PAKISTAN OR THE PARTITION OF INDIA
________________________________________________________________
Contents
PART
V :
Chapter
XIII : Must there
be Pakistan
Chapter XIV : The problems of Pakistan
PART
V
Different
people have thought differently of what has been said in the foregoing pages on the
question of 'Pakistan. One set of people have alleged that I have only stated the two
sides of the issue and the problems arising out of it but have not expressed my personal
views on either of them. This is not correct. Anyone who has read the preceding parts will
have to admit that I have expressed my views in quite positive terms, if not on all,
certainly on many questions. In particular I may refer to two of the most important ones
in the controversy, namely, Are the Muslims a Nation, and Have they a case for Pakistan.
There are others whose line of criticism is of a different sort. They do not complain that
I have failed to express my personal views. What they complain is that in coming to my
conclusions I have relied on propositions as though they were absolute in their
application and have admitted no exception. I am told, " Have you not stated your
conclusions in too general terms ? Is not a general proposition subject to conditions and
limitations ? Have you not disposed of certain complicated problems in a brief and
cavalier fashion ? Have you shown how Pakistan can be brought into existence in a just and
peaceful manner ?" Even this criticism is not altogether correct. It is not right to
say that I have omitted to deal with these points. It may be that my treatment of them is
brief, and scattered. However, I am prepared to admit that there is much force in this
criticism and I am in duty bound to make good the default. This part is therefore intended
and is devoted to the consideration of the following subjects :—
1. What
ate the limiting considerations which affect the Muslim case for Pakistan ?
2. What
are the problems of Pakistan ? and what is their solution ?
3. Who has
the authority to decide the issue of Pakistan ?
MUST THERE BE PAKISTAN ?
I
With all that has gone before, the sceptic,
the nationalist, the conservative and the old-world Indian will not fail to ask "
Must there be Pakistan ?" No one can make light of such an attitude. For the problem
of Pakistan is indeed very grave and it must be admitted that the question is not only a
relevant and fair one to be put to the Muslims and to their protagonists but it is also
important. Its importance lies in the fact that the limitations on the case for Pakistan
are so considerable in their force that they can never be easily brushed aside. A mere
statement of these limitations should be enough to make one feel the force they have. It
is writ large on the very face of them. That being so, the burden of proof on the Muslims
for establishing an imperative need in favour of Pakistan is very heavy. Indeed the issue
of Pakistan or to put it plainly of partitioning India, is of such a grave character that
the Muslims will not only have to discharge this burden of proof but they will have to
adduce evidence of such a character as to satisfy the conscience of an international
tribunal before they can win their case. Let us see how the case for Pakistan stands in the light of these limitations.
II
Must there be Pakistan because a good part of
the Muslim population of India happens to be concentrated in certain defined areas which
can be easily severed from the rest of India ? Muslim population is admittedly
concentrated in certain well defined areas and it may be that these areas are severable.
But what of that ? In considering this question one must never lose sight of the
fundamental fact that nature has made India one single geographical unit. Indians are of
course quarrelling and no one can prophesy when they will stop quarrelling. But granting
the fact, what does it establish ? Only that Indians are a quarrelsome people. It does not
destroy the fact that India is a single geographical unit. Her unity is as ancient as
Nature. Within this geographic unit and covering the whole of it there has been a cultural
unity from time immemorial. This cultural unity has defied political and racial divisions.
And at any rate for the last hundred and fifty years all institutions—cultural,
political, economic, legal and administrative—have been working on a single, uniform
spring of action. In any discussion of Pakistan the fact cannot be lost sight of, namely,
that the starting point, if not the governing factor, is the fundamental unity of India.
For it is necessary to grasp the fact that there are really two cases of partition which
must be clearly distinguished. There is a case in which the starting point is a pre
existing state of separation so that partition is. only a dissolution of parts which were
once separate and which were subsequently joined together. This case is quite different
from another in which the starting point at all times is a state of unity. Consequently
partition in such a case is the severance of a territory which has been one single whole
into separate parts. Where the starting point is not unity of territory, i.e., where there
was disunity before there was unity, partition—which is only a return to the
original—may not give a mental shock. But in India the starting point is unity. Why
destroy its unity now, simply because some Muslims are dissatisfied ? Why tear it when the
unit is one single whole from historical times ?
III
Must there be Pakistan because there is
communal antagonism between the Hindus and the Muslims ? That the communal antagonism
exists nobody can deny. The question however is, is the antagonism such that there is no
will to live together in one country and under one constitution ? Surely that will to live
together was not absent till 1937. During the formulation of the provisions of the
Government of India Act, 1935, both Hindus and Musalmans accepted the view that they must
live together under one constitution and in one country and participated in the
discussions that preceded the passing of the Act. And what was the state of communal
feeling in India between—say 1920 and 1935 ? As has been recorded in the preceding
pages, the history of India from 1920 up to 1935 has been one long tale of communal
conflict in which the loss of life and loss of property had reached a most shameful limit.
Never was the communal situation so acute as it was between this period of 15 years
preceding the passing of the Government of India Act, 1935, and yet this long tale of
antagonism did not prevent the Hindus and the Musalmans from agreeing to live in a single
country and under a single constitution. Why make so much of communal antagonism now ?
Is India the only country where there is
communal antagonism ? What about Canada ? Consider what Mr. Alexander Brady 1[f.1] has to say on the relations between the English and the
French in Canada :—
" Of the four original provinces, three.
Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Ontario had populations substantially of the same
Anglo-Saxon stock and traditions. Originally a by-product of the American Revolution,
these colonies were established by the 50,000 United Empire Loyalists who trekked north
from persecution and cut their settlements out of the wilderness. Previous to the American
Revolution, Nova Scotia had received a goodly number of Scotch and American settlers, and
in all the colonies after the Revolution the Loyalist settlements were reinforced by
immigrants from Great Britain and Ireland."
*
*
*
*
" Very different was the province of
Quebec. French Canada in 1867 was a cultural unit by itself, divorced from the British
communities, by the barriers of race, language and religion. Its life ran in a different
mould. Stirred by a Catholic faith mediaeval in its intensity, it viewed with scant
sympathy the mingled Puritanism and other-worldliness of a Protestantism largely
Calvinistic. The religious faiths of the two peoples were indeed poles apart. In social,
if not always in religious, outlook, English
Protestantism tended towards democracy, realism and modernism: the Catholicism of the
French leaned to paternalism, idealism and a reverence for the past."
*
*
*
*
" What French Canada was in 1867 it
remains substantially today. It still cherishes beliefs, customs, and institutions which
have little hold on the English provinces. It has distinctive thought and enthusiasm, and
its own important values. Its attitude, for example, on marriage and divorce is in
conflict with the dominant view, not merely of the rest of Canada, but of the remainder of
Anglo-Saxon-North-America."
*
*
*
*
" The infrequency of intercourse between
the two peoples is illustrated in Canada's largest city, Montreal. About 63 per cent. of
the population is French and 24 per cent British. Here, if anywhere, is ample scope for
association, but in fact they remain apart and distinct except where business and politics
force them together. They have their own residential sections; their own shopping centres,
and if either is more notable for racial reserve, it is the English."
*
*
*
*
" The English-speaking residents of
Montreal, as a whole, have made no effort to know their French-speaking fellow citizens,
to learn their language, to understand their traditions and their aspirations, to observe
with a keen eye and a sympathetic mind their qualities and their defects. The separation
of the two peoples is encouraged by the barrier of language. There is a wealth of
significance in the fact revealed by the census of 1921 ; viz., that about 50 per cent. of
the Canadians of French origin were unable to speak English and 95 per cent. of those of
British origin were unable to speak French. Even in Montreal, 70 per cent. of the British
could not speak French and 34 per cent. of the French could not speak English. The absence
of a common language maintains a chasm between the two nationalities and prevents fusion.
" The significance of Confederation is
that it provided an instrument of government which enabled the French, while retaining
their distinct national life, to become happy partners with the British and attain a
Canadian super-nationality, embracing a loyally extending beyond their own group to that
of the Dominion as a whole."
*
*
*
*
" While the federal system successfully
opened the path for a wider nationality in Canada, the co-operation which it sponsored has
at times been subjected to severe strain by the violent clash of opinion between the
French and the British. The super-nationality has indeed often been reduced to a
shadow."
What about South Africa ? Let those who do
not know the relationship between the Boers and the British ponder over what ,Mr. E. H.
Brooks 2 [f2]has to say :—
" How far is South African nationalism
common to both the white races of South Africa ? There is, of course, a very real and
intense Afrikander nationalism ; but it is, generally speaking, a sentiment confined to
one of the white races, and characterised, significantly enough, by a love of the Afrikans
language, the tongue of the early settlers from Holland, as modified slightly by Huguenot
and German influence, and greatly by the passage of time. Afrikander nationalism has a
tendency to be exclusive, and has little place for the man who, while in every way a
devoted son of South Africa, is wholly or mainly English-speaking."
*
* * *
" Is there a South African nation today
?
" There are certain factors in South
African life which militate against an affirmative answer."
*
* * *
" Among English-speaking South Africans
there are found many tendencies inclined to hinder the cause of national unity. With all
the great virtues of the race they have its one cardinal defect—a lack of
imagination, a difficulty in putting one's self in the other man's place. Nowhere does
this come out more clearly than in the language question. Until recently comparatively few
English-speaking South Africans have studied Africans except as a business proposition or
(as in the Civil Service) more or less under compulsion;
and fewer still have used it conversationally. Many have treated it with open
contempt—a contempt in inverse proportion to their knowledge of it—and the
majority with mere tolerance, exasperated or amused according to temperament."
Another witness on the same point may be
heard. He is Mr. Manfred Nathan. 3 [f3]This is what he has to say on the relations between the
Boers and the British in South Africa :—
" They are also, in the main, both of
them Protestant peoples—although this is not of too great importance nowadays, when
differences of religion do not count for much. They engage freely in commercial
transactions with each other."
*
* * *
" Nevertheless it cannot with truth be
said that hitherto there has been absolutely free social intercourse between these two
great sections of the white population. It has been suggested that this is partly due to
the fact that in the large urban centres the population is predominantly English, and that
the townsfolk know little of the people in the country and their ways of life. But even in
the country towns, though there is, as a rule, much greater friendliness, and much
hospitality shown by Boers to visitors, there is not much social intercourse between the
two sections apart from necessary business or professional relationship, and such social
functions, charitable or public, as require co-operation."
Obviously India is not the only place where
there is communal antagonism. If communal antagonism does not come in the way of the
French in Canada living in political unity with the English, if it does not come in the
way of the English in South Africa living in political unity with the Dutch, if it does
not come in the way of the French and the Italians in Switzerland living in political
unity with the Germans why then should it be impossible for the Hindus and the Muslims to
agree to live together under one constitution in India?
IV
Must there be Pakistan because the Muslims
have lost faith in the Congress majority ? As reasons for the loss of faith Muslims cite
some instances of tyranny and oppression practised by the Hindus and connived at by the
Congress Ministries during the two years and three months the Congress was in office.
Unfortunately Mr. Jinnah did not persist in his demand for a Royal Commission to inquire
into these grievances. If he had done it we could have known what truth there was in these
complaints. A perusal of these instances, as given in the reports 4[f.4] of the Muslim
League Committees, leaves upon the reader the impression that although there may be some
truth in the allegations there is a great deal which is pure exaggeration. The Congress
Ministries concerned have issued statements repudiating the charges. It may be that the
Congress during the two years and three months that it was in office did not show
statesmanship, did not inspire confidence in the minorities, nay tried to suppress them.
But can it be a reason for partitioning
India ? Is it not possible to hope that the voters who supported the Congress last time
will grow wiser and not support the Congress ? Or may it not be that if the Congress
returns to office it will profit by the mistakes it has made, revise its mischievous
policy and thereby allay the fear created by its past conduct ?
V
Must there be Pakistan because the Musalmans
are a nation ? It is a pity that Mr. Jinnah should have become a votary and champion of
Muslim Nationalism at a time when the whole world is decrying against the evils of
nationalism and is seeking refuge in some kind of international organization. Mr. Jinnah
is so obsessed with his new-found faith in Muslim Nationalism that he is not prepared to
see that there is a distinction between a society, parts of which are disintegrated, and a
society parts of which have become only loose, which no sane man can ignore. When a
society is disintegrating—and the two nation theory is a positive disintegration of
society and country—it is evidence of the fact that there do not exist what Carlyle
calls " organic filaments "—i.e., the vital forces which work to bind
together the parts that are cut asunder. In such cases disintegration can only be
regretted. It cannot be prevented. Where, however, such organic filaments do exist, it is
a crime to overlook them and deliberately force the disintegration of society and country
as the Muslims seem to be doing. If the Musalmans want to be a different nation it is not
because they have been but because they want to be. There is much in the Musalmans which,
if they wish, can roll them into a nation. But isn't there enough that is common to both
Hindus and Musalmans, which if developed, is capable of moulding them into one people ?
Nobody can deny that there are many modes, manners, rites and customs which are common to
both. Nobody can deny that there are rites, customs and usages based on religion which do
divide Hindus and Musalmans. The question is, which of these should be emphasized. If the
emphasis is laid on things that are common, there need be no two nations in India. If the
emphasis is laid on points of difference, it will no doubt give rise to two nations. The
view that seems to guide Mr. Jinnah is that Indians are only a people and that they can
never be a nation. This follows the line of British writers who make it a point of
speaking of Indians as the people of India and avoid speaking of the Indian nation.
Granted Indians are not a nation, that they are only a people. What of that ? History
records that before the rise of nations as great corporate personalities, there were only
peoples. There is nothing to be ashamed if Indians are no more than a people. Nor is there
any cause for despair that the people of India—if they wish—will not become one
nation. For, as Disraeli said, a nation is a work of art and a work of time. If the Hindus
and Musalmans agree to emphasize the things that bind them and forget those that separate
them there is no reason why in course of time they should not grow into a nation. It may
be that their nationalism may not be quite so integrated as that of the French or the
Germans. But they can easily produce a common state of mind on common questions which is
the sum total which the spirit of nationalism helps to produce and for which it is so much
prized. Is it right for the Muslim League to emphasize only differences and ignore
altogether the forces that bind ? Let it not be forgotten that if two nations come into
being it will not be because it is predestined. It will be the result of deliberate
design.
The Musalmans of India as I have said are not
as yet a nation in the de jure or de facto sense of the term and all that can be said is
that they have in them the elements necessary to make them a nation. But granting that the
Musalmans of India are a nation, is India the only country where there are going to be two
nations ? What about Canada ? Everybody knows that there are in Canada two nations, the
English and the French. Are there not two nations in South Africa, the English and the Dutch ? What about
Switzerland ? Who does not know that there are three nations living in Switzerland, the
Germans, the French and the Italians ? Have the French in Canada demanded partition
because they are a separate nation ? Do the English claim partition of South Africa
because they are a distinct nation from the Boers ? Has anybody ever heard that the
Germans, the French and the Italians have ever agitated for the fragmentation of
Switzerland because they are all different nations ? Have the Germans, the French and the
Italians ever felt that they would lose their distinctive cultures if they lived as
citizens of one country and under one constitution ? On the contrary, all these distinct
nations have been content to live together in one country under one constitution without
fear of losing their nationality and their distinctive cultures. Neither have the French
in Canada ceased to be French by living with the English, nor have the English ceased to
be English by living with the Boers in South Africa. The Germans, the French and the
Italians have remained distinct nations notwithstanding their common allegiance to a
common country and a common constitution. The case of Switzerland is worthy of note. It is
surrounded by countries, the nationalities of which have a close religious and racial
affinity with the nationalities of Switzerland. Notwithstanding these affinities the
nationalities in Switzerland have been Swiss first and Germans, Italians and French
afterwards.
Given the experience of the French in Canada,
the English in South Africa and the French and the Italians in Switzerland, the questions
that arise are, why should it be otherwise in India ? Assuming that the Hindus and the
Muslims split into two nations, why cannot they live in one country and under one
constitution ? Why should the emergence of the two-nation theory make partition necessary
? Why should the Musalmans be afraid of losing their nationality and national culture by
living with the Hindus ? If the Muslims insist on separation, the cynic may well conclude
that there is so much that is common between the Hindus and the Musalmans that the Muslim
leaders are afraid that unless there is partition whatever little distinctive Islamic
culture is left with the Musalmans will eventually vanish by continued social contact with
the Hindus with the result that in the end instead of two nations there will grow up in
India one nation. If the Muslim nationalism is so thin then the motive for partition is
artificial and the case for Pakistan loses its very basis.
VI
Must there be Pakistan because otherwise
Swaraj will be a Hindu Raj ? The Musalmans are so easily carried away by this cry that it
is necessary to expose the fallacies underlying it.
In the first place, is the Muslim objection
to Hindu Raj a conscientious objection or is it a political objection If it is a conscientious objection all one can say
is that it is a very strange sort of conscience. There are really millions of Musalmans in
India who are living under unbridled and uncontrolled Hindu Raj of Hindu Princes and no
objection to it has been raised by the Muslims or the Muslim League. The Muslims had once
a conscientious objection to the British Raj. Today not only have they no objection to it
but they are the greatest supporters of it. That there should be no objection to British
Raj or to undiluted Hindu Raj of a Hindu Prince but that there should be objection to
Swaraj for British India on the ground that it is Hindu Raj as though it was not subjected
to checks and balances is an attitude the logic of which it is difficult to follow.
The political objections to Hindu Raj rest on
various grounds. The first ground is that Hindu society is not a democratic society. True,
it is not It may not be right to ask whether the Muslims have taken any part in the
various movements for reforming Hindu society as distinguished from proselytising. But it
is right to ask if the Musalmans are the only sufferers from the evils that admittedly
result from the undemocratic character of Hindu society. Are not the millions of Shudras
and non-Brahmins or millions of the Untouchables, suffering the worst consequences of the
undemocratic character of Hindu society ? Who benefits from education, from public service
and from political reforms except the Hindu governing class—composed of the higher
castes of the Hindus—which form not even 10 per cent. of the total Hindu population ?
Has not the governing class of the Hindus, which controls Hindu politics, shown more
regard for safeguarding the rights and interests of the Musalmans than they have for
safeguarding the rights and interests of the Shudras and the Untouchables ? Is not Mr.
Gandhi, who is determined to oppose any political concession to the Untouchables, ready to
sign a blank cheque in favour of the Muslims ? Indeed, the Hindu governing class seems to
be far more ready to share power with the Muslims than it is to share power with the
Shudras and the Untouchables. Surely, the Muslims have the least ground to complain of the
undemocratic character of Hindu society.
Another ground on which the Muslim objection
to Hindu Raj rests is that the Hindus are a majority community and the Musalmans are a
minority community. True. But is India the only country where such a situation exists ?
Let us compare the conditions in India with the conditions in Canada, South Africa and
Switzerland. First, take the distribution of population. In Canada 5[f.5] out of a total population of 10,376,786 only 2,927,990 are
French. In South Africa 6 [f6]the Dutch number 1,120,770 and the English are only 783,071.
In Switzerland 7[f.7] out of the
total population of 4,066,400 the Germans are 2,924,313, the French 831,097 and the
Italians 242,034.
This shows that the smaller nationalities
have no fear of being placed under the Raj of a major community. Such a notion seems to be
quite foreign to them. Why is this so? Is it because there is no possibility of the major
nationality establishing its supremacy in those centres of power and authority, namely the
Legislature and in the Executive ? Quite the contrary. Unfortunately no figures are
available to show the actual extent of representation which the different major and minor
nationalities have in Switzerland, Canada and South Africa. That is because there is no
communal reservation of seats such as is found in India. Each community is left to win in
a general contest what number of seats it can. But it is quite easy to work out the
probable number of seats which each nationality can obtain on the basis of the ratio of
its population to the total seats in the Legislature Proceeding on this basis what do we
find? In Switzerland the total representatives in the Lower House is 187. Out of them the
German population has a possibility of winning 138, French 42 and Italians only 7 seats.
In South Africa out of the total of 153, there is a possibility of the English gaining 62,
and the Dutch 94 seats. In Canada the total is 245. Of these the French 8 [f.8] have only 65. On this basis it is quite clear that in all
these countries there is a possibility of the major nationality establishing its supremacy
over the minor nationalities. Indeed, one may go so far as to say that speaking de jure
and as a mere matter of form in Canada the French are living under the British Raj, the
English in South Africa under the Dutch Raj, and the Italians and French in Switzerland
under the German Raj. But what is the position de facto ? Have Frenchmen in Canada raised
a cry that they will not live under British Raj ? Have Englishmen in South Africa raised a
cry that they will not live under Dutch Raj ? Have the French and Italians in Switzerland
any objection to living under the German Raj ? Why should then the Muslims raise this cry
of Hindu Raj ?
Is it proposed that the Hindu Raj should be
the rule of a naked communal majority ? Are not the Musalmans granted safeguards against
the possible tyranny of the Hindu majority ? Are not the safeguards given to the Musalmans
of India wider and better than the safeguards which have been given to the French in
Canada, to the English in South Africa and to the French and the Italians in Switzerland?
To take only one item from the list of safeguards. Haven't the Musalmans got an enormous
degree of weightage in representation in the Legislature ? Is weightage known in Canada,
South Africa or Switzerland ? And what is the effect of this weightage to Muslims ? Is it
not to reduce the Hindu majority in the Legislature? What is the degree of reduction?
Confining ourselves to British India and taking account only of the representation granted
to the territorial constituencies, Hindu and Muslim, in the Lower House in the Central
Legislature under the Government of India Act, 1935, it is clear that out of a total of
187, the Hindus have 105 seats and the Muslims have 82 seats. Given these figures one is
forced to ask where is the fear of the Hindu Raj ?
If Hindu Raj does become a fact, it will, no
doubt, be the greatest calamity for this country. No matter what the Hindus say, Hinduism
is a menace to liberty, equality and fraternity. On that account it is incompatible with
democracy. Hindu Raj must be prevented at any cost. But is Pakistan the true remedy
against it ? What makes communal Raj possible is a marked disproportion in the relative
strength of the various communities living in a country. As pointed out above, this
disproportion is not more marked in India than it is in Canada, South Africa and
Switzerland. Nonetheless there is no British Raj in Canada, no Dutch Raj in South Africa,
and no German Raj in Switzerland. How have the French, the English and the Italians
succeeded in preventing the Raj of the majority community being established in their
country ? Surely not by partition : What is their method ? Their method is to put a ban on
communal parties in politics. No community in Canada, South Africa or Switzerland ever
thinks of starting a separate communal party. What is important to note is that it is the
minority nations which have taken the lead in opposing the formation of a communal party.
For they know that if they form a communal political party the major community will also
form a communal party and the majority community will thereby find it easy to establish
its communal Raj. It is a vicious method of self-protection. It is because the minority
nations are fully aware how they will be hoisted on their own petard that they have
opposed the formation of communal political parties.
Have the Muslims thought of this method of
avoiding Hindu Raj. Have they considered how easy it is to avoid it ? Have they considered
how futile and harmful the present policy of the League is ? The Muslims are howling
against the Hindu Maha Sabha and its slogan of Hindudom and Hindu Raj. But who is
responsible for this ? Hindu Maha Sabha and Hindu Raj are the inescapable nemesis which
the Musalmans have brought upon themselves by having a Muslim League. It is action and
counter-action. One gives rise to the other. Not partition, but the abolition, of the
Muslim League and the formation of a mixed party of Hindus and Muslims is the only
effective way of burying the ghost of Hindu Raj. It is, of course, not possible for
Muslims and other minority parties to join the Congress or the Hindu Maha Sabha so long as
the disagreement on the question of constitutional safeguards continues. But this question
will be settled, is bound to be settled and there is every hope that the settlement will
result in securing to the Muslims and other minorities the safeguards they need. Once this
consummation, which we so devoutly wish, takes place nothing can stand in the way of a
party re-alignment, of the Congress and the Maha Sabha breaking up and of Hindus and
Musalmans forming mixed political parties based on an agreed programme of social and
economic regeneration, and thereby avoid the danger of both Hindu Raj or Muslim Raj
becoming a fact. Nor should the formation of a mixed party of Hindus and Muslims be
difficult in India. There are many lower orders in the Hindu society whose economic,
political and social needs are the same as those of the majority of the Muslims and they
would be far more ready to make a common cause with the Muslims for achieving common ends
than they would with the high caste of Hindus who have denied and deprived them of
ordinary human rights for centuries. To pursue such a course cannot be called an
adventure. The path along that line is a well trodden path. Is it not a fact that under
the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms in most Provinces, if not in all, the Muslims, the
Non-Brahmins and the Depressed Classes united together and worked the reforms as members
of one team from 1920 to 1937 ? Herein lay the most fruitful method of achieving communal
harmony among Hindus and Muslims and of destroying the danger of a Hindu Raj. Mr. Jinnah
could have easily pursued this line. Nor was it difficult for Mr. Jinnah to succeed in it.
Indeed Mr. Jinnah is the one person who had all the chances of success on his side if he
had tried to form such a united non-communal party. He has the ability to organize. He had
the reputation of a nationalist. Even many Hindus who were opposed to the Congress would
have flocked to him if he had only sent out a call for a united party of like-minded
Hindus and Muslims. What did Mr. Jinnah do ? In 1937 Mr. Jinnah made his entry into Muslim
politics and strangely enough he regenerated the Muslim League which was dying and
decaying and of which only a few years ago he would have been glad to witness the funeral.
However regrettable the starting of such a communal political party may have been, there
was in it one relieving feature. That was the leadership of Mr. Jinnah. Everybody felt
that with the leadership of Mr. Jinnah the League could never become a merely communal
party. The resolutions passed by the League during the first two years of its new career
indicated that it would develop into a mixed political party of Hindus and Muslims. At the
annual session of the Muslim League held at Lucknow in October 1937 altogether 15
resolutions were passed. The following two are of special interest in this connection.
" This meeting of the All India Muslim
League deprecates and protests against the formation of Ministries in certain Provinces by
the Congress parties in flagrant violation of the letter and the spirit of the Government
of India Act, 1935, and Instrument of Instructions and condemns the Governors for their
failure to enforce the special powers entrusted to them for the safeguards of the interest
of the Musalmans and other important minorities"
Resolution* No. 8:
" Resolved that the object of the All
India Muslim League shall be the establishment in India of Full Independence in the form
of federation of free democratic states in which the rights and interests of the Musalmans
and other minorities are adequately and effectively safeguarded in the constitution."
Equal number of resolutions were passed at
the next annual session of the League held at Patna in December 1938. Resolution* No. 10
is noteworthy. It reads as follows :—
"The All India Muslim League reiterates
its view that the scheme of Federation embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935, is
not acceptable, but in view of the further developments that have taken place or may take
place from time to time it hereby authorises the President of the All India Muslim League
to adopt such course as may be necessary with a view to explore the possibility of a
suitable alternative which will safeguard the interests of the Musalmans and other
minorities in India." By these resolutions Mr. Jinnah showed that he was for a common
front between the Muslims and other non-Muslim minorities. Unfortunately the catholicity
and statesmanship that underlies these resolutions did not last long. In 1939 Mr. Jinnah
took a somersault and outlined the dangerous and disastrous policy of isolation of the
Musalmans by passing that notorious resolution in favour of Pakistan. What is the reason
for this isolation ? Nothing but the change of view that the Musalmans were a nation and
not a community ! ! One need not quarrel over the question whether the Muslims are a
nation or a community. But one finds it extremely difficult to understand how the mere
fact that the Muslims are a nation makes political isolation a safe and sound policy ?
Unfortunately Muslims do not realize what disservice Mr. Jinnah has done to them by this
policy. But let Muslims consider what Mr. Jinnah has achieved by making the Muslim League
the only organization for the Musalmans. It may be that it has helped him to avoid the
possibility of having to play the second fiddle. For inside the Muslim camp he can always
be sure of the first place for himself. But how does the League hope to save by this plan
of isolation the Muslims from Hindu Raj ? Will Pakistan obviate the establishment of Hindu
Raj in Provinces in which the Musalmans are in a minority ? Obviously it cannot. This is
what would happen in the Muslim minority Provinces if Pakistan came. Take an all-India
view. Can Pakistan prevent the establishment of Hindu Raj at the centre over Muslim
minorities that will remain Hindustan? It is plain that it cannot. What good is Pakistan
then ? Only to prevent Hindu Raj in Provinces in which the Muslims are in a majority and
in which there could never be Hindu Raj ! ! To put it differently Pakistan is unnecessary
to Muslims where they are in a majority because there, there is no fear of Hindu Raj. It
is worse than useless to Muslims where they are in a minority, because Pakistan or no
Pakistan they will have to face a Hindu Raj. Can politics be more futile than the politics
of the Muslim League ? The Muslim League started to help minority Muslims and has ended by
espousing the cause of majority Muslims. What a perversion in the original aim of the
Muslim League ! What a fall from the sublime to the ridiculous ! Partition as a remedy
against Hindu Raj is worse than useless.
VI
These are some of the weaknesses in the
Muslim case for Pakistan which have occurred to me. There might be others which have not
struck me. But the list as it is, is quite a formidable one. How do the Muslims propose to
meet them ? That is a question for the Muslims and not for me. My duty as a student of the
subject extends to setting forth these weaknesses. That I have done. I have nothing more
to answer for.
There are, however, two other questions of
such importance that this discussion cannot be closed with any sense of completeness
without reference to them. The purpose of these questions is to clear the ground between
myself and my critics. Of these questions, one I am entitled to ask the critics, the other
the critics are entitled to ask me.
Beginning with the first question, what I
feel like asking the critics is, what good do they expect from a statement of these
weaknesses ? Do they expect the Musalmans to give up Pakistan if they are defeated in a
controversy over the virtues of Pakistan ? That of course depends upon what method is
adopted to resolve this controversy. The Hindus and the Musalmans may follow the procedure
which Christian missionaries had set up in early times in order to secure converts from
amongst the Hindus. According to this procedure a day was appointed for a disputation,
which was open to public, between a Christian missionary and a Brahmin, the former
representing the Christian religion and the latter holding himself out as the protagonist
of the Hindu religion with the condition that whoever failed to meet the case against his
religion was bound to accept the religion of the other. If such a method of resolving the
dispute between the Hindus and the Muslims over the issue of Pakistan was agreed upon
there may be some use in setting out this string of weaknesses. But let it not be
forgotten that there is another method of disposing of a controversy which maybe called
Johnsonian after the manner which Dr. Johnson employed in dealing with arguments of Bishop
Berkeley. It is recorded by Boswell that when he told Dr. Johnson that the doctrine of
Bishop Berkeley that matter was non-existent and that everything in the universe was
merely ideal, was only an ingenious sophistry but that it was impossible to refute it. Dr.
Johnson with great alacrity answered, striking his foot with mighty force against a large
stone, till he rebounded from it saying, " I refute it thus." It may be that the
Musalmans will agree, as most rational people do, to have their case for Pakistan decided
by the tests of reason and argument. But I should not be surprised if the Muslims decided
to adopt the method of Dr. Johnson and say " Damn your arguments ! We want
Pakistan." In that event the critic must realize that any reliance placed upon the
limitations for destroying the case for Pakistan will be of no avail. It is therefore no
use being jubilant over the logic of these objections to Pakistan.
Let me now turn to the other question which I
said the critic is entitled to put to me. What is my position regarding the issue of
Pakistan in the light of the objections, which I have set out ? I have no doubts as to my
position. I hold firmly that, subject to certain conditions, detailed in the chapters that
follow, if the Musalmans are bent on having Pakistan then it must be conceded to them. I
know my critics will at once accuse me of inconsistency and will demand reasons for so
extraordinary a conclusion— extraordinary because of the view expressed by me in the
earlier part of this chapter that the Muslim case for Pakistan has nothing in it which can
be said to carry the compelling force which the decree of an inexorable fate may be said
to have. I withdraw nothing from what I have said as to the weaknesses in the Muslim case
for Pakistan. Yet I hold that if the Muslims must have Pakistan there is no escape from
conceding it to them. As to the reasons which have led me to that conclusion I shall not
hesitate to say that the strength or weakness of the logic of Pakistan is not one of them.
In my judgement there are two governing factors which must determine the issue. First is
the defence of India and second is the sentiment of the Muslims. I will state why I regard
them as decisive and how in my opinion they tell in favour of Pakistan.
To begin with the first. One cannot ignore
that what is important is not the winning of independence but the having of the sure means
of maintaining it. The ultimate guarantee of the independence of a country is a safe
army—an army on which you can rely to fight for the country at all time and in any
eventuality. The army in India must necessarily be a mixed army composed of Hindus and
Muslims. If India is invaded by a foreign power, can the Muslims in the army be trusted to
defend India ? Suppose invaders are their co-religionists. Will the Muslims side with the
invaders or will they stand against them and save India ? This is a very crucial question.
Obviously, the answer to this question must depend upon to what extent the Muslims in the
army have caught the infection of the two-nation theory, which is the foundation of
Pakistan. If they are infected, then the army in India cannot be safe. Instead of being
the guardian of the independence of India, it will continue to be a menace and a potential
danger to its independence. I confess I feel aghast when I hear some Britishers argue that
it is for the defence of India that they must reject Pakistan. Some Hindus also sing the
same tune. I feel certain that either they are unaware as to what the determining factor
in the independence of India is or that they are talking of the defence of India not as an
independent country responsible for its own defence but as a British possession to be
defended by them against an intruder. This is a hopelessly wrong angle of vision. The
question is not whether the British will be able to defend India better if there was no
partition of India. The question is whether Indians will be able to defend a free India.
To that, I repeat, the only answer is that Indians will be able to defend a free India on
one and one condition alone—namely, if the army in India remains non-political,
unaffected by the poison of Pakistan. I want to warn Indians against the most stupid habit
that has grown up in this country of discussing the question of Swaraj without reference
to the question of the army. Nothing can be more fatal than the failure to realize that a
political army is the greatest danger to the liberty of India. It is worse than having no
army.
Equally important is the fact that the army
is the ultimate sanction which sustains Government in the exercise of its authority inside
the country, when it is challenged by a rebellious or recalcitrant element. Suppose the
Government of the day enunciates a policy which is vehemently opposed by a section of the
Muslims. Suppose the Government of the day is required to use its army to enforce its
policy. Can the Government of the day depend upon the Muslims in the army to obey its
orders and shoot down the Muslim rebels ? This again depends upon to what extent the
Muslims in the army have caught the infection of the two-nation theory. If they have
caught it, India cannot have a safe and secure Government.
Turning to the second governing factor the
Hindus do not seem to attach any value to sentiment as a force in politics. The Hindus
seem to rely upon two grounds to win against the Muslims. The first is that even if the
Hindus and the Muslims are two nations, they can live under one state. The other is that
the Muslim case for Pakistan is founded on strong sentiment rather than upon clear
argument. I don't know how long the Hindus are going to fool themselves with such
arguments. It is true that the first argument is not without precedent. At the same time
it does not call for much intelligence to see that its value is extremely limited. two nations and one state is a pretty plea. It has
the same attraction which a sermon has and may result in the conversion of Muslim leaders.
But instead of being uttered as a sermon if it is intended to issue it as an ordinance for
the Muslims to obey it will be a mad project to which no sane man will agree. It will, I
am sure, defeat the very purpose of Swaraj. The second argument is equally silly. That the
Muslim case for Pakistan is founded on sentiment is far from being a matter of weakness;
it is really its strong point. It does not need deep understanding of politics to know
that the workability of a constitution is not a matter of theory. It is a matter of
sentiment. A constitution like clothes must suit as well as please. If a constitution does
not please, then, however perfect it may be, it will not work. To have a constitution
which runs counter to the strong sentiments of a determined section is to court disaster
if not to invite rebellion.
It is not realized by the Hindus that,
assuming there is a safe army, rule by armed forces is not the normal method of governing
a people. Force, it cannot be denied, is the medicine of the body politic and must be
administered when the body politic becomes sick. But just because force is the medicine of
the body politic it cannot be allowed to become its daily bread. A body politic must work
as a matter of course by springs of action which are natural. This can happen only when
the different elements constituting the body politic have the will to work together and to
obey the laws and orders passed by a duly constituted authority. Suppose the new
constitution for a United India contained in it all the provisions necessary to safeguard
the interests of the Muslims. But suppose the Muslims said " Thank you for your
safeguards, we don't want to be ruled by you " ; and suppose they boycott the
Legislatures, refuse to obey laws, oppose the payment of taxes ; what is to happen ? Are
the Hindus prepared to extract obedience from Muslims by the use of Hindu bayonets ? Is
Swaraj to be an opportunity to serve the people or is it to be an opportunity for Hindus
to conquer the Musalmans and for the Musalmans to conquer the Hindus ? Swaraj must be a
Government of the people by the people and for the people. This is the raison d'etre of
Swaraj and the only justification for Swaraj. If Swaraj is to usher in an era in which the
Hindus and the Muslims will be engaged in scheming against each other, the one planning to
conquer its rival, why should we have Swaraj and why should the democratic nations allow
such a Swaraj to come into existence ? It will be a snare, a delusion and a perversion.
The non-Muslims do not seem to be aware that
they are presented with a situation in which they are forced to choose between various
alternatives. Let me state them. In the first place they have to choose between Freedom of
India and the Unity of India. If the non-Muslims will insist on the Unity of India they
put the quick realization of India's freedom into jeopardy. The second choice relates to
the surest method of defending India, whether they can depend upon Muslims in a free and
united India to develop and sustain along with the non-Muslims the necessary will to
defend the common liberties of both: or whether it is better to partition India and
thereby ensure the safety of Muslim India by leaving its defence to the Muslims and of
non-Muslim India by leaving its defence to non-Muslims.
As to the first, I prefer Freedom of India to
the Unity of India. The Sinn Feinners who were the staunchest of nationalists to be found
anywhere in the world and who like the Indians were presented with similar alternatives
chose the freedom of Ireland to the unity of Ireland. The non-Muslims who are opposed to
partition may well profit by the advice tendered by the Rev. Michael O'Flanagan, at one
time Vice-President of the Feinns to the Irish Nationalists on the issue of the partition
of Ireland. 10[f.10] Said the Rev.
Father :—
" If we reject Home Rule rather than
agree to the exclusion of the Unionist parts of Ulster, what case have we to put before
the world ? We can point out that Ireland is an island with a definite geographical
boundary. That argument might be all right if we were appealing to a number of Island
nationalities that had themselves definite geographical boundaries. Appealing, as we are,
to continental nations with shifting boundaries, that argument will have no force
whatever. National and geographical boundaries scarcely ever coincide. Geography would
make one nation of Spain and Portugal; history has made two of them. Geography did its
best to make one nation of Norway and Sweden ; history has succeeded in making two of
them. Geography has scarcely anything to say to the number of nations upon the North
American continent; history has done the whole thing. If a man were to try to construct a
political map of Europe out of its physical map, he would find himself groping in the
dark. Geography has worked hard to make one nation out of Ireland; history has. worked
against it. The island of Ireland and the national unit of Ireland simply do not coincide.
In the last analysis the test of nationality is the wish of the people."
These words have emanated from a profound
sense of realism which we in India so lamentably lack.
On the second issue I prefer the partitioning
of India into Muslim India and non-Muslim India as the surest and safest method of
providing for the defence of both. It is certainly the safer of the two alternatives. I
know it will be contended that my fears about the loyalty of the Muslims in the army to a
Free and United India arising from the infection of the two nation theory is only an
imaginary fear. That is no doubt true. That does not militate against the soundness of the
choice I have made. I may be wrong. But I certainly can say without any fear of
contradiction that, to use the words of Burke, it is better to be ridiculed for too great
a credulity than to be ruined by too confident a sense of security. I don't want to leave
things to chance. To leave so important an issue, as the defence of India, to. chance is
to be guilty of the grossest crime.
Nobody will consent to the Muslim demand for
Pakistan unless he is forced to do so. At the same time, it would be a folly not to face
what is inevitable and face it with courage and common sense. Equally would it be a folly
to lose the. Part one can retain in the vain attempt of preserving the whole.
These are the reasons why I hold that if the
Musalman will not yield on the issue of Pakistan then Pakistan must come. So far as I am
concerned the only important question is : Are the Musalmans determined to have Pakistan ?
Or is Pakistan a mere cry ? Is it only a passing mood ? Or does it represent their
permanent aspiration ? On this there may be difference of opinion. Once it becomes certain
that the Muslims want Pakistan there can be no doubt that the wise course would be to
concede the principle of it.
THE PROBLEMS OF PAKISTAN
I
Among the many problems to which the
partition of India into Pakistan and Hindustan must give rise will be the following three
problems:—
(1) The problem of the allocation of the financial
assets and liabilities of the present Government of India,
(2) The problem of the delimitation of the areas,
and
(3) The problem of the transfer of population from
Pakistan to Hindustan and vice versa.
Of these problems the first is consequential,
in the sense, that it would be worth while to consider it only when the partition of India
has been agreed to by the parties concerned. The two other problems stand on a different
footing. They are conditions precedent to Pakistan in the sense that there are many people
who will not make up their mind on Pakistan unless they are satisfied that some reasonable
and just solution of them is possible. I will, therefore, confine myself to the
consideration only of the last two problems of Pakistan.
II
On the question of the boundaries of Pakistan
we have had so far no clear and authoritative statement from the Muslim League. In fact it
is one of the complaints made by the Hindus that while Mr. Jinnah has been carrying on a
whirlwind campaign in favour of Pakistan, which has resulted in fouling the political
atmosphere in the country, Mr. Jinnah has not thought fit to inform his critics of the
details regarding the boundaries of his proposed Pakistan. Mr. Jinnah's argument has all
along been that any discussion regarding the boundaries of Pakistan is premature and that
the boundaries of Pakistan will be a matter for discussion when the principle of Pakistan
has been admitted. It may be a good rhetorical answer, but it certainly does not help
those who wish to apply their mind without taking sides to offer whatever help they can to
bring about a peaceful solution of this problem. Mr. Jinnah seems to be under the
impression that if a person is committed to the principle of Pakistan he will be bound to
accept Mr. Jinnah's plan of Pakistan. There cannot be a greater mistake than this. A
person may accept the principle of Pakistan, which only means the partition of India. But
it is difficult to understand how the acceptance of this principle can commit him to Mr.
Jinnah's plan of Pakistan. Indeed if no plan of Pakistan is satisfactory to him he will be
quite free to oppose any form of Pakistan although he may be in favour of the principle of
Pakistan. The plan of Pakistan and the principle of Pakistan are therefore two quite
distinct propositions. There is nothing wrong in this view. By way of illustration it may
be said that the principle of self-determination is like an explosive substance. One may
agree in principle to its use when the necessity and urgency of the occasion is proved.
But no one can consent to the use of the dynamite without first knowing the area that is
intended to be blown up. If the dynamite is going to blow up the whole structure or if it
is not possible to localize its application to a particular part he may well refuse to
apply the dynamite and prefer to use some other means of solving the problem.
Specifications of boundary lines seem therefore to be an essential preliminary for working
out in concrete shape the principle of Pakistan. Equally essential it is for a bona fide
protagonist of Pakistan not to hide from the public the necessary particulars of the
scheme of Pakistan. Such contumacy and obstinacy as shown by Mr. Jinnah in refusing to
declare the boundaries of his Pakistan is unforgivable in a statesman. Nevertheless those
who are interested in solving the question of Pakistan need not wait to resolve the
problems of Pakistan until Mr. Jinnah condescends to give full details. Only one has to
carry on the argument on the basis of certain assumptions. In this discussion I will
assume that what the Muslim League desires is that the boundaries of the Western Pakistan
should be the present boundaries of the Provinces of the North-West Frontier, the Punjab,
Sind and Baluchistan, and that the boundaries of Eastern Pakistan should be the boundaries
of the present Province of Bengal with a few districts of Assam thrown in.
Ill
The question for consideration therefore is :
Is this a just claim ? The claim is said to be founded on the principle of
self-determination. To be able to assess the justice of this claim it is necessary to have
a clear understanding of the scope and limitations of the principle of self-determination.
Unfortunately, there seems to be a complete lack of such an understanding. It is therefore
necessary to begin with the question : What is the de facto and de jure' connotation of
this principle of self-determination ? The term self-determination has become current
since the last few years. But it describes something which is much older. The idea
underlying self-determination has developed along two different lines. During the 19th
century self-determination meant the right to establish a form of government in accordance
with the wishes of the people. Secondly, self-determination has meant the right to obtain
national independence from an alien race irrespective of the form of government. The
agitation for Pakistan has reference to self-determination in its second aspect.
Confining the discussion to this aspect of
Pakistan it seems to me essential that the following points regarding the issue of
self-determination should be borne in mind.
In the first place, self-determination must
be by the people. This point is too simple even to need mention. But it has become
necessary to emphasize it. Both the Muslim League and the Hindu Maha Sabha seem to be
playing fast and loose with the idea of self-determination. An area is claimed by the
Muslim League for inclusion in Pakistan because the
people of the area are Muslims. An area is also claimed for being included in Pakistan
because the ruler of the area is a Muslim though the majority of the people of that area
are non-Muslims. The Muslim League is claiming the benefit of self-determination in India.
At the same time the League is opposed to self-determination being applied to Palestine.
The League claims Kashmir as a Muslim State because the majority of people are Muslims and
also Hyderabad because the ruler is Muslim. In like manner the Hindu Maha Sabha claims an
area to be included in Hindustan because the people of the area are non-Muslims. It also
comes forward to claim an area to be a part of Hindustan because the ruler is a Hindu
though the majority of the people are Muslims. Such strange and conflicting claims are
entirely due to the fact that either the parties to Pakistan, namely, the Hindus and the
Muslims do not understand what self-determination means or are busy in perverting the
principle of self-determination to enable them to justify themselves in carrying out the
organized territorial loot in which they now seem to be engaged. India will be thrown into
a state of utter confusion whenever the question of reorganization of its territories
comes up for consideration if people have no exact notions as to what self-determination
involves and have not the honesty to stand by the principle and take the consequences
whatever they be. It is, therefore, well to emphasize what might be regarded as too simple
to require mention, namely, that self-determination is a determination by the people and
by nobody else.
The second point to note is the degree of
imperative character with which the principle of self-determination can be said to be
invested. As has been said by Mr. O' Connor 11[f.11] :
" The doctrine of self-determination is
not a universal principle at all. The most that can be said about it is that generally
speaking, it is a sound working rule, founded upon justice, making for harmony and peace
and for the development of people in their own fashion, which, again generally speaking,
is the best fashion. But it must yield to circumstances, of which size and geographical
situation are some of the most important. Whether the rule should prevail against the
circumstances or the circumstances against the rule can be determined only by the
application of one's common sense or sense of justice, or, as a Benthamite would prefer to
put it, by reference to the greatest good of the greatest number— all these three, if
properly understood, are really different methods of expressing the same thing. In solving
a particular case very great difficulties may arise. There are facts one way and facts
another way. Facts of one kind may make a special appeal to some minds, little or none to
others. The problem may be of the kind that is called imponderable, that is to say, no
definite conclusion that will be accepted by the generality of the mankind may be
possible. There are cases in which it is no more possible to say that a nation is right in
its claim to interfere with the self-determination of another nation than that it is to
say that it is wrong. It is a matter of opinion, upon which honest and impartial minds may
differ."
There are two reasons why this must be so.
Firstly, nationality is not such a sacrosanct and absolute principle as to give it the
character of a categorical imperative, over-riding every other consideration. Secondly,
separation is not quite so essential for the maintenance and preservation of a distinct
nationality.
There is a third point to be borne in mind in
connection with the issue of self-determination. Self-determination for a nationality may
take the form of cultural independence or may take the form of territorial independence.
Which form it can take must depend upon the territorial layout of the population. If a
nationality lives in easily severable and contiguous areas, other things being equal, a
case can be made out for territorial independence. But where owing to an inextricable
intermingling the nationalities are so mixed up that the areas they occupy are not easily
severable, then all that they can be entitled to is cultural independence. Territorial
separation in a case like this is an impossibility. They are doomed to live together. The
only other alternative they have is to migrate.
IV
Having defined the scope and limitations of
the idea of self-determination we can now proceed to deal with the question of boundaries
of Pakistan. How does the claim of the Muslim League for the present boundary to remain
the boundaries of Pakistan stand in the light of these considerations ? The answer to this
question seems to me quite clear. The geographical layout seems to decide the issue. No
special pleading of any kind is required. In the case of the North-West Frontier Province,
Baluchistan and Sind, the Hindus and the Muslims are intermixed. In these Provinces a case
for territorial separation for the Hindus seems to be impossible. They must remain content
with cultural independence and such political safeguards as may be devised for their
safety. The case of the Punjab and Bengal stands on a different footing. A glance at the
map shows that the layout of the population of the Hindus and the Muslims in these two
Provinces is totally different from what one finds in the other three Provinces. The
non-Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal are not found living in small islands in the midst of
and surrounded by a vast Muslim population spread over the entire surface as is the case
with the North-West Frontier Province, Baluchistan and Sind. In Bengal and the Punjab the
Hindus occupy two different areas contiguous and severable. In these circumstances, there
is no reason for conceding what the Muslim League seems to demand, namely, that the
present boundaries of the Punjab and Bengal shall continue to be the boundaries of Western
Pakistan and Eastern Pakistan.
Two conclusions necessarily follow from the
foregoing discussion. One is that the non-Muslims of the Punjab and Bengal have a case for
exclusion from Pakistan by territorial severance of the areas they occupy. The other is
that the non-Muslims of North-West Frontier Province, Baluchistan and Sind have no case
for exclusion and are only entitled to cultural independence and political safeguards. To
put the same thing in a different way it may be said that the Muslim League claim for
demanding that the boundaries of Sind, North-West Frontier and Baluchistan shall remain as
they are cannot be opposed. But that in the case of the Punjab and Bengal such a claim is
untenable and that the non-Muslims of these Provinces, if they desire, can claim that the
territory they occupy should be excluded by a redrawing of the boundaries of these two
Provinces.
V
One should have thought that such a claim by
the non-Muslim minorities of the Punjab and Bengal for the redrawing of the boundaries
would be regarded by the Muslim League as a just and reasonable claim. The possibility of
the redrawing of boundaries was admitted in the Lahore Resolution of the Muslim League
passed in March 1940. The Resolution 12[f.12] said :—
" The establishment of completely
independent States formed by demarcating geographically contiguous units into regions
which shall be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary,
that the areas in which the Musalmans are numerically in a majority, as in the
north-western and eastern zones of India, shall be grouped together to constitute
independent States as Muslim free national homelands in which the constituent units shall
be autonomous and sovereign."
That this continued to be the position of the
Muslim League is clear from the resolution passed by the Muslim League on the Cripps
Proposals as anyone who cares to read it will know. But there are indications that Mr.
Jinnah has changed his view. At a public meeting held on 16th November 1942in Jullunder
Mr. Jinnah is reported to have expressed himself in the following terms:—
" The latest trick—1 call it
nothing but a trick—to puzzle and to mislead the ignorant masses purposely, and those
playing the game understand it, is, why should the right of self-determination be confined
to Muslims only and why not extend it to other communities ? Having said that all have the
right of self-determination, they say the Punjab must be divided into so many bits ;
likewise the North-West Frontier Province and Sind. Thus there will be hundreds of
Pakistans.
" Who is the author of this new formula
that every community has the right of self-determination all over India ? Either it is
colossal ignorance or mischief and trick. Let me give them a reply, that the Musalmans
claim the right of self-determination because they are a national group on a given
territory which is their homeland and in the zones where they are in a majority. Have you
known anywhere in history that national groups scattered all over have been given a State
? Where are you going to get a State for them ? In that case you have got 14 per cent.
Muslims in the United Provinces. Why not have a State for them ? Muslims in the United
Provinces are not a national group; they are scattered. Therefore in constitutional
language they are characterized as a sub-national group who cannot expect anything more
than what is due from any civilized Government to a minority. I hope I have made the
position clear. The Muslims are not a sub-national group; it is their birthright to claim
and exercise the right of self-determination."
Mr. Jinnah has completely missed the point.
The point raised by his critics was not with regard to the non-Muslim minorities in
general. It had reference to the non-Muslim minorities in the Punjab and Bengal. Does Mr.
Jinnah propose to dispose of the case of non-Muslim minorities who occupy a compact and an
easily severable territory by his theory of a sub-nation ? If that is so, then one is
bound to say that a proposition cruder than his it would be difficult to find in any
political literature. The concept of a sub-nation is unheard of. It is not only an
ingenious concept but it is also a preposterous concept. What does the theory of a
subnation connote ? If I understand its implications correctly, it means a sub-nation must
not be severed from the nation to which it belongs even when severance is possible: it
means that the relations between a nation and a sub-nation are no higher than the
relations which subsist between a man and his chattels, or between property and its
incidents. Chattels go with the owner, incidents go with property, so a sub-nation goes
with a nation. Such is the chain of reasoning in Mr. Jinnah's argument. But does Mr.
Jinnah seriously wish to argue that the Hindus of the Punjab and Bengal are only chattels
so that they must always go wherever the Muslims of the Punjab and the Muslims of Bengal
choose to drive them ? Such an argument will be too absurd to be entertained by any
reasonable man. It is also the most illogical argument and certainly it should not be
difficult for so mature a lawyer as Mr. Jinnah, to see the illogicality of it. If a
numerically smaller nation is only a sub-nation in relation to a numerically larger nation
and has no right to territorial separation, why can it not be said that taking India as a
whole the Hindus are a nation and the Muslims a sub-nation and as a sub-nation they have
no right to self-determination or territorial separation ?
Already there exists a certain amount of
suspicion with regard to the banafides of Pakistan. Rightly or wrongly, most people
suspect that Pakistan is pregnant with mischief. They think that it has two motives, one
immediate, the other ultimate. The immediate motive, it is said, is to join with the
neighbouring Muslim countries and form a Muslim Federation. The ultimate motive is for the
Muslim Federation to invade Hindustan and conquer or rather reconquer the Hindu and
re-establish Muslim Empire in India. Others think that Pakistan is the culmination of the
scheme of hostages which lay behind the demand, put forth by Mr. Jinnah in his fourteen
points, for the creation of separate Muslim Provinces. Nobody can fathom the mind of the
Muslims and reach the real motives that lie behind their demand for Pakistan. The Hindu
opponents of Pakistan if they suspect that the real motives of the Muslims are different
from the apparent ones, may take note of them and plan accordingly. They cannot oppose
Pakistan because the motives behind it are bad. But they are entitled to ask Mr. Jinnah,
Why does he want to have a communal problem within Pakistan ? However vicious may be the
motives behind Pakistan it should possess at least one virtue. The ideal of Pakistan
should be not to have a communal problem inside it. This is the least of virtues one can
expect from Pakistan. If Pakistan is to be plagued by a communal problem in the same way
as India has been, why have Pakistan at all ? It can be welcomed only if it provides an
escape from the communal problem. The way to avoid it is to arrange the boundaries in such
a way that it will be an ethnic State without a minority and a majority pitched against
each other. Fortunately it can be made into an ethnic State if only Mr. Jinnah will allow
it. Unfortunately Mr. Jinnah objects to it. Therein lies the chief cause for suspicion and
Mr. Jinnah, instead of removing it, is deepening it by such absurd, illogical and
artificial distinctions as nations and sub-nations.
Rather than resort to such absurd and
illogical propositions and defend what is indefensible and oppose what is just, would it
not be better for Mr. Jinnah to do what Sir Edward Carson did in the matter of the
delimitation of the boundaries of Ulster ? As all those who know the vicissitudes through
which the Irish Home Rule question passed know that it was at the Craigavon meeting held
on 23rd September 1911 that Sir Edward Carson formulated his policy that in Ulster there
will be a government of Imperial Parliament or a Government of Ulster but never a Home
Rule Government. As the Imperial Parliament was proposing to withdraw its government, this
policy meant the establishment of a provisional government for Ulster. This policy was
embodied in a resolution passed at a joint meeting of delegates representing the Ulster
Unionist Council, the County Grand Orange Lodges and Unionist Clubs held in Belfast on
25th September 1911. The Provisional Government of Ulster was to come into force on the
day of the passing of the Home Rule Bill. An important feature of this policy was to
invest the Provisional Government with a jurisdiction over all " those districts
which they (Ulsterites) could control."
The phrase " those districts which they
could control " was no doubt meant to include the whole of the administrative
division of Ulster. Now this administrative division of Ulster included nine counties. Of
these three were overwhelmingly Catholic. This meant the compulsory retention of the three
Catholic counties under Ulster against their wishes. But what did Sir Edward Carson do in
the end ? It did not take long for Sir Edward Carson to discover that Ulster with three
overwhelmingly Catholic districts would be a liability, and with all the courage of a true
leader he came out with a declaration that he proposed to cut down his losses and make
Ulster safe. In his speech in the House of Commons on the 18th of May 1920 he announced
that he was content with six counties only. The speech that he made on that occasion
giving his reasons why he was content only with six counties is worth quoting. This is
what he said 14[f.14] :—
" The truth is that we came to the
conclusion after many anxious hours and anxious days of going into the whole matter,
almost parish by parish and townland by townland, that we would have no chance of
successfully starting a Parliament in Belfast which would be responsible for the
government of Donegal, Caven and Monaghan. It would be perfectly idle for us to come here
and pretend that we should be in a position to do so. We should like to have the very
largest areas possible, naturally. That is a system of land grabbing that prevails in all
countries for widening the jurisdiction of the various governments that are set up ; but
there is no use in our undertaking a government which we know would be a failure if we
were saddled with these three counties."
These are wise, sagacious and most courageous
words. The situation in which they were uttered has a close parallel with the situation
that is likely to be created in the Punjab and Bengal by the application of the principle
of Pakistan. The Muslim League and Mr. Jinnah if they want a peaceful Pakistan should not
forget to take note of them. It is no use asking the non-Muslim minorities in the Punjab
and Bengal to be satisfied with safeguards. If the Musalmans are not prepared to be
content with safeguards against the tyranny of Hindu majority why should the Hindu
minorities be asked to be satisfied with the safeguards against the tyranny of the Muslim
majority ? If the Musalmans can say to the Hindus " Damn your safeguards, we don't
want to be ruled by you "—an argument which Carson used against Redmond—the
same argument can be returned by the Hindus of the Punjab and Bengal against the Muslim
offer to be content with safeguards.
The point is that this attitude is not
calculated to lead to a peaceful solution of the problem of Pakistan. Sabre-rattling or
show of force will not do. In the first place, this is a game which two can play. In the
second place, arms may be an element of strength. But to have arms is not enough. As
Rousseau said : " The strongest is never strong enough to be always master, unless he
transforms his might into right, and obedience into duty." Only ethics can convert
might into right and obedience into duty. The League must see that its claim for Pakistan
is founded on ethics.
VI
So much for the problem of boundaries. I will
now turn to the problem of the minorities which must remain within Pakistan even after
boundaries are redrawn. There are two methods of protecting their interests.
First is to provide safeguards in the
constitution for the protection of the political and cultural rights of the minorities. To
Indians this is a familiar matter and it is unnecessary to enlarge upon it.
Second is to provide for their transfer from
Pakistan to Hindustan. Many people prefer this solution and would be ready and willing to
consent to Pakistan if it can be shown that an exchange of population is possible. But
they regard this as a staggering and a baffling problem. This no doubt is the sign of a
panic-stricken mind. If the matter is considered in a cool and calm temper it will be
found that the problem is neither staggering nor baffling.
To begin with consider the dimensions of the
problem. On what scale is this transfer going to be ? In determining the scale one is
bound to take into account three considerations. In the first place, if the boundaries of
the Punjab and Bengal are redrawn there will be no question of transfer of population so
far as these two Provinces are concerned. In the second place, the Musalmans residing in
Hindustan do not propose to migrate to Pakistan nor does the League want their transfer. In the third place, the Hindus in the North-West
Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan do not want to migrate. If these assumptions are
correct, the problem of transfer of population is far from being a staggering problem.
Indeed it is so small that there is no need to regard it as a problem at all.
Assuming it does become a problem, will it be
a baffling problem ? Experience shows that it is not a problem which it is impossible to
solve. To devise a solution for such a problem it might be well to begin by asking what
are the possible difficulties that are likely to arise in the way of a person migrating
from one area to another on account of political changes. The following are obvious enough
: (1) The machinery for effecting and facilitating the transfer of population. (2)
Prohibition by Government against migration. (3) Levy by Government of heavy taxation on
the transfer of goods by the migrating family. (4) The impossibility for a migrating
family to carry with it to its new home its immovable property. (5) The difficulty of
obviating a resort to unfair practices with a view to depress unduly the value of the
property of the migrating family. (6) The fear of having to make good the loss by not
being able to realize the full value of the property by sale in the market. (7) The
difficulty of realizing pensionary and other charges due to the migrating family from the
country of departure. (8) The difficulty of fixing the currency in which payment is to be
made. If these difficulties are removed the way to the transfer of population becomes
clear.
The first three difficulties can be easily
removed by the two States of Pakistan and Hindustan agreeing to a treaty embodying an
article in some such terms as follows :—
" The Governments of Pakistan and
Hindustan agree to appoint a Commission consisting of equal number of representatives and
presided over by a person who is approved by both and who is not a national of either.
" The expense of the Commission and of
its Committees both on account of its maintenance and its operation shall be borne by the
two Governments in equal proportion.
" The Government of Pakistan and the
Government of Hindustan hereby agree to grant
to all their nationals within their territories who belong to ethnic minorities the right
to express their desire to emigrate.
" The Governments of the States above
mentioned undertake to facilitate in every way the exercise of this right and to interpose
no obstacles, directly or indirectly, to freedom of emigration. All laws and regulations
whatsoever which conflict with freedom of emigration shall be considered as null and
void."
The fourth and the fifth difficulties which
relate to transfer of property can be effectually met by including in the treaty articles
the following terms:
" Those who, in pursuance of these
articles, determine to take advantage of the right to migrate shall have the right to
carry with them or to have transported their movable property of any kind without any duty
being imposed upon them on this account.
"So far as immovable property is
concerned it shall be liquidated by the Commission in accordance with the following
provisions:
(1) The Commission shall appoint a Committee
of Experts to estimate the value of the immovable property of the emigrant The emigrant
interested shall have a representative chosen by him on the Committee.
(2) The Commission shall take necessary
measures with a view to the sale of immovable property of the emigrant"
As for the rest of the difficulties relating
to reimbursement for loss, for payment of pensionary and charges for specifying the
currency in which payments are to be made the following articles in the treaty should be
sufficient to meet them :
" (1) The difference in the estimated
value and the sale price of the immovable property of the emigrant shall be paid in to the
Commission by the Government of the country of departure as soon as the former has
notified it of the resulting deficiency. One-fourth of this payment may be made in the
money of the country of departure and three-fourths in gold or short term gold bonds.
" (2) The Commission shall advance to
the emigrants the value of their immovable property determined as above.
" (3) All civil or military pensions
acquired by an emigrant at the dale of the signature of the present treaty shall be
capitalized at the charge of the debtor Government, which must pay the amount to the
Commission for the account of its owners.
" (4) The funds necessary to facilitate
emigration shall be advanced by the States interested in the Commission."
Are not these provisions sufficient to
overcome the difficulties regarding transfer of population ? There are of course other
difficulties. But even those are not insuperable. They involve questions of policy. The
first question is : is the transfer of population to be compulsory or is it to be
voluntary ? The second is : is this right to State-aided transfer to be open to all or is
it to be restricted to any particular class of persons ? The third is : how long is
Government going to remain liable to be bound by these provisions, particularly the
provision for making good the loss on the sale of immovable property ? Should the
provisions be made subject to a time limit or should the liability be continued
indefinitely ?
With regard to the first point, both are
possible and there are instances of both having been put into effect. The transfer of
population between Greece and Bulgaria was on a voluntary basis while that between Greece
and Turkey was on a compulsory basis. Compulsory transfer strikes one as being prima facie
wrong. It would not be fair to compel a man to change his ancestral habitat if he does not
wish to, unless the peace and tranquility of the State is likely to be put in jeopardy by
his continuing to live where he is or such transfer becomes necessary in his own interest.
What is required is that those who want to transfer should be able to do so without
impediment and without loss. I am therefore of opinion that transfer should not be forced
but should be left open for those who declare their intention to transfer.
As to the second point, it is obvious that
only members of a minority can be allowed to take advantage of the scheme of State-aided
transfer. But even this restriction may not be sufficient to exclude all those who ought
not to get the benefit of this scheme. It must be confined to certain well defined
minorities who on account of ethnic or religious differences are sure to be subjected to
discrimination or victimization.
The third point is important and is likely to
give rise to serious difference of opinion. On a fair view of the matter it can be said
that it is quite unreasonable to compel a Government to keep open for an indefinite period
the option to migrate at Government cost .There is nothing unfair in telling a person that
if he wants to take advantage of the
provisions of the scheme of State-aided migration contained in the forgoing articles, he
must exercise his option to migrate within a stated period and that if he decides to
migrate after the period has elapsed he will be free to migrate but it will have to be at
his own cost and without the aid of the State There
is no inequity in thus limiting the right to State aid. State-aid becomes a necessary part
of the scheme because the migration is a resultant consequence of political changes over
which individual citizens have no control. But migration may not be the result of
political change. lt may be for other causes, and when it is for other causes, aid to the
emigrant cannot bean obligation on the State. The only way to determine whether migration
is for political reasons or for private reasons is to relate it to a definite point of
time. When it takes place with in a defined period from the happening of a political
change it may be presumed open for an indefinite period the option to migrate at
Government cost. There is nothing unfair in telling a person that if he wants to take
advantage of the provisions of the scheme of State-aided migration contained in the
foregoing articles, he must exercise his option to migrate within a stated period and that
if he decides to migrate after the period has elapsed he will be free to migrate but it
will have to be at his own cost and without the aid of the State. There is no inequity in
thus limiting the right to State-aid. State-aid becomes a necessary part of the scheme
because the migration is a resultant consequence of political changes over which
individual citizens have no control. But migration may not be the result of political
change. It may be for other causes, and when it is for other causes, aid to the emigrant
cannot be an obligation on the State. The only way to determine whether migration is for
political reasons or for private reasons is to relate it to a definite point of time. When
it takes place within a defined period from the happening of a political change it may be
presumed to be political. When it occurs after the period it may be presumed to be for
private reasons. There is nothing unjust in this. The same rule of presumption governs the
cases of civil servants who, when a political change takes place, are allowed to retire on
proportionate pensions if they retire within a given period but not if they retire after
it has lapsed.
If the policy in these matters is as I
suggest it should be, it may be given effect to by the inclusion of the following articles
in the treaty:
" The right to voluntary emigration may
be exercised under this treaty by any person belonging to an ethnic minority who is over
18 years of age.
" A declaration made before the
Commission shall be sufficient evidence of intention to exercise the right.
" The choice of the husband shall carry
with it that of the wife, the option of parents or guardians that of their children or
wards aged less than 18 years.
" The right to the benefit provided by
this treaty shall lapse if the option to migrate is not exercised within a period of 5
years from the date of signing the treaty.
" The duties of the Commission shall be
terminated within six months after the expiration of the period of five years from the
date when the Commission starts to function."
What about the cost ? The question of cost
will be important only if the transfer is to be compulsory. A scheme of voluntary transfer
cannot place a very heavy financial burden on the State. Men love property more than
liberty. Many will prefer to endure tyranny at the hands of their political masters than
change the habitat in which they are rooted. As Adam Smith said, of all the things man is
the most difficult cargo to transport. Cost therefore need not frighten anybody.
What about its workability ? The scheme is
not new. It has been tried and found workable. It was put into effect after the last
European War, to bring about a transfer 15 [f.15] of population between Greece and Bulgaria and Turkey and
Greece. Nobody can deny that it has worked, has been tried and found workable. The scheme
I have outlined is a copy of the same scheme. It had the effect of bringing about a
transfer* of population between Greece and Bulgaria and Turkey and Greece. Nobody can deny
that it was worked with signal success. What succeeded elsewhere may well be expected to
succeed in India.
The issue of Pakistan is far from simple. But
it is not so difficult as it is made out to be provided the principle and the ethics of it
are agreed upon. If it is difficult it is only because it is heart-rending and nobody
wishes to think of its problems and their solutions as the very idea of it is so painful.
But once sentiment is banished and it is decided that there shall be Pakistan, the
problems arising out of it are neither staggering nor baffling.
WHO CAN DECIDE ?
There are two sides to the question of
Pakistan, the Hindu side and the Muslim side. This cannot be avoided. Unfortunately
however the attitude of both is far from rational. Both are deeply embedded in sentiment.
The layers of this sentiment are so thick that reason at present finds it extremely
difficult to penetrate. Whether these opposing sentiments will wither away or they will
thicken, time and circumstances alone can tell. How long Indians will have to wait for the
melting of the snow no one can prophesy. But one thing is certain that 'until this snow
melts freedom will have to be put in cold storage. I am sure there must be many millions
of thinking Indians who are dead opposed to this indefinite postponement of Indian freedom
till an ideal and a permanent solution of Pakistan is found. I am one of them. I am one of
those who hold that if Pakistan is a problem and not a pose there is no escape and a
solution must be found for it. I am one of those who believe that what is inevitable must
be faced. There is no use burying one's head in the sand and refusing to take notice of
what is happening round about because the sound of it hurts one's sentiments. I am also
one of those who believe that one must, if one can, be ready with a solution long before
the hour of decision arrives. It is wise to build a bridge if one knows that one will be
forced to cross the river.
The principal problem of Pakistan is : who
can decide whether there shall or shall not be Pakistan ? I have thought over the subject
for the last three years, and I have come to some conclusions as to the proper answer to
this question. These conclusions I would like to share with others interested in the
solution of the problem so that they may be further explored. To give clarity to my
conclusions, I have thought that it would serve the purpose better if I were to put them,
in the form of an Act of Parliament. The following is the draft of the Act which embodies
my conclusions:—
Government
of India (Preliminary Provisions) Act
Be it enacted by the King's most Excellent
Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and
Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same as follows
:—
I.—(1) If within six months from the
date appointed in this behalf a majority of the Muslim members of the Legislatures of the
Provinces of the North-West Frontier, the Punjab, Sind and Bengal pass a resolution that
the predominantly Muslim areas be separated from British India, His Majesty shall cause a
poll to be taken on that question of the Muslim and the non-Muslim electors of these
Provinces and of Baluchistan in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
(2) The question shall be submitted to the
electors in these Provinces in the following form :— (i) Are you in favour of
separation from British India ? (U) Are you against separation ?
(3) The poll of Muslim and non-Muslim
electors shall be taken separately.
II.—(1) If on a result of the poll, a
majority of Muslim electors are found to be in favour of separation and a majority of
non-Muslim electors against separation, His Majesty shall by proclamation appoint a
Boundary Commission for the purpose of preparing a list of such districts and areas in
these Provinces in which a majority of inhabitants are Muslims. Such districts and areas
shall be called Scheduled Districts.
(2) The Scheduled Districts shall be
collectively designated as Pakistan and the rest of British India as Hindustan. The
Scheduled Districts lying in the North-west shall be called the State of Western Pakistan
and those lying in the North-east shall be called Eastern Pakistan.
///.—(1) After the findings of the
Boundary Commission have become final either by agreement or the award of an Arbitrator,
His Majesty shall cause another poll to be taken of the electors of the Scheduled
Districts.
(2) The following shall be the form of the
questions submitted to the electors :— (i) Are you in favour of separation forthwith
? (U) Are you against separation forthwith ?
IV.—(I ) If the majority is in favour of
separation forthwith it shall be lawful for His Majesty to make arrangements for the
framing of two separate constitutions, one for Pakistan and the other for Hindustan.
(2) The New States of Pakistan and Hindustan
shall commence to function as separate States on the day appointed by His Majesty by
proclamation issued in that behalf.
(3) If the majority are against separation
forthwith it shall be lawful for His Majesty to make arrangements for the framing of a
single constitution for British India as a whole.
V.— No motion for the separation of
Pakistan. lf the poll under the last preceding section has been against separation
forthwith and no motion for incorporation of Pakistan into Hindustan if the poll under the
last preceding section has been in favour of separation forthwith shall be entertained
until ten years have elapsed from the date appointed by His Majesty for putting into
effect the new constitution for British India or the two separate constitutions for
Pakistan and Hindustan.
VI.—(1) In the event of two separate
constitutions coming into existence under Section Four it shall be lawful for His Majesty
to establish as soon as may be after the appointed day, a Council of India with a view to
the eventual establishment of a constitution for the whole of British India, and to
bringing about harmonious action between the Legislatures and Governments of Pakistan and
Hindustan, and to the promotion of mutual intercourse and uniformity in relation to
matters affecting the whole of British India, and to providing for the administration of
services which the two parliaments mutually agree should be administered uniformly
throughout the whole of British India, or which by virtue of this Act are to be so
administered.
(2) Subject as hereinafter provided, the
Council of India shall consist of a President nominated in accordance with instructions
from His Majesty and forty other persons, of whom twenty shall be members representing
Pakistan and twenty shall be members representing Hindustan.
(3) The members of the Council of India shall
be elected in each case by the members of the Lower Houses of the Parliament of Pakistan
or Hindustan.
(4) The election of members of the Council of
India shall be the first business of the Legislatures of Pakistan and Hindustan.
(5) A member of the Council shall, on ceasing
to be a member of that House of the Legislature of Pakistan or Hindustan by which he was
elected a member of the Council, cease to be a member of the Council : Provided that, on
the dissolution of the Legislature of Pakistan or Hindustan, the persons who are members
of the Council shall continue to hold office as members of the Council until a new
election has taken place and shall then retire unless re-elected.
(6) The President of the Council shall
preside at each meeting of the Council at which he is present and shall be entitled to
vote in case of an equality of votes, but not otherwise.
(7) The first meeting of the Council shall be
held at such time and place as may be appointed by the President.
(8)
The Council may act notwithstanding a deficiency in their number, and the quorum of the
Council shall be fifteen.
(9) Subject as aforesaid, the Council may
regulate their own procedure, including the delegation of powers to committees.
(10) The constitution of the Council of India
may from time to time be varied by identical Acts passed by the Legislature of Pakistan
and the Legislature of Hindustan, and the Acts may provide for all or any of the members
of the Council of India being elected by parliamentary electors, and determine the
constituencies by which the several elective members are to be returned and the number of
the members to be returned by the several constituencies and the method of election.
VII.—(1) The Legislatures of Pakistan
and Hindustan may, by identical Acts, delegate to the Council of India any of the powers
of the Legislatures and Government of Pakistan and Hindustan, and such Acts may determine
the manner in which the powers so delegated are to be exercisable by the Council.
(2) The powers of making laws with respect to
railways and waterways shall, as from the day appointed for the operation of the new
constitution, become the powers of the Council of India and not of Pakistan or Hindustan :
Provided that nothing in this subsection shall prevent the Legislature of Pakistan or
Hindustan making laws authorising the construction, extension, or improvement of railways
and waterways where the works to be constructed are situate wholly in Pakistan or
Hindustan as the case may be.
(3) The Council may consider any questions
which may appear in any way to bear on the welfare of both Pakistan and Hindustan, and
may, by resolution, make suggestions in relation thereto as they may think proper, but
suggestions so made shall have no legislative effect.
(4)
It shall be lawful for the Council of India to make recommendations to the Legislatures of
Pakistan and Hindustan as to the advisability of passing identical Acts delegating to the
Council of India the administration of any all-India subject, with a view to avoiding the
necessity of administering them separately in Pakistan or Hindustan.
(5) It shall be lawful for either Legislature
at any time by Act to deprive the delegation to the Council of India of any powers which
are in pursuance of such identical Acts as aforesaid for the time being delegated to the
Council and thereupon the powers in question shall cease to be exercisable by the Council
of India and shall become exercisable in parts of British India within their respective
jurisdictions by the Legislatures and Governments of Pakistan and Hindustan and the
Council shall take such steps as may be necessary to carry out the transfer, including
adjustments of any funds in their hands or at their disposal.
VIII.—(1) If at the end of ten years
after coming into operation of a constitution for British India as prescribed by Section
IV—(3) a petition is presented to His Majesty by a majority of the Muslim members
representing the Scheduled Districts in the Provincial and Central Legislatures demanding
a poll to be taken with regard to the separation of Pakistan from Hindustan, His Majesty
shall cause a poll to be taken. (2) The following shall be the form of the questions
submitted to the electors :— d) Are you in favour of separation of Pakistan from
Hindustan ?
(ii) Are you against the separation of
Pakistan from Hindustan ?
IX.— If the result of the poll is in
favour of separation it shall be lawful for His Majesty to declare by an Order-in-Council
that from a day appointed in that behalf Pakistan shall cease to be a part of British
India, and dissolve the Council of India.
X.—(1) Where two constitutions have come
into existence under circumstances mentioned in Section IV it shall be lawful for His
Majesty to declare by an Order-in-Council that Pakistan shall cease to be a separate State
and shall form part of Hindustan. Provided that no such order shall be made until ten
years have elapsed from the commencement of the separate constitution for Pakistan.
Provided also that no such declaration shall be made unless the Popular Legislatures of
Pakistan and Hindustan have passed Constituent Acts as are provided for in Section
X—(2).
(2) The popular Legislatures of Pakistan and
Hindustan may, by identical Acts agreed to by an absolute majority of members at the third
reading (hereinafter referred to as Constituent Acts), establish, in lieu of the Council
of India, a Legislature for United India, and may determine the number of members thereof
and the manner in which the members are to be appointed or elected and the constituencies
for which the several elective members are to be returned, and the number of members to be
returned by the several constituencies, and the method of appointment or election, and the
relations of the two Houses if provided for to one another.
XI.—(1) On the date of the union of
Pakistan and Hindustan the Council of India shall cease to exist and there shall be
transferred to the Legislature and Government of India all powers then exercisable by the
Council of India.
(2) There shall also be transferred to the
Legislature and Government of British India all the powers and duties of the Legislatures
and Government of Pakistan and Hindustan, including all powers as to taxation, and those
Legislatures and Government shall cease to exist.
XII.—(1) A poll under this Act shall be
taken by ballot in the same manner so far as possible as a poll of electors for the
election of a member to serve in a Legislature and His Majesty may make rules adopting the
election laws for the purpose of the taking of the poll.
(2) An elector shall not vote more than once
at the poll, although registered in more than one place.
(3) Elector means every adult male and female
residing in the Provinces of North-West Frontier, the Punjab, Sind, and Bengal and in
Baluchistan.
XIII.— This Act may be called the Indian
Constitution
(Preliminary Provisions) Act, I94 .
I do not think .that any detailed explanation
is necessary for the reader to follow and grasp the conclusions I have endeavoured to
embody in this skeleton Act. Perhaps it might be advantageous if I bring out some of the
salient features of the proposals to which the projected statute of Parliament is intended
to give effect by comparing them with the Cripps proposals.
In my opinion it is no use for Indians to ask
and the British Parliament to agree to proceed forthwith to pass an Act conferring
Dominion Status or Independence without first disposing of the issue of Pakistan. The
Pakistan issue must be treated as a preliminary issue and must be disposed of one way or
the other. This is why I have called the proposed Act " The Government of India
(Preliminary Provisions) Act." The issue of Pakistan being one of self-determination
must be decided by the wishes of the people. It is for this that I propose to take a poll
of the Muslims and non-Muslims in the predominantly Muslim Provinces. If the Majority of
the Muslims are in favour of separation and a majority of non-Muslims are against
separation, steps must be taken to delimit the areas wherever it is possible by redrawing
provincial boundaries on ethnic and cultural lines by separating the Muslim majority
districts from the districts in which the majority consists of non-Muslims. A Boundary
Commission is necessary for this purpose. So a Boundary Commission is provided for in the
Act. It would be better if the Boundary Commission could be international in its
composition.
The scheme of separate referenda of Muslims
and non-Muslims is based on two principles which I regard as fundamental. The first is
that a minority can demand safeguards for its protection against the tyranny of the
majority. It can demand them as a condition precedent. But a minority has no right to put
a veto on the right of the majority .to decide on questions of ultimate destiny. This is
the reason why I have confined the referendum on the establishment of Pakistan to Muslims
only. The second is that a communal majority cannot claim a communal minority to submit
itself to its dictates. Only a political majority may be permitted to rule a political
minority. This principle has been modified in India where a communal minority is placed
under a communal majority subject to certain safeguards. But this is as regards the
ordinary question of social, economic and political importance. It has never been conceded
and can never be conceded that a communal majority has a right to dictate to a communal
minority on an issue which is of a constitutional character. That is the reason why I have
provided a separate referendum of non-Muslims only, to decide whether they prefer to go in
Pakistan or come into Hindustan.
After the Boundary Commission has done its
work of delimiting the areas, various possibilities can arise. The Musalmans may stop with
the delimitation of the boundaries of Pakistan. They
may be satisfied that after all the principle of Pakistan has been accepted—which is
what delimitation means. Assuming that the Musalmans are not satisfied with mere
delimitation but want to move in the direction of establishing Pakistan there are two
courses open to them. They may want to establish Pakistan forthwith or they may agree to
live under a common Central Government for a period of say ten years and put the Hindus on
their trial. Hindus will have an opportunity to show that the minorities can trust them.
The Muslims will learn from experience how far their fears of Hindu Raj are justified.
There is another possibility also. The Musalmans of Pakistan having decided to separate
forthwith may after a period become so disgusted with Pakistan that they might desire to
come back and be incorporated in Hindustan and be one people subject to one single
constitution.
These are some of the possibilities I see.
These possibilities should in my judgement be kept open for time and circumstances to have
their effect. It seems to me to be wrong to say to the Musalmans if you want to remain as
part of India then you can never go out or if you want to go then you can never come back.
I have in my scheme kept the door open and have provided for both the possibilities in the
Act (1) for union after a separation of ten years, (2) for separation for ten years and
union there after. I personally prefer the second alternative although I have no strong
views either way. It would be much better that the Musalmans should have the experience of
Pakistan. A union after an experience of Pakistan is bound to be stable and lasting. In
case Pakistan comes into existence forthwith, it seems to me necessary that the separation
should not altogether be a severance, sharp and complete. It is necessary to maintain live
contact between Pakistan and Hindustan so as to prevent any estrangement growing up and
preventing the chances of reunion. A Council of India is accordingly provided for in the
Act. It cannot be mistaken for a federation. It is not even a confederation. Its purpose
is to do nothing more than to serve as a coupling to link Pakistan to Hindustan until they
are united under a single constitution.
Such is my scheme. It is based on a
community-wise plebiscite. The scheme is flexible. It takes account of the fact that the
Hindu sentiment is against it. It also recognizes the fact that the Muslim demand for
Pakistan may only be a passing mood. The scheme is not a divorce. It is only a judicial
separation. It gives to the Hindus a term. They can use it to show that they can be
trusted with authority to rule justly. It gives the Musalmans a term to try out Pakistan.
It might be desirable to compare my proposals
with those of Sir Stafford Cripps. The proposals were given out as a serial story in
parts. The draft Declaration issued on 29th March 1943 contained only the following
:—
" His Majesty's Government therefore
make the following terms:—
(a) Immediately upon cessation of hostilities
steps shall be taken to set up in India in manner described hereafter an elected body
charged with the task of framing a new constitution for India.
(b)
Provision shall be made, as set out below, for participation of Indian States in the
constitution-making body.
(c) His Majesty's Government undertake to
accept and implement forthwith the constitution so framed subject only to:
(i) The right of any province of British
India that is not prepared to accept the new constitution to retain its present
constitutional position, provision being made for its subsequent accession if it so
decides.
With such non-acceding provinces should they
so desire. His Majesty's Government will be prepared to agree upon a new constitution
giving them the same full status as the Indian Union and arrived at by a procedure
analogous to that here laid down."
Particulars of accession and secession were
given in his broadcast. They were in the following terms :—
" That constitution-making body will
have as its object the framing of a single constitution for the whole of India—that
is, of British India, together with such of the Indian States as may decide to join in.
"
But we realize this very simple fact. If you want to persuade a number of people who are
inclined to be antagonistic to enter the same room, it is unwise to tell them that once
they go in there is no way out, they are to be forever locked in together.
" It is much wiser to tell them they can
go in and if they find they can't come to a common decision, then there is nothing to
prevent those who wish, from leaving again by another door. They are much more likely all
to go in if they have knowledge that they can by their free will go out again if they
cannot agree.
" Well, that is what we say to the
provinces of India. Come together to frame a common constitution—if you find after
all your discussion and all the give and take of a constitution-making assembly that you
cannot overcome your differences and that some provinces are still not satisfied with the
constitution, then such provinces can go out and remain out if they wish and just the same
degree of self-government and freedom will be available for them as for the Union itself,
that is to say complete self-government."
To complete the picture further details were
added at the Press Conference. Explaining the plan for accession or secession of provinces
Sir Stafford Cripps said :—
" If at the end of the Constituent
Assembly proceedings, any province or provinces did not wish to accept the new
constitution and join the Union, it was free to keep out—provided the Provincial
Assembly of that province, by a substantial vote say not less than 60 per cent., decided
against accession. If it was less than 60 per cent, the minority could claim a plebiscite
of the whole province for ascertaining the will of the people. In the case of the
plebiscite, a bare majority would be enough. Sir Stafford explained that for completing
accession there would have to be a positive vote from the Provincial Assembly concerned.
The non-acceding province could, if they wanted, combine into a separate union through a
separate Constituent Assembly, but in order to make such a Union practicable they should
be geographically contiguous."
The main difference between my plan and that
of Sir Stafford Cripps is quite obvious. For deciding the issue of accession or secession
which is only another way of saying, will there be or will there not be Pakistan, Sir
Stafford Cripps took the Province as a deciding unit. I have taken community as the
deciding unit. I have no doubt that Sir Stafford adopted a wrong basis. The Province can
be a proper unit if the points of dispute were interprovincial. For instance, if the
points of dispute related to questions such as distribution of taxation, of water, etc.,
one could understand the Province as a whole or a particular majority in that Province
having the right to decide. But the dispute regarding Pakistan is an inter-communal
problem which has involved two communities in the same Province. Further the issue in the
dispute is not on what terms the two communities will agree to associate in a common
political life. The dispute goes deeper and raises the question whether the communities
are prepared at all to associate in a common political life. It is a communal difference
in its essence and can only be decided by a community-wise plebiscite.
IV
I do not claim any originality for the
solution I have proposed. The ideas which underlie it are drawn from three sources, from
the Irish Unity Conference at which Horace Plunket presided, from the Home Rule Amending
Bill of Mr. Asquith and from the Government of Ireland Act of 1920. It will be seen that
my solution of the Pakistan problem is the result of pooled wisdom. Will it be accepted ?
There are four ways of resolving the conflict which is raging round the question of
Pakistan. First is that the British Government should act as the deciding authority.
Second is that the Hindus and the Muslims should agree. Third is to submit the issue to an
International Board of Arbitration and the fourth is to fight it out by a Civil War.
Although India today is a political mad-house
there are I hope enough sane people in the country who would not allow matters to reach
the stage of Civil War. There is no prospect of an agreement between political leaders in
the near future. The A.I.C.C. of the Indian National Congress at a meeting in Allahabad
held in April 1942 on the motion of Mr. Jagat Narayan Lal resolved 16 [f16]not to entertain the proposal for Pakistan. Two other ways
are left to have the problem solved. One is by the people concerned ; the other is by
international arbitration. This is the way I have suggested. I prefer the former. For
various reasons this seems to me the only right course. The leaders having failed to
resolve the dispute it is time it was taken to the people for decision. Indeed, it is
inconceivable how an issue like that of partition of territory and transference of
peoples' allegiance from one government to another can be decided by political leaders.
Such things are no doubt done by conquerors to whom victory in war is sufficient authority
to do what they like with the conquered people. But we are not working under such a
lawless condition. In normal times when constitutional procedure is not in abeyance the
views of political leaders cannot have the effect which the fiats of dictators have. That
would be contrary to the rule of democracy. The highest value that can be put upon the
views of leaders is to regard them as worthy to be placed on the agenda. They cannot
replace or obviate the necessity of having the matter decided by the people. This is the
position which was taken by Sir Stafford Cripps. The stand taken by the Muslim League was,
let there be Pakistan because the Muslim League has decided to have it. That position has
been negatived by the Cripps proposals and
quite rightly. The Muslim League is recognized by the Cripps proposals only to the extent
of having a right to propose that Pakistan as a proposition be considered. It has not been
given the right to decide. Again it does not seem to have been realized that the decision
of an All-India body like the Congress which does not carry with it the active consent of
the majority of the people, immediately affected by the issue of Pakistan, cannot carry
the matter to solution. What good can it do if Mr. Gandhi or Mr. Rajagopalachariar
agreeing or the All-India Congress Committee resolving to concede Pakistan, if it was
opposed by the Hindus of the Punjab, or Bengal. Really speaking it is not the business of
the people of Bombay or Madras to say, ' let there be Pakistan ' It must be left to be
decided by the people who are living in those areas and who will have to bear the
consequences of so violent, so revolutionary and so fundamental a change in the political
and economic system with which their lives and fortunes have been closely bound up for so
many years. A referendum by people in the Pakistan Provinces seems to me the safest and
the most constitutional method of solving the problem of Pakistan.
But I fear that solving the question of
Pakistan by a referendum of the people howsoever attractive may not find much favour with
those who count. Even the Muslim League may not be very enthusiastic about it. This is not
because the proposal is unsound. Quite the contrary. The fact is that there is another
solution which has its own attractions. It calls upon the British Government to establish
Pakistan by the exercise of its sovereign authority. The reason why this solution may be
preferred to that which rests on the consent of the people is that it is simple and
involves no such elaborate procedure as that of a referendum to the people and has none of
the uncertainties involved in a referendum. But there is another ground why it is
preferred, namely, that there is a precedent for it. The precedent is the Irish precedent
and the argument is that if the British Government by virtue of its sovereign authority
divided Ireland and created Ulster why cannot the British Government divide India and
create Pakistan ?
The British Parliament is the most sovereign
legislative body in the world. De L'home, a French writer on English Constitution,
observed that there is nothing the British Parliament cannot do except make man a woman
and woman a man. And although the sovereignty of the British Parliament over the affairs
of the Dominions is limited by the Statute of Westminster it is still unlimited so far as
India is concerned. There is nothing in law to prevent the British Parliament from
proceeding to divide India as it did in the case of Ireland. It can do it, but will it do
it? The question is not one of power but of will.
Those who urge the British Government to
follow the precedent in Ireland should ask what led the British Government to partition
Ireland. Was it the conscience of the British Government which led them to sanction the
course they took or was it forced upon them by circumstances to which they had to yield ?
A student of the history of Irish Home Rule will have to admit that the partition of
Ireland was not sanctioned by conscience but by the force of circumstances. It is not
often clearly realized that no party to the Irish dispute wanted partition of Ireland. Not
even Carson, the Leader of Ulster. Carson was opposed to Home Rule but he was not in
favour of partition. His primary position was to oppose Home Rule and maintain the
integrity of Ireland. It was only as a second line of defence against the imposition of
Home Rule that he insisted on partition. This will be quite clear from his speeches both
inside and outside the House of Commons. Asquith's Government on the other side was
equally opposed to partition. This may be seen from the proceedings in the House of
Commons over the Irish Home Rule Bill of 1912. Twice amendments were moved for the
exclusion of Ulster from the provisions of the Bill, once in the Committee stage by Mr.
Agar-Roberts and again on the third reading by Carson himself. Both the times the
Government opposed and the amendments were lost.
Permanent partition of Ireland was effected
in 1920 by Mr. Lloyd George in his Government of Ireland Act. Many people think that this
was the first time that partition of Ireland was thought of and that it was due to the
dictation of the Conservative—Unionists in the Coalition Government of which Mr.
Lloyd George was the nominal head. It may be true that Mr. Lloyd George succumbed to the
influence of the predominant party in his coalition. But it is not true that partition was
thought of in 1920 for the first time. Nor is it true that the Liberal Party had not
undergone a change and shown its readiness to favour partition as a possible solution. As
a matter of fact partition as a solution came in 1914 six years before Mr. Lloyd George's
Act when the Asquith Government, a purely Liberal Government, was in office. The real
cause which led to the partition of Ireland can be understood only by examining the
factors which made the Liberal Government of Mr. Asquith change its mind. I feel certain
that the factor which brought about this change in the viewpoint of the Liberal Government
was the Military crisis which took place in March 1914 and which is generally referred to
as the " Curragh Incident". A few facts will be sufficient to explain what the
" Curragh Incident " was and how decisive it was in bringing about a change in
the policy of the Asquith Government.
To begin at a convenient point the Irish Home
Rule Bill had gone through all its stages by the end of 1913. Mr. Asquith who had been
challenged that he was proceeding without a mandate from the electorate had however given
an undertaking that the Act would not be given effect to until another general election
had been held. In the ordinary course there would have been a general election in 1915 if
the War had not supervened. But the Ulstermen were not prepared to take their chance in a
general election and started taking active steps to oppose Home Rule. They were not always
very scrupulous in choosing their means and their methods and under the seductive pose
that they were fighting against the Government which was preventing them from remaining
loyal subjects of the King they resorted to means which nobody would hesitate to call
shameless and nefarious. There was one Maginot Line on which the Ulstermen always depended
for defeating Home Rule. That was the House of Lords. But by the Parliament Act of 1911
the House of Lords had become a Wailing Wall neither strong nor high. It had ceased to be
a line of defence to rely upon. Knowing that the Bill might pass notwithstanding its
rejection by the House of Lords, feeling that in the next election Asquith might win, the
Ulstermen had become desperate and were searching for another line of defence. They found
it in the Army. The plan was twofold. It included the project of getting the House of
Lords to hold up the Annual Army Act so as to ensure that there would be no Army in
existence to be used against Ulster. The second project was to spread their
propaganda—That Home Rule will be Home Rule—in the Army with a view to preparing
the Army to disobey the Government in case Government decided to use the Army for forcing
Home Rule on Ireland. The first became unnecessary as they succeeded easily in bringing
about the second. This became clear in March 1914 when there occurred the Curragh
Incident. The Government had reasons to suspect that certain Army depots in Ireland were
likely to be raided by the Unionist Volunteers. On March 20th, order-were sent to Sir
Arthur Paget, Commander-in-Chief of the Forces in Ireland, to take steps to safeguard
these depols. His reply was a telegram to the effect that officers were not prepared to
obey and were resigning their commissions and it was feared that men would refuse to move.
General Sir Hubert Gough had refused to serve against the Ulster Unionists and his example
had been followed by others. The Government realized that the Army had become political, 17[f.17] nay, partisan.
It took fright and decided in favour of partition acting on the well-known maxim that
wisdom is the better part of valour. What made Asquith change his position was not
conscience but the fright of the Army rebelling. The fright was so great that no one
thereafter felt bold enough to challenge the Army and enforce Home Rule without partition.
Can His Majesty's Government be depended upon
to repeat in India what it did in Ireland ? I am unable to answer the question. But two
things I will say. The first thing is that His Majesty's Government knows full well what
have been the consequences of this partition of Ireland. The Irish Free State has become
the most irreconcilable enemy of Great Britain. The enmity knows no limits. The wound
caused by partition will never be healed so long as partition remains a settled fact. The
Partition of Ireland cannot but be said to be morally indefensible inasmuch as it was the
result not of the consent of the people but of superior force. It was as bad as the murder
of Duncan by Macbeth. The blood stains left on His Majesty's Government are as deep as
those on Lady Macbeth and of which Lady Macbeth said that " All the perfumes of
Arabia " had failed to remove the stink. That His Majesty's Government does not like
to be responsible for the execution of another deed of partition is quite clear from its
policy with the Jew-Arab problem in Palestine. It appointed the Peel Commission to
investigate. The Commission recommended partition of Palestine. The Government accepted 18[f.18] it in
principle as the most hopeful line of solving the deadlock. Suddenly the Government
realized the gravity of forcing such a solution on the Arabs and appointed another Royal
Commission called the Woodhead Commission which condemned partition and opened an easy way
to a Government which was anxious to extricate itself from a terrible position. The
partition of Ireland is not a precedent worthy to be followed. It is an ugly incident
which requires to be avoided. It is a warning and not an example. I doubt very much if His
Majesty's Government will partition India on its own authority at the behest of the Muslim
League.
And why should His Majesty's Government
oblige the Muslim League ? In the case of Ulster there was the tie of blood which made a
powerful section of the British politicians take the side of Ulster. It was this tie of
blood which made Lord Curzon say " You are compelling Ulster to divorce her present
husband, to whom she is not unfaithful and you are compelling her to marry someone else
who she cordially dislikes, with whom she does not want to live." There is no such
kinship between His Majesty's Government and the Muslim League and it would be a vain hope
for the League to expect His Majesty's Government to take her side.
The other thing I would like to say is that
it would not be in the interests of the Muslim League to achieve its object by invoking
the authority of His Majesty's Government to bring about the partition of India. In my
judgement more important than getting Pakistan is the procedure to be adopted in bringing
about Pakistan if the object is that after partition Pakistan and Hindustan should
continue as two friendly States with goodwill and no malice towards each other.
What is the procedure which is best suited for
the realization of this end ? Everyone will agree that the procedure must be such that it
must not involve victory to one community and humiliation to the other. The method must be
of peace with honour to both sides. I do not know if there is another solution better
calculated to achieve this end than the decision by a referendum of the people. I have
made my suggestion as to which is the best course. Others also will come forth with
theirs. I cannot say that mine is the best. But whatever the suggestion be unless good
sense as well as a sense of responsibility is brought to bear upon the solution of this
question it will remain a festering sore.
Here I propose to stop. For I feel that I
have said all that I can say about the subject. To use legal language I have drawn the
pleadings. This I may claim to have done at sufficient length. In doing so, I have adopted
that prolix style so dear to the Victorian lawyers, under which the two sides plied one
another with plea and replication, rejoinder and rebutter, surrejoinder and surrebutter
and so on. I have done this deliberately with the object that a full statement of the case
for and against Pakistan may be made. The foregoing pages contain the pleadings. The facts
contained therein are true to the best of my knowledge and belief. I have also given my
findings. It is now for Hindus and Muslims to give theirs.
To help them in their task it might be well to
set out the issues. On the pleadings the following issues seem to be necessary issues:
(1) Is Hindu-Muslim unity necessary for India's political
advancement ? If necessary, is it still possible of realization notwithstanding the new
ideology of the Hindus and the Muslims being two different nations?
(2) If Hindu-Muslim unity is possible, should it be reached by
appeasement or by settlement ?
(3) If it is to be achieved by appeasement, what are the new
concessions that can be offered to the Muslims to obtain their willing co-operation,
without prejudice to other interests ?
(4) (4) If it is to be achieved by a settlement, what are the
terms of that - settlement ? If there
are only two alternatives, (i) Division of India into Pakistan and Hindustan, or (ii)
Fifty-fifty share in Legislature, Executive and the Services, which alternative is
preferable ?
(5) Whether India, if she remained one integral whole, can rely
upon both Hindus and Musalmans to defend her independence, assuming it is won from the
British?
(6) Having regard to the prevailing antagonism between Hindus
and Musalmans and having regard to the new ideology demarcating them as two distinct
nations and postulating an opposition in their ultimate destinies, whether a single
constitution for these two nations can be built in the hope that they will show an
intention to work it and not to stop it ?
(7) On the assumption that the two-nation theory has come to
stay, will not India as one single unit become an incoherent body without organic unity,
incapable of developing into a strong united nation bound by a common faith in a common
destiny and therefore likely to remain a feebler and sickly country, easy to be kept in
perpetual subjection either of the British or-of any other foreign power ?
(8) If India cannot be one united country, is it not better that
Indians should help India in the peaceful dissolution of this incoherent whole into its
natural parts, namely, Pakistan and Hindustan ?
(9) Whether it is not better to provide for the growth of two
independent and separate nations, a Muslim nation inhabiting Pakistan and a Hindu nation
inhabiting Hindustan, than pursue the vain attempt to keep India as one undivided country
in the false hope that Hindus and Muslims will some day be one and occupy it as the
members of one nation and sons of one motherland ?
Nothing can come in the way of an Indian
getting to grips with these issues and reaching his own conclusions with the help of the
material contained in the foregoing pages except three things : (1)A false sentiment of
historical patriotism, (2) a false conception of the exclusive ownership of territory and
(3) absence of willingness to think for oneself. Of these obstacles, the last is the most
difficult to get over. Unfortunately thought in India is rare and free thought is rarer
still. This is particularly true of Hindus. That is why a large part of the argument of
this book has been addressed to them. The reasons for this are obvious. The Hindus are in
a majority. Being in a majority, their view point must count! There is not much
possibility of peaceful solution if no attempt is made to meet their objections rational
or sentimental. But there are special reasons which have led me to address so large a part
of the argument to them and which may not be quite so obvious to others. I feel that those
Hindus who are guiding the destinies of their fellows have lost what Carlyle calls "
the Seeing Eye " and are walking in the glamour of certain vain illusions, the
consequences of which must, I fear, be terrible for the Hindus. The Hindus are in the grip
of the Congress and the Congress is in the grip of Mr. Gandhi. It cannot be said that Mr.
Gandhi has given the Congress the right lead. Mr. Gandhi first sought to avoid facing the
issue by taking refuge in two things. He started by saying that to partition India is a
moral wrong and a sin to which he will never be a party. This is a strange argument. India
is not the only country faced with the issue of partition or shifting of frontiers based
on natural and historical factors to those based on the national factors. Poland has been
partitioned three times and no one can be sure that there will be no more partition of
Poland. There are very few countries in Europe which have not undergone partition during
the last 150 years. This shows that the partition of a country is neither moral nor
immoral. It is unmoral. It is a social, political or military question. Sin has no place
in it.
As a second refuge Mr. Gandhi started by
protesting that the Muslim League did not represent the Muslims and that Pakistan was only
a fancy of Mr. Jinnah. It is difficult to understand how Mr. Gandhi could be so blind as
not to see how Mr. Jinnah's influence over the Muslim masses has been growing day by day
and how he has engaged himself in mobilizing all his forces for battle. Never before was
Mr. Jinnah a man for the masses. He distrusted them. 19[f.19] To exclude
them from political power he was always for a high franchise. Mr. Jinnah was never known
to be a very devout, pious or a professing Muslim. Besides kissing the Holy Koran as and
when he was sworn in as an M.L.A., he does not appear to have bothered much about its
contents or its special tenets. It is doubtful if he frequented any mosque either out of
curiosity or religious fervour. Mr. Jinnah was never found in the midst of Muslim mass
congregations, religious or political.
Today
one finds a complete change in Mr. Jinnah. He has become a man of the masses. He is no
longer above them. He is among them. Now they have raised him above themselves and call
him their Qaid-e-Azam. He has not only become a believer in Islam, but is prepared to die
for Islam. Today, he knows more of Islam than mere Kalama.
Today, he goes to the mosque to hear Khutba
and takes delight in joining the Id
congregational prayers. Dongri and Null Bazaar once knew Mr. Jinnah by name. Today they
know him by his presence. No Muslim meeting in Bombay begins or ends without
Allah-ho-Akbar and Long Live Qaid-e-Azam. In this Mr. Jinnah has merely followed King
Henry IV of France—the unhappy father-in-law of the English King Charles I. Henry IV
was a Huguenot by faith. But he did not hesitate to attend mass in a Catholic Church in
Paris. He believed that to change his Huguenot faith and go to mass was an easy price to
pay for the powerful support of Paris. As Paris became worth a mass to Henry IV, so have
Dongri and Null Bazaar become worth a mass to Mr. Jinnah and for similar reason. It is
strategy ; it is mobilization. But even if it is viewed as the sinking of Mr. Jinnah from
reason to superstition, he is sinking with his ideology which by his very sinking is
spreading into all the different strata of Muslim society and is becoming part and parcel
of its mental make-up. This is as clear as anything could be. The only basis for Mr.
Gandhi's extraordinary view is the existence of what are called Nationalist Musalmans. It
is difficult to see any real difference between the communal Muslims who form the Muslim
League and the Nationalist Muslims. It is extremely doubtful whether the Nationalist
Musalmans have any real community of sentiment, aim and policy with the Congress which
marks them off from the Muslim League. Indeed many Congressmen are alleged to hold the
view that there is no different between the two and that the Nationalist Muslim inside the
Congress are only an outpost of the communal Muslims. This view does not seem to be quite
devoid of truth when one recalls that the late Dr. Ansari, the leader of the Nationalist
Musalmans, refused to oppose the Communal Award although it gave the Muslims separate
electorates in teeth of the resolution passed by the Congress and the Nationalist
Musalmans. Nay, so great has been the increase in the influence of the League among the
Musalmans that many Musalmans who were opposed to the League have been compelled to seek
for a place in the League or make peace with it. Anyone who takes account of the turns and
twists of the late Sir Sikandar Hyat Khan and Mr. Faziul Huq, the late Premier of Bengal,
must admit the truth of this fact. Both Sir Sikandar and Mr. Fazlul Huq were opposed to
the formation of branches of the Muslim League in their Provinces when Mr. Jinnah tried to
revive it in 1937. Notwithstanding their opposition, when the branches of the League were
formed in the Punjab and in Bengal within one year both were compelled to join them. It is
a case of those coming to scoff remaining to pray. No more cogent proof seems to be
necessary to prove the victory of the League.
Notwithstanding this Mr. Gandhi instead of
negotiating with Mr. Jinnah and the Muslim League with a view to a settlement, took a
different turn. He got the Congress to pass the famous Quit India Resolution on the 8th
August 1942. This Quit India Resolution was primarily a challenge to the British
Government. But it was also an attempt to do away with the intervention of the British
Government in the discussion of the Minority question and thereby securing for the
Congress a free hand to settle it on its own terms and according to its own lights. It was
in effect, if not in intention, an attempt to win independence by bypassing the Muslims
and the other minorities. The Quit India Campaign turned out to be a complete failure.
It
was a mad venture and took the most diabolical form. It was a scorch-earth campaign in
which the victims of looting, arson and murder were Indians and the perpetrators were
Congressmen. Beaten, he started a fast for twenty-one days in March 1943 while he was in
gaol with the object of getting out of it. He failed. Thereafter he fell ill. As he was
reported to be sinking the British Government released him for fear that he might die on
their hand and bring them ignominy. On coming out of gaol, he found that he and the
Congress had not only missed the bus but had also lost the road. To retrieve the position
and win for the Congress the respect of the British Government as a premier party in the
country which it had lost by reason of the failure of the campaign that followed up the
Quit India Resolution, and the violence which accompanied it, he started negotiating with
the Viceroy. Thwarted in that attempt, Mr. Gandhi turned to Mr. Jinnah. On the 17th July
1944 Mr. Gandhi wrote to Mr. Jinnah expressing his desire to meet him and discuss with him
the communal question. Mr. Jinnah agreed to receive Mr. Gandhi in his house in Bombay.
They met on the 9th September 1944. It was good that at long last wisdom dawned on Mr.
Gandhi and he agreed to see the light which was staring him in the face and which he had
so far refused to see.
The basis of their talks was the offer made by
Mr. Rajagopalachariar to Mr. Jinnah in April 1944 which, according to the somewhat
incredible 20[f.20] story told by
Mr. Rajagopalachariar, was discussed by him with Mr. Gandhi in March 1943 when he (Mr.
Gandhi) was fasting in gaol and to which Mr. Gandhi had given his full approval. The
following is the text of Mr. Rajagopalachariar's formula popularly spoken of as the C. R.
Formula:—
(1) Subject
to the terms set out below as regards the constitution for Free India, the Muslim League
endorses the Indian demand for Independence and will co-operate with the Congress in the
formation of a provisional interim government for the transitional period.
(2) After
the termination of the war, a commission shall be appointed for demarcating contiguous
districts in the north-west and east of India, wherein the Muslim population is in
absolute majority. In the areas thus demarcated, a plebiscite of all the inhabitants held
on the basis of adult suffrage or other practicable franchise shall ultimately decide the
issue of separation from Hindustan. If the majority decide in favour of forming a
sovereign State separate from Hindustan, such decision shall be given effect to, without
prejudice to the right of districts on the border to choose to join either State.
(3) It
will be open to all parties to advocate their points of view before the plebiscite is
held.
(4) In the
event of separation, mutual agreements shall be entered into for safeguarding defence, and
commerce and communications and for other essential purposes.
(5) Any
transfer of population shall only be on an absolutely voluntary basis.
(6) These
terms shall be binding only in case of transfer by Britain of full power and
responsibility for the governance of India.
The talks which began on the 9th September were
carried on over a period of 18 days till 27th September when it was announced that the
talks had failed. The failure of the talks produced different reactions in the minds of
different people. Some were glad, others were sorry. But as both had been, just previous
to the talks, worsted by their opponents in their struggle for supremacy, Gandhi by the
British and Jinnah by the Unionist Party in the Punjab, and had lost a good deal of their
credit the majority of people expected that they would put forth some constructive effort
to bring about a solution. The failure may have been due to the defects of personalities.
But it must however be said that failure was inevitable having regard to certain
fundamental faults in the C. R. Formula. In the first place, it tied up the communal
question with the political question in an indissoluble knot. No political settlement, no
communal settlement, is the strategy on which the formula proceeds. The formula did not
offer a solution. It invited Mr. Jinnah to enter into a deal. It was a bargain—"
If you help us in getting independence, we shall be glad to consider your proposal for
Pakistan. " I don't know from where Mr. Rajagopalachariar got the idea that this was
the best means of getting independence. It is possible that he borrowed it from the old
Hindu kings of India who built up alliance for protecting their independence against
foreign enemies by giving their daughters to neighbouring princes. Mr. Rajagopalachariar
forgot that such alliances brought neither a good husband nor a permanent ally. To make
communal settlement depend upon help rendered in winning freedom is a very unwise way of
proceeding in a matter of this kind. It is a way of one party drawing another party into
its net by offering communal privileges as a bait. The C. R. Formula made communal
settlement an article for sale.
The second fault in the C. R. Formula relates
to the machinery for giving effect to any agreement that may be arrived at. The agency
suggested in the C. R. Formula is the Provisional Government. In suggesting this Mr.
Rajagopalachariar obviously overlooked two difficulties. The first thing he overlooked is
that once the Provisional Government was established, the promises of the contracting
parties, to use legal phraseology, did not remain concurrent promises. The case became one
of the executed promise against an executory promise. By consenting to the establishment
of a Provisional Government, the League would have executed
its promise to help the Congress to win independence. But the promise of the Congress to
bring about Pakistan would remain executory. Mr. Jinnah who insists, and quite rightly,
that the promises should be concurrent could never be expected to agree to place himself
in such a position. The second difficulty which Mr. Rajagopalachariar has overlooked is
what would happen if the Provisional Government failed to give effect to the Congress part
of the agreement. Who is to enforce it ? The Provisional Government is to be a sovereign
government, not subject to superior authority. If it was unwilling to give effect to the
agreement, the only sanction open to the Muslims would be rebellion. To make the
Provisional Government the agency for forging a new Constitution, for bringing about
Pakistan, nobody will accept. It is a snare and not a solution.
The
only way of bringing about the constitutional changes will be through an Act of Parliament
embodying provisions agreed upon by the important elements in the national life of British
India. There is no other way.
There is a third fault in the C. R. Formula. It
relates to the provision for a treaty between Pakistan and Hindustan to safeguard what are
called matters of common interests such as Defence, Foreign Affairs, Customs, etc. Here
again Mr. Rajagopalachariar does not seem to be aware of obvious difficulties. How are
matters of common interest to be safeguarded? I see only two ways. One is to have a
Central Government vested with Executive and Legislative authority in respect of these
matters. This means Pakistan and Hindustan will not be sovereign States. Will Mr. Jinnah
agree to this ? Obviously he does not. The other way is to make Pakistan and Hindustan
sovereign States and to bind them by a treaty relating to matters of common interests. But
what is there to ensure that the terms of the treaty will be observed ? As a sovereign
State Pakistan can always repudiate it even if it was a Dominion. Mr. Rajagopalachariar
obviously drew his inspiration in drafting this clause from the Anglo-Irish Treaty of
1922. But he forgot the fact that the treaty lasted so long as Ireland was not a Dominion
and that as soon as it became a Dominion it repudiated the treaty and the British
Parliament stood silent and grinned, for it knew that it could do nothing.
One does not mind very much that the talks
failed. What one feels sorry for is that the talks failed giving us a clear idea of some
of the questions about which Mr. Jinnah has been observing discreet silence in his public
utterances, though he has been quite outspoken about them in his private talks. These
questions are— (1) Is Pakistan to be conceded because of the Resolution of the Muslim
League ? (2) Are the Muslims, as distinguished from the Muslim League, to have no say in
the matter ? (3) What will be the boundaries of Pakistan ? Whether the boundaries will be
the present administrative boundaries of the Punjab and Bengal or whether the boundaries
of Pakistan will be ethnological boundaries ? (4) What do the words " subject to such
territorial adjustments as may be necessary " which occur in the Lahore Resolution
mean ? What were the territorial adjustments the League had in mind ? (5) What does the
word " finally " which occurs in the last part of the Lahore Resolution mean ?
Did the League contemplate a transition period in which Pakistan will not be an
independent and sovereign State ? (6) If Mr. Jinnah's proposal that the boundaries of
Eastern and Western Pakistan are to be the present administrative boundaries, will he
allow the Scheduled Castes, or, if I may say so, the non-Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal
to determine by a plebiscite whether they wish to be included in Mr. Jinnah's Pakistan and
whether Mr. Jinnah would be prepared to abide by the results of the plebiscite of the
non-Muslim elements in the Punjab and Bengal ?
(7)
Does Mr. Jinnah want a corridor running through U. P. and Bihar to connect up Eastern
Pakistan to Western Pakistan ? It would have been a great gain if straight questions had
been put to Mr. Jinnah and unequivocal answers obtained. But instead of coming to grips
with Mr. Jinnah on these questions, Mr. Gandhi spent his whole time proving that the C. R.
Formula is substantially the same as the League's Lahore Resolution—which was
ingenious if not nonsensical and thereby lost the best opportunity he had of having these
questions clarified.
After these talks Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah
have retired to their pavilions as players in a cricket match do after their game is over,
as though there is nothing further to be done. There is no indication whether they will
meet again and if so when. What next ? is not a question which seems to worry them. Yet it
is difficult to see how India can make any political advance without a solution of the
question which one may refuse to discuss. It does not belong to that class of questions
about which people can agree to differ. It is a question for which solution will have to
be found. How ? It must be by agreement or by arbitration. If it is to be by agreement, it
must be the result of negotiations—of give and take and not of surrender by one side
to the other. That is not agreement. It is dictation. Good sense may in the end prevail
and parties may come to an agreement. But agreement may turn out to be a very dilatory
way. It may take long before good sense prevails. How long one cannot say. The political
freedom of India is a most urgent necessity. It cannot be postponed and yet without a
solution of the communal problem it cannot be hastened. To make it dependent on agreement
is to postpone its solution indefinitely. Another expeditious method must be found. It
seems to me that arbitration by an International Board is the best way out. The disputed
points in the minorities problem including that of Pakistan should be remitted to such a
Board. The Board should be constituted of persons drawn from countries outside the British
Empire. Each statutory minority in India—Muslims, Scheduled Castes, Sikhs, Indian
Christians—should be asked to select its nominee to this Board of Arbitration. These
minorities as also the Hindus should appear before the Board in support of their demands
and should agree to abide by the decision given by the Board. The British should give the
following undertakings :—
(1) That they will have nothing to do with the communal
settlement. It will be left to agreement or to a Board of Arbitration.
(2) They will implement the decision of the Board of Arbitration
on the communal question by embodying it in the Government of India Act.
(3) That the award of the International Board of Arbitration
would be regarded by them as a sufficient discharge of their obligations to the minorities
in India and would agree to give India Dominion Status.
The procedure has many advantages. It
eliminates the fear of British interference in the communal settlement which has been
offered by the Congress as an excuse for its not being able to settle the communal
problem. It is alleged that, as there is always the possibility of the minorities getting
from the British something more than what the Congress thinks it proper to give, the
minorities do not wish to come to terms with the Congress. The proposal has a second
advantage. It removes the objection of the Congress that by making the constitution
subject to the consent of the minorities, the British Government has placed a veto in the
hands, of the minorities over the constitutional progress of India. It is complained that
the minorities can unreasonably withhold their consent or they can be prevailed upon by
the British Government to withhold their consent as the minorities are suspected by the
Congress to be mere tools in the hands of the British Government. International
arbitration removes completely every ground of complaint on this account. There should be
no objection on the part of the minorities. If their demands are fair and just no minority
need have any fear from a Board of International Arbitration. There is nothing unfair in
the requirement of a submission to arbitration. It follows the well known rule of law,
namely, that no man should be allowed to be a judge in his own case. There is no reason to
make any exception in the case of a minority. Like an individual it cannot claim to sit in
judgement over its own case. What about the British Government ? I cannot see any reason
why the British Government should object to any part of this scheme. The Communal Award
has brought great odium on the British. It has been a thankless task and the British
should be glad to be relieved of it. On the question of the discharge of their
responsibilities for making adequate provision for the safety and security of certain
communities in respect of which they have regarded themselves as trustees before they
relinquish their sovereignty what more can such communities ask than the implantation in
the constitution of safeguards in terms of the award of an International Board of
Arbitration ? There is only one contingency which may appear to create some difficulty for
the British Government in the matter of enforcing the award of the Board of Arbitration.
Such a contingency can arise if any one of the parties to the dispute is not prepared to
submit its case to arbitration.
In
that case the question will be: will the British Government be justified in enforcing the
award against such a party ? I see no difficulty in saying that the British Government can
with perfect justice proceed to enforce the award against such a party. After all what is
the status of a party which refuses to submit its case to arbitration ? The answer is that
such a party is an aggressor. How is an aggressor dealt with ? By subjecting him to
sanctions. Implementing the award of the Board of Arbitration in a constitution against a
party which refuses to go to arbitration is simply another name for the process of
applying sanctions against an aggressor. The British Government need not feel embarrassed
in following this process if the contingency should arise. For it is a well recognized
process of dealing with such cases and has the imprimatur of the League of Nations which
evolved this formula when Mussolini refused to submit to arbitration his dispute with
Abyssinia. What I have proposed may not be the answer to the question : What next ? I
don't know what else can be. All I know is that there will be no freedom for India without
an answer. It must be decisive, it must be prompt and it must be satisfactory to the
parties concerned.
[f.1]Canada—Chapter
1.
[f2]The Political Future
of South Africa, 1927.
[f3]The South African
Commonwealth, p. 365.
[f.4]On this point, see Report of the Inquiry Committee appointed
by the All-India Muslim League to inquire into Muslim grievances in Congress Provinces
popularly known as Pirpur Report. Also Report of the Bihar Provincial Muslim League to
inquire into some grievances of Muslims in Bihar and the Press Note issued by the
Information Officer, Government of Bihar, replying to some of the allegations contained in
these reports published in Amrita Bazar Patrika
of 13-3-39.
[f.5]Canada Year Book,
1936.
[f6]South Africa Year
Book. 1941.
[f.7]Statesman's Year Book,
1941.
[f.8]That is for the Province of Quebec.
[f.9]Italics not in the original.
[f.10]Quoted by Sir James O'Connor—-History of Ireland, Vol. II, p. 257.
[f.11]History of Ireland, vol. II
[f.12]Italics are mine.
[f.13]Eastern Times (Lahore) of 17th November 1942.
[f.14]Hansard (House of Commons), 1920, Vol. 129, p. 1315. Italics
are mine.
[f.15]Those who want more information on the question of transfer
of population may consult with great advantage The
Exchange of Minorities, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey by Stephen P. Ladas (Mac), 1932,
where the scheme for the transfer of population between Greece and Bulgaria and Greece and
Turkey has been fully set out.
[f16]The text of the resolution is as follows :—
"
The A. I. C. C. is of opinion that any proposal to disintegrate India by giving liberty to
any component Slate or territorial unit to secede from the Indian Union or Federation will
be highly detrimental to the best interests of the people of the States and Provinces and
the country as a whole and the Congress, therefore, cannot agree to any such
proposal."
[f.17]On this point see Life
of Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson by Major General Sir C. E.Callwell, Vol. 1., Chapter
IX ; also Parliamentary Debates (House of Lords), 1914, Vol. 15, pp. 998-1017, on Ulster
and the Army. This shows that the Army had been won over by the Ulsterites long before the
Curragh Incident. It is possible that Mr. Asquith decided in 1913 to bring in an Amending
Bill to exclude Ulster from Home Rule for six years because he had become aware that the
Army had gone over to Ulster and that it could not be used for enforcing Home Rule.
[f.18]See Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 1938-39, Vol. 341, pp.
1987-2107 ; also (Lords) 1936-37, Vol. 106, pp. 599-674.
[f.19]Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru in his autobiography says that Mr.
Jinnah wanted the Congress to restrict its membership to matriculates
[f.20]The formula was discussed with Mr. Gandhi in March 1943 but
was not communicated to Mr. Jinnah till April 1944.