speak. The laic Baijnalh told Mufti Saheb that as the
resolution concerned the Hindus only, he need not speak. At this the Mufti flared up.
" There was no loophole left for the
President and Mufti Saheb was allowed to have his say. Mufti Saheb's argument was that as
Hindu Shastras did not allow remarriage, it was a sin to press for it. Again, when the
resolution about the reconversion of those who had become Christians and Musalmans came
up. Mufti Saheb urged that when a man abandoned the Hindu religion he ought not to be
allowed to come back."
Another illustration would be the attitued of
the Muslims towards the problem of the Untouchables. The Muslims have always been looking
at the Depressed Classes with a sense of longing and much of the jealousy between Hindus
and Muslims arises out of the fear of the latter that the former might become stronger by
assimilating the Depressed Classes. In 1909 the Muslims took the bold step of suggesting
that the Depressed Classes should not be enrolled in the census as Hindus. In 1923 Mr.
Mahomed Ali in his address as the President of the Congress went much beyond the position
taken by the Muslims in 1909. He said:—
"The quarrels about ALAMS and PIPAL trees
and musical processions are truly childish ; but there is one question which can easily
furnish a ground for complaint of unfriendly action if communal activities are not
amicably adjusted. It is the question of the conversion of the Suppressed Classes, if
Hindu society does not speedily absorb them. The Christian missionary is already busy and
no one quarrels with him. But the moment some Muslim Missionary Society is organized for
the same purpose there is every likelihood of an outcry in the Hindu press. It has been
suggested to me by an influential and wealthy gentleman who is able to organize a
Missionary Society on a large scale for the conversion of the Suppressed Classes, that it
should be possible to reach a settlement with leading Hindu gentlemen and divide the
country into separate areas where Hindu and Muslim missionaries could respectively work,
each community preparing for each year, or longer unit of lime if necessary, an estimate
of the numbers it is prepared to absorb or convert. These estimates would, of course, be
based on the number of workers and funds each had to spare, and tested by the actual
figures of the previous period. In this way each community would be free to do the work of
absorption and conversion, or rather, of reform without chances of collision with one
another. I cannot say in what light my Hindu brethren will lake it and I place this
suggestion tentatively in all frankness and sincerity before them. All that I say for
myself is that I have seen the condition of the ' Kali Praja ' in the Baroda Slate and of
the Gonds in the Central Provinces and I frankly confess it is a reproach to us all. If
the Hindus will not absorb them into their own society, others will and must, and then the
orthodox Hindu loo will cease to treat them as untouchables. Conversion seems to transmute
them by a strong alchemy. But does this not place a premium upon conversion ?"
The other feature is the " preparations
" which the Muslims and Hindus are making against each other without abatement. It is
like a race in armaments between two hostile nations. If the Hindus have the Benares
University, the Musalmans must have the Aligarh University. If the Hindus start Shudhi
movement, the Muslims must launch the Tablig movement. If the Hindus start Sangathan, the
Muslims must meet it by Tanjim. If the Hindus have the R. S. S. S.,14[f.14] the Muslims
must reply by organizing the Khaksars.t This race in social armament and equipment is run
with the determination and apprehension characteristic of nations which are on the war
path. The Muslims fear that the Hindus are subjugating them. The Hindus feel that the
Muslims are engaged in reconquering them. Both appear to be preparing for war and each is
watching the " preparations " of the other.
Such a state of things cannot but be ominous.
It is a vicious circle. If the Hindus make themselves stronger, the Musalmans feel
menaced. The Muslims endeavour to increase their forces to meet the menace and the Hindus
then do the same to equalize the position. As the preparations proceed, so does the
suspicion, the secrecy, and the plotting. The possibilities of peaceful adjustment are
poisoned at the source and precisely because everyone is fearing and preparing for it that
" war " between the two tends to become inevitable. But in the situation in
which they find themselves, for the Hindus and the Muslims not to attend to anything,
except to prepare themselves to meet the challenge of each other, is quite natural. It is
a struggle for existence and the issue, that counts, is survival and not the quality or
the plane of survival.
Two things must be said to have emerged from
this discussion. One is that the Hindus and the Muslims regard each other as a menace. The
second is that to meet this menace, both have suspended the cause of removing the social
evils with which they are infested. Is this a desirable state of things ? If it is not how
then can it be ended ?
No one can say that to have the problems of
social reform put aside is a desirable state of things. Wherever there are social evils,
the health of the body politic requires that they shall be removed before they become the
symbols of suffering and injustice. For it is the social and economic evils which
everywhere are the parent of revolution or decay. Whether social reform should precede
political reform or political reform should precede social reform may be a matter of
controversy. But there can be no two opinions on the question that the sole object of
political power is the use to which it can be put in the cause of social and economic
reform. The whole struggle for political power would be a barren and bootless effort if it
was not justified by the feeling that, because of the want of political power, urgent and
crying social evils are eating into the vitals of society and are destroying it. But
suppose the Hindus and the Muslims somehow come into possession of political power, what
hope is there that they will use it for purposes of social reform ? There is hardly any
hope in that behalf. So long as the Hindus and the Muslims regard each other as a menace,
their attention will be engrossed in preparations for meeting the menace. The exigencies
of a common front by Musalmans against Hindus and by Hindus against Musalmans
generate—and is bound to generate—a conspiracy of silence over social evils.
Neither the Muslims nor the Hindus will attend to them even though the evils may be
running sores and requiring immediate attention, for the simple reason that they regard
every measure of social reform as bound to create dissension and division and thereby
weaken the ranks when they ought to be closed to meet the menace of the other community.
It is obvious that so long as one community looks upon the other as a menace there will be
no social progress and the spirit of conservatism will continue to dominate the thoughts
and actions of both.
How long will this menace last ? It is sure to
last as long as the Hindus and Muslims are required to live as members of one country
under the mantle of a single constitution. For, it is the fear of the single constitution
with the possibility of the shifting of the balance—for nothing can keep the balance
at the point originally fixed by the constitution—which makes the Hindus a menace to
the Muslims and the Muslims a menace to the Hindus. If this is so, Pakistan is the obvious
remedy. It certainly removes the chief condition which makes for the menace. Pakistan
liberates both the Hindus and the Muslims from the fear of enslavement of and encroachment
against each other. It removes, by providing a separate constitution for each, Pakistan
and Hindustan, the very basis which leads to this perpetual struggle for keeping a balance
of power in the day-to-day life and frees them to take in hand those vital matters of
urgent social importance which they are now forced to put aside in cold storage, and
improve the lives of their people, which after all is the main object of this fight for
Swaraj.
Without some such arrangement, the Hindus and
the Muslims will act and react as though they were two nations, one fearing to be
conquered by the other. Preparations for aggression will 'always have precedence over
social reform, so that the social stagnation which has set in must continue. This is quite
natural and no one need be surprised at it. For, as Bernard Shaw pointed out:—
" A conquered nation is like a man with
cancer ; he can think of nothing else . . . . A healthy nation is as unconscious of' its
nationality as a healthy man of his bones. But if you break a nation's nationality it will
think of nothing else but getting it set again. It will listen to no reformer, to no
philosopher, to no preacher until the demand of the nationalist is granted. It will attend
to no business, however vital, except the business of unification and liberation."
Unless there is unification of the Muslims who
wish to separate from the Hindus and unless there is liberation of each from the fear of
domination by the other, there can be no doubt that this malaise of social stagnation will
not be set right.
COMMUNAL AGGRESSION
Even a superficial observer cannot fail to
notice that a spirit of aggression underlies the Hindu attitude towards the Muslim and the
Muslim attitude towards the Hindu. The Hindu's spirit of aggression is a new phase which
he has just begun to cultivate. The Muslim's spirit of aggression is his native endowment
and is ancient as compared with that of the Hindu. It is not that the Hindu, if given
time, will not pick up and overtake the Muslim. But as matters stand to-day, the Muslim in
this exhibition of the spirit of aggression leaves the Hindu far behind.
Enough has been said about the social
aggression of the Muslims in the chapter dealing with communal riots. It is necessary to
speak briefly of the political aggression of the Muslims. For this political aggression
has created a malaise which cannot be overlooked.
Three things are noticeable about this
political aggression of the Muslims.
First is the ever-growing catalogue of the
Muslim's political demands. Their origin goes back to the year 1892.
In 1885 the Indian National Congress was
founded. It began with a demand for good government as distinguished from self-government.
In response to this demand the British Government felt the necessity of altering the
nature of the Legislative Councils, Provincial and Central, established under the Act of
1861. In that nascent stage of Congress agitation, the British Government did not feel
called upon to make them fully popular. It thought it enough to give them a popular
colouring. Accordingly the British Parliament passed in 1892 what is called the Indian
Councils Act. This Act is memorable for two things. It was in this Act of 1892 that the
British Government for the first time accepted the semblance of the principle of popular
representation as the basis for the constitution of the Legislatures in India. It was not
a principle of election. It was a principle of nomination, only it was qualified by the
requirement that before nomination a person must be selected by important public bodies
such as municipalities, district boards, universities and the associations of merchants,
etc. Secondly, it was in the legislatures that were constituted under this Act that the
principle of separate representation for Musalmans was for the first time introduced in
the political constitution of India.
The introduction of this principle is shrouded
in mystery. It is a mystery because it was introduced so silently and so stealthily. The
principle of separate representation does not find a place in the Act. The Act says
nothing about it. It was in the directions—but not in the Act—issued to those
charged with the duty of framing regulations as to the classes and interests to whom
representation was to be given that the Muslims were named as a class to be provided for.
It is a mystery as to who was responsible for
its introduction. This scheme of separate representation was not the result of any demand
put forth by any organized Muslim association. In whom did it then originate ? It is
suggested 1[f.15]5 that
it originated with the Viceroy, Lord Dufferin, who, as far back as the year 1888, when
dealing with the question of representation in the Legislative Councils, emphasized the
necessity that in India representation will have to be, not in the way representation is
secured in England, but representation by interests. Curiosity leads to a further
question, namely, what could have led Lord Dufferin to propose such a plan ? It is
suggested 16[f.16] that the idea
was to wean 17[f.17] away the Musalmans from the Congress which had already been
started three years before. Be that as it may, it is certain that it is by this Act that
separate representation for Muslims became, for the first time, a feature of the Indian
Constitution. It should, however, be noted that neither the Act nor the Regulations
conferred any right of selection upon the Muslim community, nor did the Act give the
Muslim community a right to claim a fixed number of seats. All that it did was to give the
Muslims the right to separate representation.
Though, to start with, the suggestion of
separate representation came from the British, the Muslims did not fail to appreciate the
social value of separate political rights with the result that when in 1909 the Muslims
came to know that the next step in the reform of the Legislative Councils was
contemplated, they waited of their own accord in deputation 18[f.18] upon the
Viceroy, Lord Minto, and placed before him the following demands :—
(i)
Communal representation in
accordance with their numerical strength, social position and local influence, on district
and municipal boards.
(ii)
An assurance of Muhammadan
representation on the governing bodies of Universities.
(iii)
Communal representation on
provincial councils, election being by special electoral colleges composed of Muhammadan
landlords, lawyers, merchants, and representatives of other important interests,
University graduates of a certain standing and members of district and municipal boards.
(iv)
The number of Muhammadan
representatives in the Imperial Legislative Council should not depend on their numerical
strength, and Muhammadans should never be in an ineffective minority. They should be
elected as far as possible (as opposed to being nominated), election being by special
Muhammadan colleges composed of landowners, lawyers, merchants, members of provincial
councils, Fellows of Universities, etc.
These demands were granted and given effect to
in the Act of 1909. Under this Act the Muhammadans were given (1) the right to elect their
representatives, (2) the right to elect their representatives by separate electorates, (3)
the right to vote in the general electorates as well, and (4) the right to weightage in
representation. The following table shows the proportion of representation- secured to the
Muslims in the Legislatures by the Act of 1909
and the Regulations made thereunder :—
Composition of Legislative Councils under the act of 1999 showing Communal Proportion between Hindus ad Muslims |
Province |
Maximum
number of additional Members prescribed by the Act of 1909 |
Maximum
number of Additional Members allowed by Regulatory columns 5 and 12 |
Ex-officio
Members |
Strength
of the Councils under the Regulations |
Total
strength columns 4, 5, 12 |
|||||||
Elected
Members |
Nominated
Members |
|||||||||||
Total |
Non-Muslims |
Muslims |
Officials |
Non
officials |
Experts |
Total |
||||||
Law
Officials |
Others |
|||||||||||
1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
7 |
8 |
9 |
10 |
11 |
12 |
13 |
India |
60 |
60 |
8 |
27 |
22 |
5 |
-- |
28 |
5 |
-- |
33 |
63 |
Madras |
50 |
45 |
4 |
21 |
19 |
2 |
-- |
16 |
5 |
2 |
24 |
49 |
Bombay |
50 |
45 |
4 |
21 |
17 |
4 |
1 |
14 |
7 |
2 |
24 |
49 |
Bengal |
50 |
50 |
4 |
28 |
23 |
5 |
1 |
16 |
4 |
2 |
22 |
54 |
Bihar |
50 |
41 |
4 |
21 |
17 |
4 |
-- |
15 |
4 |
1 |
20 |
45 |
U.P. |
50 |
49 |
1 |
21 |
17 |
4 |
-- |
20 |
6 |
2 |
28 |
50 |
Punjab |
30 |
26 |
1 |
8 |
8 |
none |
-- |
10 |
6 |
2 |
18 |
27 |
Burma |
30 |
17 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
none |
-- |
6 |
8 |
2 |
16 |
18 |
Assam |
30 |
25 |
1 |
11 |
9 |
2 |
-- |
9 |
4 |
1 |
14 |
25 |
The provisions were applied to all Provinces
except the Punjab and the C. P. It was not applied to the Punjab because such special
protection was considered unnecessary for the Musalmans of the Punjab and it was not
applied to the C. P. because it had no Legislative Council at the time. 20[f.20]
In October 1916, 19 members of the Imperial
Legislative Council presented the Viceroy (Lord Cheirnsford) a memorandum demanding a
reform of the Constitution. Immediately the Muslims came forward with a number of demands
on behalf of the Muslim community. These were :—
(i)
The extension of the
principle of separate representation to the Punjab and the C. P.
(ii)
Fixing the numerical
strength of the Muslim representatives in the Provincial and Imperial Legislative
Councils.
(iii)
Safeguards against
legislation affecting Muslims, their religion and religious usages.
The negotiations following upon these demands
resulted in agreement between the Hindus and the Muslims which is known as the Lucknow
Pact. It may be said to contain two clauses. One related to legislation, under which it
was agreed that :—
" No Bill, nor any clause thereof, nor a
resolution introduced by a nonofficial affecting one or other community (which question is
to be determined by the members of that community in the Legislative Council concerned)
shall be' proceeded with, if three-fourths of the members of that community in the
particular Council, Imperial and Provincial, oppose the Bill or any clause thereof or the
resolution."
The other clause related to the proportion of
Muslim representation. With regard to the Imperial Legislative Council the Pact provided
:—
"That one-third of the Indian elected
members should be Muhammadans, elected by
separate electorates in the several
Provinces, in the proportion, as nearly as might be, in which they were represented on the
provincial legislative councils by separate Muhammadan electorates."
In the matter of Muslim representation in the
Provincial Legislative Councils it was agreed that the proportion of Muslim representation
should be as follows 21 [f.21] :—
Percentage of elected Indian
Members to the Provincial
Legislature
Punjab
|
50 |
United Provinces
|
30 |
Bengal
|
40
|
Bihar and Orissa
|
25 |
Central Province
|
15 |
Madras
|
15 |
Bombay
|
33 |
While allowing this proportion of seats to the
Muslims, the right to second vote in the general electorates which they had under the
arrangement of 1909 was taken away.
The Lucknow Pact was adversely criticized by
the Montagu Chelmsford Report. But being an agreement between the parties Government did
not like to reject it and to substitute in its place its own decision. Both clauses of the
agreement were accepted by Government and embodied in the Government of India Act of 1919.
The clause relating to legislation was given effect to but in a different form. Instead of
leaving it to the members of the Legislature to oppose it, it was provided' 22[f.22] ' that legislation affecting the religion or religious
rites and usages of any class of British subjects in India shall not be introduced at any
meeting of either Chamber of the Indian Legislature without the previous sanction of the
Governor-General.
The clause relating to representation was
accepted by the Government, though in the opinion of the Government the Punjab and Bengal
Muslims were not fairly treated.
The effect of these concessions can be seen by
reference to the composition of the Legislatures constituted under the Government of India
Act, 1919, which was as follows :—
Composition
of the Legislatures
|
Statu- tory Mini- mum |
Elected
Members |
Nominated
Members |
Actu- al Total |
|||
|
|
Total |
Muslims |
Non-Muslims |
Officials |
Non-officials |
|
(1) |
(2) |
(3) |
(4) |
(5) |
(6) |
(7) |
(8) |
Legislative
Assembly |
145 |
104 |
52 |
52 |
26 |
15 |
145 |
Council
of State |
60 |
33 |
11 |
22 |
17 |
10 |
60 |
Madras
Provincial Council |
118 |
98 |
13 |
85 |
11 |
23 |
132 |
Bombay
Provincial Council |
III |
86 |
27 |
59 |
19 |
9 |
114 |
Bengal
Provincial Council |
125 |
114 |
39 |
75 |
16 |
10 |
140 |
U. P.
Provincial Council |
118 |
110 |
29 |
71 |
17 |
6 |
123 |
Punjab
Provincial Council |
83 |
71 |
32 |
39 |
15 |
8 |
94 |
Bihar
Provincial Council |
98 |
76 |
18 |
58 |
15 |
12 |
103 |
C. P.
Provincial Council |
70 |
55 |
7 |
48 |
10 |
8 |
73 |
Assam
Provincial Council |
53 |
39 |
12 |
27 |
7 |
7 |
53 |
The extent of representation secured by the
Muslims by the Lucknow Pact can be seen from the following table 23[f.23] :—
|
|
|
|
Percentage of |
|
|
Percentage |
|
Percentage |
Muslim |
|
|
o{ Muslims |
Percentage |
of elected. |
' Members |
|
|
to total |
of Muslim |
Muslim |
to total |
|
|
population |
Members |
Members |
Members |
Lucknow |
Legislative Body. |
of the |
to total |
to total |
in seats filled |
Pact |
|
electoral |
No. ol |
No. of |
by election |
Percentage |
|
area (1921 |
Members |
elected |
from Indian |
|
|
Census) |
|
Indian |
general |
|
|
|
|
Members' |
(communal) |
|
|
|
|
consti- |
|
|
|
|
|
|
tuencies |
|
|
(1) |
(2) |
(3) |
(4) |
(5) |
Punjab |
55.2 |
40 |
48.5 |
50 |
50 |
United Provinces |
14.3 |
25 |
30 |
32.5 |
30 |
Bengal |
54.6 |
30 |
40.5 |
46 |
40 |
Bihar and Orissa |
10.9 |
18.5 |
25 |
27 |
25 |
Central Provinces |
4.4 |
9.5 |
13 |
14.5 |
15 |
Madras |
6.7 |
10.5 |
14 |
16.5 |
15 |
Bombay |
19.8 |
25.5 |
35 |
37 |
33.3 |
Assam |
32.2 |
30 |
35.5 |
37.5 |
No. provision |
Legislative Assembly |
24.0 |
26 |
34 |
38 |
33.3 |
This table does not show quite clearly the
weightage obtained by the Muslims under the Lucknow Pact. It was worked out by the
Government of India in their despatch 25
[f25]on the Report of Franchise Committee of which Lord
Southborough was the Chairman. The following table is taken from that despatch which shows
that the Muslims got a weightage under the Lucknow Pact far in excess of what Government
gave them in 1909.
|
Muslim percentage of Population |
Percentage of Muslim seats Proposed |
Percentage (2) of (1) |
|
(1) |
(2) |
(3) |
Bengal |
52.6 |
40 |
76 |
Bihar and Orissa |
10.5 |
25 |
238 |
Bombay |
20.4 |
33.3 |
163 |
Central Provinces |
4.3 |
15 |
349 |
Madras |
6.5 |
15 |
231 |
Punjab |
54.8 |
50 |
91 |
United Provinces |
14.0 |
30 |
214 |
In 1927 the British Government announced the
appointment of the Simon Commission to examine the working of the Indian Constitution and
to suggest further reforms. Immediately the Muslims came forward with further political
demands. These demands were put forth from various Muslim platforms such as the Muslim
League, All-India Muslim Conference, All-Parties Muslim Conference, Jamiat-ul-Ulema and
the Khilafat Conference. The demands were substantially the same. It would suffice to
state those that were formulated by Mr. Jinnah 26[f.26] on behalf of
the Muslim League.
They were in the following terms :—
1. The form of the future Constitution should be
federal with residuary powers vested in the provinces.
2. A uniform measure of autonomy should be granted
to all provinces.
3. All legislatures in the country and other
elected bodies should be reconstituted on the definite principle of adequate and effective
representation of minorities in every province without reducing the majority of any
province to a minority or even equality.
4. In the Central Legislature, Muslim
representation should not be less than one-third.
5. The representation of communal groups should
continue to be by means of separate electorates as at present, provided that it should be
open to any community at any time to abandon its separate electorate in favour of joint
electorates.
6. Any territorial redistribution that might at
any lime be necessary should not in any way affect the Muslim majority in the Punjab,
Bengal and North-West Province.
7. Full religious liberty, that is, liberty of
belief, worship, observances, propaganda, association and education should be guaranteed
to all communities.
8. No bill or resolution, or any part thereof,
should be passed in any legislature or any other elected body if three-fourths of the
members of any community in that particular body oppose such bill or resolution or part
thereof on the ground that it would be injurious to the interests of that community or, in
the alternative, such other method as may be devised or as may be found feasible and
practicable to deal with such cases.
9. Sind should be separated from the Bombay
Presidency.
10. Reforms should be introduced in the North-West Frontier
Province and Baluchistan on the same fooling as in other provinces.
11. II. Provision should be made in the Constitution giving the
Muslims an adequate share along with other Indians in all the Services of the Slate and in
self-governing bodies, having due regard to the requirements of efficiency.
12. The constitution should embody adequate safeguards for the
protection of Muslim religion, culture and personal law, and the promotion of Muslim
education, language, religion, personal laws, Muslim charitable institutions, and for
their due share in grants-in-aid given by the Stale and by self-governing bodies.
13. No Cabinet, either Central or Provincial, should be formed
without there being a proportion of Muslim Ministers of at least one-third.
14. No change to be made in the Constitution by the Central
Legislature except with the concurrence of the States constituting the Indian Federation.
15. That in the present circumstances the representation of
Musalmans in the different legislatures of the country and of the other elected bodies
through separate electorates is inevitable, and, further, Government being pledged not to
deprive the Musalmans of this right, it cannot be taken away without their consent, and so
long as the Musalmans are not satisfied that their rights and interests are safeguarded in
the manner specified above (or herein) they would in no way consent to the establishment
of joint electorates with or without conditions.
Note:—The question of excess representation of
Musalmans over and above their population in the provinces where they are in minority to
be considered hereafter.
This is a consolidated statement of Muslim
demands. In it there are some which are old, and some which are new. The old ones are
included because the aim is to retain the advantages accruing therefrom. The new ones are
added in order to remove the weaknesses in the Muslim position. The new ones are five in
number: (1) Representation in proportion to population to Muslim majorities in the Punjab
and Bengal, (2) One-third representation to Muslims in the cabinets both Central and
Provincial, (3) Adequate representation of Muslims in the Services, (4) Separation of Sind
from the Bombay Presidency and the raising of N.-W. F. P. and Baluchistan to the status of
self-governing provinces, and (5) Vesting of residuary powers in the provinces instead of
in the Central Government.
These new demands are self-explanatory except
perhaps I, 4 and 5. The object of demands I and 4 was to place, in four provinces, the
Muslim community in a statutory majority where it had only communal majority, as a force
counteracting the six provinces in which the Hindu community happened to be in a majority.
This was insisted upon as a guarantee of good treatment by both the communities of its
minorities. The object of demand No. 5 was to guarantee Muslim rule in Sind, N.-W. F. P.,
the Punjab and Bengal. But a Muslim majority rule in these Muslim Provinces, it was
feared, would not be effective if they remained under the control of the Central
Government which could not but be in the hand of the Hindus. To free the Muslim Provinces
from the control of the Hindu Government at the Centre was the object for which demand No.
5 was put forth.
These
demands were opposed by the Hindus. There may not be much in this. But what is significant
is that they were also rejected by the Simon Commission. The Simon Commission, which was
by no means unfriendly to the Muslims, gave some very cogent reasons for rejecting the
Muslim demands. It said 27[f.27] :—
" This claim goes to the length of seeking
to preserve the full security for representation now provided for Muslims in these six
provinces and at the same time to enlarge in Bengal and the Punjab the present proportion
of seats secured to the community by separate electorates to figures proportionate to
their ratio of population. This would give Muhammadans a fixed and unalterable majority of
the general constituency seats in both provinces. We cannot go so far. The continuance of
the present scale of weightage in the six provinces could not—in the absence of a new
general agreement between the communities—equitably be combined with so great a
departure from the existing allocation in Bengal and the Punjab.
" It would be unfair that Muhammadans
should retain the very considerable weightage they enjoy in the six provinces, and that
there should at the same lime be imposed, in face of Hindu and Sikh opposition, a definite
Muslim majority in the Punjab and Bengal unalterable by any appeal to the
electorate........ "
'Notwithstanding the opposition of the Hindus
and the Sikhs and the rejection by the Simon Commission, the British Government when
called upon to act as an arbiter granted the Muslims all their demands old and new.
By a Notification 28[f.28] in the Gazette of India 25th January 1932 the Government
of India, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of section 52 A of the
Government of India Act, 1916, declared that the N.-W. F. Province shall be treated as a
Governor's Province. 29[f.29] By an Order in Council, issued under the provisions
contained in sub-section (1) of section 289 of the Government of India Act of 1935, Sind
was separated from Bombay as from 1st April 1936 and declared to be a Governor's Province
to be known as the province of Sind. By the Resolution issued by the Secretary of State
for India and published on 7th July 1934 the Muslim share in the public services was fixed
at 25 per cent. of all appointments Imperial and Provincial. With regard to residuary
powers, it is true that the Muslim demand that they should be vested in the Provinces was
not accepted. But in another sense the Muslim demand in this respect may be deemed to have
been granted. The essence of the Muslim demand was that the residuary powers should not be
vested in the Centre, which, put in different language, meant that they should not be in
the hands of the Hindus. This is precisely what is done by section 104 of the Government
of India Act, 1935, which vests the residuary powers in the Governor-General to be
exercised in his discretion. The demand for 33 1/3 per cent. representation in the
Cabinets, Central and Provincial, was not given effect to by a legal provision in the Act.
The right of Muslims to representation in the Cabinets was however accepted by the British
Government and provision for giving effect to it was made in the Instruments of
Instructions issued to the Governors and Governor-General. As to the remaining demand
which related to a statutory majority in the Punjab and Bengal, the demand was given
effect to by the Communal Award. True, a statutory majority in the whole House has not
been given to the Muslims and could not be given having regard to the necessity for
providing representation to other interests. But a statutory majority as against Hindus
has been given to the Muslims of the Punjab and Bengal without touching the weightages
obtained by the Muslim minorities under the Lucknow Pact.
These political grants to the Muslim community
by the British Government lacked security and it was feared by the Muslims that pressure
might be brought upon them or upon His Majesty's Government by the Hindus to alter the
terms of the grants to the prejudice of the Muslims. This fear was due to two reasons. One
was the success of Mr. Gandhi in getting that part of the Award which related to the
Depressed Classes revised by means of the pressure of a fast unto death. 30[f.30] Some people
encouraged by this success actually agitated for revision of that part of the Award which
related to the Muslims and some Muslims were even found to be in favour of entering into
such negotiations 31[f.31]. This alarmed the Muslim community. The other reason for
the fear of are vision of the terms of the grants arose out of certain amendments in the
clauses in the Government of India Bill which were made in the House of Commons permitting
such revision under certain conditions. To remove these fears and to give complete
security to the Muslims against hasty and hurried revision of the grants, His Majesty's Government authorized he Government of India to
issue the following communiqué 32[f.32] :—
" It has come to the notice of His
Majesty's Government that the impression is prevalent that what is now Clause 304 of the
Government of India Bill (numbered 285 in the Bill as first introduced and 299 in the Bill
as amended by the Commons in Committee) has been amended during the passage of the Bill
through the Commons in such a way as to give His Majesty's Government unfettered power to
alter at any lime they may think fit the constitutional provisions based upon what is
commonly known as Government's Communal Award.
" His Majesty's Government think it
desirable to give the following brief explanation both of what they consider is the
practical effect of Clause 304 in relation to any change in the Communal Award and of
their own policy in relation to any such change.
- "Under this Clause there is conferred on
the Governments and Legislatures in India, after the expiry of ten years, the right of
initiating a proposal to modify the provisions and regulating various matters relating to
the constitution of the Legislature, including such questions as were covered by the
Communal Award.
"The Clause also imposes on the Secretary
of State the duty of laying before Parliament from the Governor-General or the Governor as
the case may be his opinion as to the proposed amendment and in particular as to the
effect which it would have on the interests of any minority and of informing Parliament of
any action which he proposed to take.
"Any change in the constitutional
provisions resulting from this procedure can be effected by an Order in Council, but this
is subject to the proviso that the draft of the proposed Order has been affirmatively
approved by both Houses of Parliament by a resolution. The condition is secured by Clause
305 of-the Bill.
" Before the expiry of ten years there is
no similar constitutional initiative residing in the Governments and the Legislatures of
India. Power is, however, conferred by the Clause to make such a change by an Order in
Council (always with the approval of both Houses of Parliament) even before the end of ten
years, but within the first ten years (and indeed subsequently, if the initiative has not
come from the Legislatures of India) it is incumbent upon the Secretary of Slate to
consult the Governments and the Legislatures of India who will be affected (unless the
change is of a minor character) before any Order in Council is laid before Parliament for
its approval.
" The necessity for the powers referred to
in the preceding paragraph is due to such reasons as the following :—
" (a) It is impossible to foresee when
the necessity may arise for amending minor details connected with the franchise and the
constitution of legislatures, and for such amendment it will be clearly disadvantageous to
have no method available short of a fresh amending Act of Parliament, nor is it
practicable statutorily to separate such details from the more important matter such as
the terms of the Communal Award;
" (b) It might also become desirable, in
the event of a unanimous agreement between the communities in India, to make a
modification in the provisions based on the Communal Award ; and for such an agreed change
it would also be disadvantageous to have no other method available than an amending Act of
Parliament.
" Within the range of the Communal Award
His Majesty's Government would not propose, in the exercise of any power conferred by this
Clause, to recommend to Parliament any change unless such changes had been agreed to
between the communities concerned.
" In conclusion. His Majesty's Government
would again emphasise the fact that none of the powers in Clause 304 can, in view of the
provisions in Clause 305, be exercised unless both Houses of Parliament agreed by an
affirmative resolution."
.After taking into account what the Muslims
demanded at the R. T. C. and what was conceded to them, any one could have thought that
the limit of Muslim demands was reached and that the 1932 settlement was a final
settlement. But, it appears that even with this the Musalmans are not satisfied. A further
list of new demands for safeguarding the Muslim position seems to be ready. In the
controversy that went on between Mr. Jinnah and the Congress in the year 1938, Mr. Jinnah
was asked to disclose his demands which he refused to do. But these demands have come to
the surface in the correspondence that passed between Pandit Nehru and Mr. Jinnah in the
course of the controversy and they have been tabulated by Pandit Nehru in one of his
letters to Mr. Jinnah. His tabulation gives the following items as being matters of
disputes and requiring settlement 33
[f.33]:—
( 1 ) The fourteen points formulated by the
Muslim League in 1929.
(2) The Congress should withdraw all opposition to the Communal
Award and should not describe it as a negation of nationalism.
(3) The share of the Muslims in the state services should be
definitely fixed in the constitution by statutory enactment.
(4) Muslim personal law and culture should be guaranteed by
statute.
(5) The Congress should take in hand the agitation in connection
with the Sahidganj Mosque and should use its moral pressure to enable the Muslims to gain
possession of the Mosque.
(6) The Muslims' right to call Azan and perform their religious
ceremonies should not be fettered in any way.
(7) Muslims should have freedom to perform cow-slaughter.
(8) Muslim majorities in the Provinces, where such majorities exist at present, must not
be affected by any territorial re-distribution or adjustments.
(9) The ' Bande Mataram' song should be given up.
(10) Muslims want Urdu to be the national language
of India and they desire to have statutory guarantees that the use of Urdu shall not be
curtailed or damaged.
(11) Muslim representation in the local bodies
should be governed by the principles underlying the Communal Award, that is, separate
electorates and population strength.
(12) The tricolour flag should be changed or
alternately the flag of the Muslim League should be given equal importance.
(13) Recognition of the Muslim League as the one
authoritative and representative organization of Indian Muslims.
(14) Coalition Ministries should be formed.
With this new list, there is no knowing where
the Muslims are going to stop in their demands. Within one year, that is, between 1938 and
1939, one more demand and that too of a substantial character, namely 50 per cent. share
in every thing, has been added to it. In this catalogue of new demands there are some
which on the face of them are extravagant and impossible, if not irresponsible. As an
instance, one may refer to the demand for fifty-fifty and the demand for the recognition
of Urdu as the national language of India. In 1929, the Muslims insisted that in allotting
seats in Legislatures, a majority shall not be reduced to a minority or equality. 34 [f34]This principle, enunciated by themselves, it is now
demanded, shall be abandoned and a majority shall be reduced to equality. The Muslims in
1929 admitted that the other minorities required protection and that they must have it in
the same manner as the Muslims. The only distinction made between the Muslims and other
minorities was as to the extent of the protection. The Muslims claimed a higher degree of
protection than was conceded to the other minorities on the ground of their political
importance. The necessity and adequacy of protection for the other minorities the Muslims
never denied. But with this new demand of 50 per cent. the Muslims are not only seeking to
reduce the Hindu majority to a minority but they are also cutting into the political
rights of the other minorities. The Muslims are now speaking the language of Hitler and
claiming a place in the sun as Hitler has been doing for Germany. For their demand for 50
per cent. is nothing but a counterpart of the German claims for Deutschland Uber Alles and Lebenuraum for Tthemselves, irrespective
of what happens to other minorities.
Their claim for the recognition of Urdu as the
national language of India is equally extravagant. Urdu is not only not spoken all, over
India but is not even the language of all the Musalmans of India. Of the 68 millions of
Muslims 35[f.35] only 28
millions speak Urdu. The proposal of making Urdu the national language means that the
language of 28 millions of Muslims is to be imposed particularly upon 40 millions of
Musalmans or generally upon 322 millions of Indians.
It will thus be seen that every time a proposal
for the reform of the constitution comes forth, the Muslims are there, ready with some new
political demand or demands. The only check upon such indefinite expansion of Muslim
demands is the power of the British Government, which must be the final arbiter in any
dispute between the Hindus and the Muslims. Who can confidently say that the decision of
the British will not be in favour of the Muslims if the dispute relating to these new
demands was referred to them for arbitration ? The more the Muslims demand the more
accommodating the British seem to become. At any rate, past experience shows that the
British have been inclined to give the Muslims more than what the Muslims had themselves
asked. Two such instances can be cited.
One of these relates to the Lucknow Pact. The
question was whether the British Government should accept the Pact. The authors of the
Montagu-Chelmsford Report were disinclined to accept it for reasons which were very
weighty. Speaking of the weightages granted to the Muslims by the Lucknow Pact, the
authors' of the Joint Report observed 36 [f36]:—
" Now a privileged position of this kind
is open to the objection, that if any other community here after makes good a claim to
separate representation, it can be satisfied only by deducting the non-Muslim seats, or by
a rateable deduction from both Muslim and non-Muslim ; and Hindu and Muslim opinion are
not likely to agree which process should be adopted. While, therefore, for reasons that we
explain subsequently we assent to the maintenance of separate representation for
Muhammadans, we are bound to reserve our approval of the particular proposals set before
us, until we have ascertained what the effect upon other interests will be, .. and have
made fair provision for them."
Notwithstanding this grave flaw in the Lucknow
Pact, the Government of India, in its despatch referred to above, recommended that the
terms of the Pact should be improved in so far as it related to the Muslims of Bengal. Its
reasons make a strange reading. It argued that :—
" The Muhammadan representation which they
the authors of the Pact] propose for Bengal is manifestly insufficient It is questionable
whether the claims of the Muhammadan population of Eastern Bengal were adequately pressed
when the Congress-League compact was in the making. They are conspicuously a backward and
impoverished community. The repartition of the presidency in 1912 came as a severe
disappointment to them, and we should be very loath to fail in seeing that their interests
are now generously secured. In order to give the Bengal Muslims a representation
proportionate to their numbers, and no more, we should allot them 44 instead of 34 seats
[due to them under the Pact]."
This enthusiasm for the Bengal Muslims shown by
the Government of India was not shared by the British Government It felt that as the
number of seats given to the Bengal Muslims was the result of an agreement, any
interference to improve the bargain when there was no dispute about the genuineness of the
agreement, could not but create the impression that the British Government was in some
special sense and for some special reason the friend of the Muslims. In suggesting this
augmentation in the seats, the Government of India forgot to take note of the reason why
the Muslims of the Punjab and Bengal were not given by the Pact seats in proportion to
their population. The Lucknow Pact was based upon the principle, now thrown to the winds,
that a community as such was not entitled to political protection. A community was
entitled to protection when it was in a minority. That was the principle underlying the
Lucknow Pact. The Muslim community in the Punjab and Bengal was not in a minority and,
therefore, was not entitled to the same protection which it got in other Provinces where
it was in a minority. Notwithstanding their being in a majority, the Muslims of the Punjab
and Bengal felt the necessity of separate electorates. According to the principle
underlying the Pact they could qualify themselves for this only by becoming a minority
which they did by agreeing to a minority of seats. This is the reason why the Muslims of
Bengal and the Punjab did not get the majority of seats they were entitled to on the
population basis. 37[f.37]
The proposal of the Government of India to give to the
Bengal Muslims more than what they had asked for did not go through. But the fact that
they wanted to do so remains as evidence of their inclinations.
The second occasion when the British Government as an arbiter gave the Muslims more than they asked for was when the Communal Decision was given in 1932. Sir Muhammad Shafi made two different proposals in the Minorities Sub-Committee of the R. T. C. In his speech on 6th January 1931, Sir Muhammad Shafi put forth the following proposal as a basis for communal settlement 38[f.38]:—
" We are prepared to accept joint
electorates on the conditions named by me : Firstly, that the rights at present enjoyed by
the Musalmans in the minority Provinces should be continued to them; that in the Punjab
and in Bengal they should have two joint electorates and representation on a population
basis; that there should be the principle of reservation of seats coupled with Maulana
Mahomed Ali's condition. 39[f.39]
In his speech on 14th January 1931 before the
same Committee he made a different offer. He said 40[f.40] :—
" To-day I am authorized to make this offer : that in the Punjab the Musalmans should
have through communal electorates 49 per cent. of the entire number of seats in the whole
House, and should have liberty to contest the special constituencies which it is proposed
to create in that Province : so far as Bengal is concerned that Musalmans should have
through communal electorates 46 percent, representation in the whole House, and should
have the liberty to contest the special constituencies which it is proposed to create in
that Province; in so far as the minority Provinces are concerned, the Musalmans should
continue to enjoy the weightage which they have at present through separate electorates,
similar weightage to be given to our Hindu brethren in Sind,
and to our Hindu and Sikh brethren in the North-West
Frontier Province. If at any time hereafter two-thirds of
the representatives of any
community in any Provincial Legislative Council or in the Central Legislative Council
desire to give up communal electorates and to accept joint electorates then there after
the system of joint electorates should come into being."
The difference between the two proposals is
clear. "Joint electorates, if accompanied by statutory majority. If statutory
majority was refused, then a minority of seats with separate electorates." The
British Government took statutory majority from the first demand and separate electorates
from the second demand and gave the Muslims both when they had not asked for both.
The second thing that is noticeable among the
Muslims is the spirit of exploiting the weaknesses of the Hindus. If the Hindus object to
anything, the Muslim policy seems to be to insist upon it and give it up only when the
Hindus show themselves ready to offer a price for it by giving the Muslims some other
concessions. As an illustration of this, one can refer to the. question of separate and
joint electorates. The Hindus have been to my mind utterly foolish in fighting over joint
electorates especially in Provinces in which the Muslims are in a minority. Joint
electorates can never suffice for a basis for nationalism. Nationalism is not a matter of
political nexus or cash nexus, for the simple reason that union cannot be the result of
calculation of mere externals. Where two communities live a life which is exclusive and
self-enclosed for five years, they will not be one, because, they are made to come
together on one day in five years for the purposes of voting in an election. Joint
electorates may produce the enslavement of the minor community by the major community :
but by themselves they cannot produce nationalism. Be that as it may, because the Hindus
have been insisting upon joint electorates the Muslims have been insisting upon separate
electorates. That this insistence is a -matter of bargain only can be seen from Mr.
Jinnah's 14 points 41[f.41] and the solution 42
[f42]passed in the Calcutta session of the All-India Muslim
League held cm 30th December 1927. Therein it was stipulated that only when the Hindus
agreed to the separation of Sind and to the raising of the N.-W. F. P. to the status of a
self-governing Province the Musalmans would consent to give up separate electorates. 43[f.43] The Musalmans
evidently did not regard separate electorates as vital. They regarded them as a good quid pro quo for obtaining their other claims.
Another illustration of this spirit of
exploitation is furnished by the Muslim insistence upon cow-slaughter and the stoppage of
music before mosques. Islamic law does not insist upon the slaughter of the cow for
sacrificial purposes and no Musalman, when he goes to Haj, sacrifices the cow in Mecca or
Medina. But in India they will not be content with the sacrifice of any other animal.
Music may be played before a mosque in all Muslim countries without any objection. Even in
Afghanistan, which is not a secularized country, no objection is taken to music before a
mosque. But in India the Musalmans must insist upon its stoppage for no other reason
except that the Hindus claim a right to it.
The third thing that is noticeable is the
adoption by the Muslims of the gangster's method in politics. The riots are a sufficient
indication that gangsterism has become a settled part of their strategy in politics. They
seem to be consciously and deliberately imitating the Sudeten Germans in the means
employed by them against the Czechs. 44[f.44] So long as the
Muslims were the aggressors, the Hindus were passive, and in the conflict they suffered
more than the Muslims did. But this is no longer true. The Hindus have learned to
retaliate and no longer feel any compunction in knifing a Musalman. This spirit of
retaliation bids fair to produce the ugly spectacle of gangsterism against gangsterism.
How to meet this problem must exercise the
minds of all concerned. There are the simple-minded Hindu Maha Sabha patriots who believe
that the Hindus have only to make up their minds to wipe the Musalmans and they will be
brought to their senses. On the other hand, there are the Congress Hindu Nationalists
whose policy is to tolerate and appease the Musalmans by political and other concessions,
because they believe that they cannot reach their cherished goal of independence unless
the Musalmans back their demand. The Hindu Maha Sabha plan is no way to unity. On the
contrary, it is a sure block to progress. The slogan of the Hindu Maha Sabha
President— Hindustan for Hindus— is not merely arrogant but is arrant nonsense.
The question, however, is : is the Congress way the right way ? It seems to me that the
Congress has failed to realize two things. The first thing which the Congress has failed
to realize is that there is a difference between appeasement and settlement, and that the
difference is an essential one. Appeasement means buying off the aggressor by conniving at
his acts of murder, rape, arson and loot against innocent persons who happen for the
moment to be the victims of his displeasure. On the other hand, settlement means laying
down the bounds which neither party to it can transgress. Appeasement sets no limits to
the demands and aspirations of the aggressor. Settlement does. The second thing the
Congress has failed to realize is that the policy of concession has increased Muslim aggressiveness, and what is worse, Muslims interpret these
concessions as a sign of defeatism on the part of the Hindus and the absence of the will
to resist. This policy of appeasement will involve the Hindus in the same fearful
situation in which the Allies found themselves as a result of the policy of appeasement
which they adopted towards Hitler. This is another malaise, no less acute than the malaise
of social stagnation. Appeasement will surely aggravate it. The only remedy for it is a
settlement. If Pakistan is a settlement, it is a proposition worth consideration. As a
settlement it will do away with this constant need of appeasement and ought to be welcomed
by all those who prefer the peace and tranquillity of a settlement to the insecurity due
to the growing political appetite shown by the Muslims in their dealings with the Hindus.
[f1]Studies in
Mahetnedamsm, pp. 34-35
[f2]Ibid., Chapter XXXIX.
[f.3]The Koran, its Composition and Teaching . p. 58.
[f.4]For the position of Muslim women, see Our Cause, edited by Shyam Kumar Nehru.
[f.5]It is interesting to
note the argument which the Europeans who are accused by Indians for not admitting them to
their clubs use to defend themselves. They say, " We bring our women to the clubs. If
you agree to bring your women t the club, you can be admitted. We can't expose our women
to your company if you deny us the company of your women. Be ready to go fifty-fifty. them
ask for entry in our clubs."
[f.6]Nationality and
other Essays.
[f7] For a more detailed statement, sec my tract on Annihilation of caste.
[f.8]Harijan—11th
January 1936.
[f9]The earliest retried decision was that given by the high
Court of the North-West Province in 1870 in the case of Zabaroast Kluin vs. His wife
[f.10]Legislative Assembly
Debates. 1938, Vol. V. pp. 1980 -1101.
[f.11]Legislative Assembly
Debates, 1938. Vol. V. pp. 1953-55.
[f12]The part played by woman in sustaining nationalism has not
been sufficiently noticed. See the observations of Renan on this point in his Essay on Nationality.
[f.13]26lh April 1926.
[f.14]Short for the Rashtriya Swayam Sevaka Sangh which is a Hindu
volunteer corps. Khaksar is a Muslim
volunteer corps.
[f.15]See the speech of Sir Mahomad Shaif in the Minorities
Sub-committee of the first R.T.C. (Indian Edition). p. 57.
[f.16]See the speech of Raja Narendranath, lbid„ p. 65.
[f.17]The Musalinans had already been told by Sir Sayad Ahmad not
to join the Congress in the two speeches, one delivered at Lucknow on 28th December 1887,
and the other at Meerut on 16th March 1988. Mr.
Mahomed Ali in his presidential address speaks of them as historic speeches.
[f.18]Mr' Mahomed Ali in his speech as the President of the
Congress said that this deputation was a " command performance."
[f.19]The
number in column 9 represents the maximum of Official members permitted under the
Regulations.
[f.20]The C.P. Legislative Council was established in 1914.
[f.21]For some reason the pact did not settle the proportion of
Muslim representation in Assam.
[f.22]Government of India Act, 1919, section 67(2) (h).
[f.23]Statutory Commission, 1929, Report, Vol. I, p. 189.
[f.24]Column 3 includes Indians elected by special constituencies,
e.g. Commerce, whose communal proportions may of course vary slightly from time to time.
Similarly column 2, including also officials and nominated non-officials, will show
slightly different results at different periods.
[f25]* Fifth despatch on Indian Constitutional Reforms
(Franchises) dated 23rd April 1919, para 21.
[f.26]The demands are known as Mr. Jinnah's 14 points. As a mailer
of fact they are 15 in number and were formulated at a meeting of .Muslim leaders of' all
shades of opinion held at Delhi in March 1927 and were known as the Delhi Proposals, for
Mr. Jinnah's explanation of the origin of his 14 points, see All-India Register, 1929, Vol. 1., p. 367.
[f.27]Report, Vol. II, p. 71.
[f.28]Notification No. F. 173/31-R in the Gazette of India Extraordinary, dated 25th January
1932.
[f.29]The Simon Commission had rejected the claim saying: "
We entirely share the view of the Bray Committee that provision ought now to be made for
the constitutional advance of the N.-W. F. P. .............. But we also agree that the
situation of the Province and its intimate relation with the problem of Indian defence are
such that special arrangements are required. . It is not possible, therefore, to apply to
it automatically proposals which may be suited for provincial areas in other parts of
India. " They justified it by saying: " The inherent right of a man to smoke a
cigarette must necessarily be curtailed if he lives in a powder
magazine."—Report, Vol. H. paras 120-121.
[f.30]This resulted in the Poona Pact which was .signed on 24lh
September 1932.
[f.31]For the efforts to gel the Muslim part of the Award revised,
see All-India Register. 1932 Vol. II, pp.
281-315.
[f.32]The communique is
dated Simla July 2,1935.
[f.33]Indian Annual
Register. 1938. Vol. I, p. 369.
[f34]* See points no
3 in mr . jinnah’s 14 points
[f.35]These figures relate to the Census of 1921.
[f36]* Montagu-Chelmsford Report, 1918, para 163.
The
Government of India fell that injustice was done to the Punjab as well. But as there was
no such special reason as there was in the case of Bengal, namely, the unsettling of the
partition, they did not propose any augmentation in its representation as settled by the
Pact.
[f.37]There is no doubt that this was well understood by the
Muslims who were parties to the Pact. This is what Mr. Jinnah said as a witness appearing
before the Joint Select Committee appointed by
Parliament on the Government of India Bill, 1919, in reply to question No. 3808: "
The position of Bengal was this: In Bengal the Muslims are in a majority, and the argument
was advanced that any section or any community which is in the majority cannot claim a
separate electorate: separate electorate is to protect the minority. But the
counter-argument was perfectly true that numerically we are in a majority but as voters we
are in the minority in Bengal, because of poverty and backwardness and so on. It was said:
Very well, then fix 40 per cent., because if you are really put to test you will not get
40 per cent. because you will not be qualified as voters. Then we had the advantage in
other Provinces."
[f.38]Report of the Minorities Sub-Committee of the first R.T.C.
(Indian Edition), p. 96
[f.39] Mr. Mahomed Ali's formula was for Joint Electorates and
Reserved Seats with this proviso that no candidate shall be declared elected unless he had
secured at least 40 per cent. of the votes of
his own community and at least 5 or 10 per cent. of the votes of the other community.
[f.40]Ibid., p. 123.
[f.41]See point No. 15 m Mr. Jimuh's points.
[f42]+ For the resolution and the speech of Mr. Baikal Ali
thereon, see the Indian Quarterly Register.
1927. Vol. II. pp. 447-48.
[f.43]The unfortunate thing for the Hindus is that they did not
get joint electorates although the Musalmans got the concessions.
[f.44]ln the Karachi session of the All-India Muslim League both
Mr. Jinnah and Sir AbduUah Haroon compared the Muslims of India to the " Sudeten
" of the Muslim world and capable of doing what the Sudelen Germans did to
C'echoslovakia.